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Zusammenfassung
Die stetig sinkenden Kosten für molekulares Profiling haben der Biomedizin zahlreiche
neue Arten biomedizinischer Daten geliefert und den Durchbruch für eine präzisere und
personalisierte Medizin ermöglicht. Die Veröffentlichung dieser inhärent hochsensiblen
und miteinander verbundenen Daten stellt jedoch eine neue Bedrohung für unsere
Privatsphäre dar. Während die IT-Sicherheitsforschung sich bisher hauptsächlich auf
die Auswirkung genetischer Daten auf die Privatsphäre konzentriert hat, wurden die
vielfältigen Risiken durch andere Arten biomedizinischer Daten – epigenetischer Daten
im Speziellen – größtenteils außer Acht gelassen.
Diese Dissertation stellt Verfahren zur Messung und Abwehr solcher Privatsphäre-
risiken vor. Neben dem Genom konzentrieren wir uns auf zwei der wichtigsten gesund-
heitsrelevanten epigenetischen Elemente: microRNAs und DNA-Methylierung. Wir
quantifizieren die Privatsphäre für die folgenden realistischen Angriffe: (1) Verknüpfung
von Profilen über die Zeit, Verknüpfung verschiedener Datentypen und verwandter
Personen, (2) Feststellung der Studienteilnahme und (3) Inferenz von Attributen. Un-
sere Resultate bekräftigen, dass die Privatsphärerisiken solcher Daten ernst genommen
werden müssen. Zudem präsentieren und evaluieren wir Lösungen zum Schutz der
Privatsphäre. Sie reichen von der Anwendung von Differential Privacy unter Berücksich-
tigung des Nutzwertes bis zu kryptographischen Protokollen zur sicheren Auswertung
eines Random Forests.
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Abstract
The decreasing costs of molecular profiling have fueled the biomedical research
community with a plethora of new types of biomedical data, allowing for a breakthrough
towards a more precise and personalized medicine. However, the release of these
intrinsically highly sensitive, interdependent data poses a new severe privacy threat. So
far, the security community has mostly focused on privacy risks arising from genomic
data. However, the manifold privacy risks stemming from other types of biomedical
data – and epigenetic data in particular – have been largely overlooked.
In this thesis, we provide means to quantify and protect the privacy of individuals’
biomedical data. Besides the genome, we specifically focus on two of the most important
epigenetic elements influencing human health: microRNAs and DNA methylation. We
quantify the privacy for multiple realistic attack scenarios, namely, (1) linkability attacks
along the temporal dimension, between different types of data, and between related
individuals, (2) membership attacks, and (3) inference attacks. Our results underline
that the privacy risks inherent to biomedical data have to be taken seriously. Moreover,
we present and evaluate solutions to preserve the privacy of individuals. Our mitigation
techniques stretch from the differentially private release of epigenetic data, considering
its utility, up to cryptographic constructions to securely, and privately evaluate a random
forest on a patient’s data.
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1
Introduction
1

Since the first whole-genome sequencing in 2001, the cost of molecular profiling
has been plummeting, paving the way for significant progress in biomedical science
and the rise of precision medicine [101]. This scientific breakthrough is triggered by
the increasing availability of biomedical data, whose main negative counterpart is the
new threat towards health privacy. The genome is especially privacy sensitive as it
uniquely identifies someone, is very stable over our entire lifetime, and is correlated
among relatives [61]. This may explain why the security community has been, so far,
focusing primarily on enhancing the privacy of genomic data. The extent of this threat
and mechanisms to mitigate it have been extensively studied regarding genomic data.
The various attack vectors and protection techniques have already been well surveyed
and categorized back in 2014 [35].
However, our genome is not the only element of the human body that is heavily
relied upon by the biomedical community. Environmental factors (e.g., pollution, diet,
lifestyle, etc.) often play a crucial role in the development of most common diseases.
Epigenetics (or epigenomics), transcriptomics, and proteomics aim to bridge the gap
between our genome and our health status. Multi-omics research is a complementary
step to genome sequencing: the DNA sequence tells us what the cell could possibly do,
while the epigenome and transcriptome tell what it is actually doing at a given point in
time. Using a computer analogy, if the genome is the hardware, then the epigenome is
the software [20].
Despite the growing importance of epigenetics in the biomedical community, privacy
concerns stemming from epigenetic data have received little to no attention so far. One
reason that might explain this fact is that – contrary to the genome – epigenetic data
may vary significantly over time, mainly due to the environmental influences. However,
with the increasing understanding of epigenetics, it becomes clear that epigenetic
data contains a vast amount of additional sensitive information and can thus raise
potential privacy risks. For example, a large number of severe diseases (such as cancers,
diabetes, or Alzheimer’s [127, 70, 102, 37]) are already identified to be affected by
epigenetic changes, and a recent study found that epigenetic alterations could even affect
sexual orientation [93]. Moreover, biomedical data other than genetic data might not be
considered as genetic information in the legal meaning and thus not be protected by legal
frameworks, such as the US Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) [105,
33].
The privacy concerns are further exacerbated by the fact that different kinds of
biomedical data are increasingly available through multiple public databases or third-
party providers. More specifically, many epigenetic datasets are released (without
identifiers) on open online platforms with nonrestricted access. In the light of a
multibillion-dollar business selling private medical data, and brokers linking patients’
pseudonymised data across multiple sources [129, 89, 117], it becomes unquestionable
that we are in need of both quantitative assessments of the inherent privacy risks and
proper mitigations to counter these risks. Specifically, it is essential to provide the means
for a quantitative assessment of the privacy risks induced by sharing or leaking medical
data. Potential privacy risks include linkage, identification and inference attacks against
the patients’ data, carried out by a multitude of possible adversaries. Furthermore,
besides identifying and quantifying these risks, mitigation measures have to be designed.
3
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
On the one hand, it is crucial to adjust those measures with the close collaboration of
biomedical experts to fit their application scenarios and needs. On the other hand, the
mitigation measures have to provide a sufficient amount of privacy, giving the patient
control over her data. Hence, a major challenge while designing those measures is to
strike a balance between privacy risks, the utility of the resulting data, and ease of use.
Not respecting any combination of these will result in the mitigation measure not being
adopted for real use, or in the worst case even causing harm to a patient by providing
inaccurate statements in return for a higher privacy.
In this thesis, we will outline both qualitative assessments and mitigation measures
specifically designed to fit real-life use-cases. Besides the genome, we focus on two of the
most important epigenetic elements influencing human health: microRNAs and DNA
methylation.
MicroRNAs (abbreviated miRNAs) were discovered in the early 1990s. MiRNAs
are small RNA molecules that regulate the majority of human genes. Studies of
miRNA expression profiles have shown that dysregulation of miRNA is linked to
neurodegenerative diseases, heart diseases, diabetes, and the majority of cancers [84,
127, 70, 102, 37].1 Therefore, miRNA expression profiling is a very promising technique
that could enable more accurate, earlier and minimally invasive diagnosis of major severe
diseases. As a consequence, it will certainly be increasingly used in medical practice.
DNA methylation is one of the best understood epigenetic elements. It is an essential
regulator of gene transcription. As a consequence, aberrant DNA methylation patterns
(such as hypermethylation and hypomethylation) have been associated with a large
number of cancer types [36, 23, 124].
The solutions we present in the next chapters can be classified into the following
three areas: (1) assessing the privacy risks for biomedical data, (2) provide mitigation
measures by perturbing the data, and (3) provide mitigation measures by relying on
cryptographic constructions. While the second research direction is more relevant for
the release of public medical datasets and statistics, the third research direction allows
for secure storage and analysis of medical data without losing utility.
Our work on privacy risks in biomedical data stretches across the following peer-
reviewed publications [P1, P2, P3, P4], which each contributed to the progress in
understanding and mitigating privacy risks in epigenetic data specifically, as presented
in this dissertation:
Linkability of miRNA Expression Profiles. Our work [P1] is one of the first to study the
privacy risks of epigenetic data and the first to study linkability attacks on microRNA
expression profiles in particular. We analyze the temporal linkability of personal miRNA
expression profiles by presenting and thoroughly evaluating two different types of attacks.
Namely, we present an identification attack, which pinpoints a specific miRNA expression
profile in a database of multiple expression profiles by knowing the targeted profile at
another point in time, and we present a matching attack, which tracks a set of miRNA
expression profiles over time. In our experiments, we show that two blood-based miRNA
expression profiles taken with a time difference of one week from the same person can
1Known relations between miRNA and human pathologies can be found at http://www.cuilab.
cn/hmdd.
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be matched with a success rate of 90%. We furthermore observe that this success rate
stays almost constant when the time difference is increased from one week to one year.
In order to mitigate the linkability threat, we propose and evaluate two mitigation
measures, which aim at perturbing the dataset: (1) hiding a subset of the miRNA
expressions, e.g., those that are irrelevant for a given medical use-case and (2) disclosing
noisy miRNA expression profiles in a differentially private and distributed manner. Our
experiments show that the second technique provides a better trade-off between privacy
and disease-prediction accuracy. By applying our differentially private mechanism, it is
possible to decrease linkability by at least 50% for almost no loss of accuracy (< 1%).
Membership Privacy for miRNA Expression Profiles. In our next work [P2], we
investigate the threat of membership attacks on the privacy of individuals contributing
their epigenetic profiles to scientific studies. Our results on public microRNA expression
data demonstrate that disease-specific datasets are especially prone to membership
detection, offering a true-positive rate of up to 77% at a false-negative rate of less than
1%. We present two attacks: (1) one relying on the L1 distance, and (2) the other based
on the likelihood-ratio test. We show that the likelihood-ratio test provides the highest
adversarial success and we derive a theoretical limit on this success. In order to mitigate
the membership inference, we propose and evaluate two perturbation mechanisms: a
differentially private mechanism and a hiding mechanism. We also consider two types
of prior knowledge for the differentially private mechanism and show that, for relatively
large datasets, this mechanism can protect the privacy of participants in miRNA-based
studies against strong adversaries without degrading the data utility too much. Based
on our findings and given the current number of miRNAs, we recommend releasing
summary statistics only for datasets containing at least a couple of hundred individuals.
Genotype Inference from DNA Methylation Profiles. While our previous work
focuses on a single type of biomedical data, the next work [P3] investigates the depen-
dencies between two different types of data. Specifically, we show that releasing one’s
DNA methylation data causes privacy issues akin to releasing one’s actual genome. We
show that already a small subset of methylation regions influenced by genomic variants
is sufficient to infer parts of someone’s genome and to map this DNA methylation
profile to the corresponding genome. Notably, we show that such re-identification is
possible with 97.5% accuracy, relying on a dataset of more than 2500 genomes and that
we can reject all wrongly matched genomes using an appropriate statistical test. We
provide means for countering this threat by proposing a novel cryptographic scheme
for privately classifying tumors that enables a privacy-respecting medical diagnosis in
a typical clinical setting. The scheme relies on a combination of random forests and
homomorphic encryption and is proven secure in the honest-but-curious model. We
evaluate this scheme on real DNA methylation data and show that we can keep the
computational overhead at acceptable values for our application scenario.
Privacy Risks of Interdependent Biomedical Data. In the work constituting the last
part of this thesis [P4], we make a first step towards a more holistic view by proposing
a generic framework for quantifying the privacy risks in biomedical data on a large
5
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
scale. Specifically, we propose a Bayesian network model that encompasses genomic and
epigenomic data (DNA methylation in particular) from mothers and their children, at
different points in time. We also introduce a generic algorithm for learning the structure
of a Bayesian network by combining data with external expert knowledge. Then, we
carry out a thorough evaluation, quantifying privacy risks in our interdependent model
with well-established privacy metrics such as estimation error and entropy. The strong
performance of our various inference tasks confirms that the privacy risks induced by
interdependent biomedical data have to be taken very seriously. Besides the effective
inference, we further demonstrate that our Bayesian network model can also serve as a
fundamental building block to quantify the privacy in light of other attacks. To this
end, we study the adversary’s success in linking DNA methylation profiles of mothers
to their children’s, corroborating our privacy concerns with a success rate of 95%.
1.1 Structure
The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, we provide
the necessary biomedical background. We present the related work in Chapter 3. In
Chapter 4 we then analyze the temporal linkability of miRNA expression profiles and
present mitigations thereof. We investigate the threats against membership privacy
and proper mitigations in Chapter 5. Next, we discuss the privacy threats implied
by combining genome and DNA methylation data in Chapter 6 and we also present
a cryptographic protocol to securely evaluate random forests on biomedical data. In
Chapter 7, we also consider other background knowledge of an adversary, such as familial
relationships, and take the first step towards a holistic framework analyzing privacy
risks of interdependent biomedical data. We conclude this dissertation in Chapter 8.
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2.1. GENOMICS
(a)
= Adenine
= Thymine
= Cytosine
= Guanine
(b)
Figure 2.1: (a) A set of chromosomes of a human male. (b) The structure of the DNA
double-helix.
In this section, we briefly introduce the relevant genetic principles and provide more
background on microRNAs and DNA methylation.
2.1 Genomics
In each human cell, the DNA molecule containing the hereditary information is packaged
into 23 pairs of chromosomes. Each pair consists of one chromosome inherited from
the father and one inherited from the mother. One pair of chromosomes controls the
inheritance of the sex: in males, the two sex chromosomes are different (X, Y ), whereas,
in females, the two sex chromosomes are the same (X, X). Figure 2.1(a) depicts a set
of chromosomes of a human male.
Chromosomes are further organized into segments of DNA, which are called genes.
A gene is the basic physical unit of heredity.
The DNA is a double-helix structure consisting of complementary polymer chains.
Genetic information is encoded on each of these chains as a sequence of nucleotides:
Adenine, Thymine, Cytosine, and Guanine (A, T,G,C). Each nucleotide on one strand
of the DNA has a corresponding nucleotide on the opposite strand of the DNA. An A
nucleotide on one strand is always paired with a T nucleotide on the opposite strand.
Similarly, a G nucleotide is always paired with a C nucleotide. Figure 2.1(b) exemplarily
shows a DNA double-helix structure.
Since 99.5% of the human DNA of two different individuals is identical [79], the
interesting parts are the remaining 0.5% of the positions. These positions that may
vary throughout a population are referred to as single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNP).
Figure 2.2 depicts genes of two different individuals varying in one SNP.
In order to refer to a specific position on the genome, usually a tuple of the
chromosome, the position on the chromosome, and the strand is given. The two strands
of the genome are called forward strand, abbreviated by +, and backward strand,
9
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Figure 2.2: A single nucleotide polymorphism.
abbreviated by −, as also shown in Figure 2.2. If no strand is specified, the forward
strand is assumed.
Generally, two possible nucleotides can be observed at a given SNP (with respect to
the forward strand). One is called the major allele and is the most frequently occurring
nucleotide at this SNP in the population. The other nucleotide is called the minor allele
and is the least frequently occurring nucleotide. We usually denote the major allele
using an uppercase letter B ∈ {A, T,G,C} and the minor allele using a lowercase letter
b ∈ {a, t, g, c}, with b 6= B.
Furthermore, since there are always pairs of chromosomes, each SNP position has
two alleles, one inherited from the father and one inherited from the mother. Thus, a
SNP (also called genotype) can take three different values:
BB: if an individual inherits the same major allele from both parents (homozygous-
major genotype),
Bb: if an individual inherits different alleles from the parents (heterozygous genotype),
bb: if an individual inherits the same minor allele from both parents (homozygous-
minor genotype).
For simplicity, BB is often encoded as 0, Bb as 1 and bb as 2. We will follow the same
encoding for the rest of this thesis (specifically in Chapter 6 and 7).
The prior probability of the minor allele is also called minor allele frequency (MAF)
and can be retrieved from population statistics databases, such as dbSNP [111, 24], or
Kaviar [47].
Mendel’s First Law states that, for each SNP, a child inherits one allele from his
mother and one allele from his father. Each allele of a parent is passed on to the child
with uniform probability of 0.5.
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2.2 Epigenetics
The term epigenetics etymologically comes from the combination of epi, which means
“above”, “over” in Ancient Greek, and genetics, which means “origin”. This term broadly
refers to the study of cellular and phenotypic trait variations stemming from other
causes than changes in the genotype. These external factors are for example the in-utero
or childhood development, environmental chemicals, aging or diet. Epigenetics can also
refer to the changes themselves, such as DNA methylation and histone modification,
which determine how genes are expressed without modifying the genome.
2.3 miRNAs
MicroRNAs (miRNAs) are epigenetically regulated mechanisms discovered in the early
1990s. MiRNAs are small non-coding RNA molecules that regulate gene expression in
plants and animals. It has been shown that 60% of genes coding human proteins are
regulated by miRNAs [42]. Currently, there are more than 5,000 miRNAs known in
human beings [94], and this number will undoubtedly keep increasing [83]. Whereas a
miRNA is a RNA molecule containing around 22 nucleotides, miRNA expression is a
real-valued number quantified in a two-step polymerase chain reaction (PCR) process.
Different sets of miRNAs are expressed in different cell types and tissues. The miRNA
expression level (or value) of a specific miRNA captures how often this miRNA is
expressed in the given sample of cells and tissue. A miRNA expression profile represents
the set of miRNA expressions of an individual measured from a sample taken at one
point in time.
Biomedical research is notably interested in discovering how miRNA expression
affects physiological and pathological processes.1 Studies of miRNA expression profiling
have demonstrated that dysregulation of miRNA is linked to neurodegenerative diseases
(Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s), heart diseases, diabetes, and the majority of cancers [84,
127, 70, 102, 37]. MiRNA expression profiling is hence a very promising technique that
could enable more accurate, earlier and minimally invasive diagnosis of severe diseases.
Especially when taken from blood samples, miRNAs represent a non-invasive diagnosis
and have been shown to help identify severe diseases such as cancers or Alzheimer’s [72,
77]. A summary of the relation between miRNA and human pathologies can be found
in the Human miRNA Disease Database [60].
In Chapter 4 and 5, we will rely on datasets from miRNA-expression-based studies.
2.4 DNA Methylation
One of the most important epigenetic modifications in the DNA is the methylation. Its
consequences affect the structure and the activity of the DNA molecule [69, 108].
In humans, DNA methylation so far has only been observed as the addition of a
methyl group to the cytosines by specific enzymes called methyltransferases. This type
1Strictly speaking, miRNA is part of the epigenome while miRNA expression is considered more
as part of the transcriptome. In this thesis, we use the term epigenetics in its broader meaning, thus
including miRNA expression.
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Figure 2.3: Methyl groups attached to a human DNA.
of cytosine methylation in CpG-dinucleotides leads to the formation of 5-methylcytosine.
That means that methylation can only occur at positions in the DNA where a C
nucleotide is followed by a G nucleotide (called CpG-dinucleotide). Essentially, each
such position can only have two possible states regarding DNA methylation: it can be
methylated or not. Figure 2.3 shows a DNA segment with some CpG-dinucleotides
being methylated.
However, since DNA methylation in principle can vary between strands and copies
of the DNA, e.g., in different cells, DNA methylation at a given CpG-dinucleotide is
usually measured as a real value between 0 and 1. This value represents the fraction of
methylated dinucleotides at this position.
Anomalous changes in the DNA methylation patterns, which are frequently observed
in cancer, can lead to the hyper-activation of genes such as oncogenes, or the silencing
of tumor suppressor genes [36]. However, while changes in the DNA methylation can
have a dramatic effect on cancer, such changes in normal tissues can also be caused by,
e.g., environmental influences. Recent studies showed that environmental cues such as
pollution, exposure to stress or cigarette smoke can lead to changes in the methylation [9,
120, 27, 121].
Besides these external factors, the genotype of an individual can also affect the
methylation of some regions [116, 87, 43]. Carrying particular alleles at certain SNPs
can cause specific DNA methylation patterns at other positions or regions. Such SNPs
influencing the DNA methylation are also called methylation quantitative trait loci
(meQTLs). In Chapter 6 and 7, we rely on such meQTLs and their strong influence on
DNA methylation patterns.
DNA methylation mostly has a repressive effect on gene expression, i.e., which parts
of the genome are active in a given cell. Hence, DNA methylation at the promoter
of genes can silence specific genes during development, for example, to maintain the
pluripotent state of stem cells [110].
An apparent dependency occurs when a SNP affects a CpG dinucleotide. If the
polymorphism changes the cytosine (C) or the guanine (G), the CpG dinucleotide may
be removed, and no methylation can occur at this position.
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3.1. GENERAL OVERVIEW
Here, we present the previous work on privacy in genomics and epigenomics and
how it relates to our work. We start with a broad overview of privacy in genomics and
continue with a more detailed discussion of the topics relevant to our work.
3.1 General Overview
Since the plummeting costs of molecular profiling have caused a tremendous increase in
availability of biomedical data, a new research field has emerged, studying the privacy
threats induced by the vast amount of biomedical data. So far, most of the research has
focused on quantifying and mitigating the threats concerning genomic data in particular,
well summarized in recent surveys [35, 4, 91]. Recent advances also highlight the role
of direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetics, which further increases the chances of genomic
data to be made available in less regulated environments like the internet.
On the mitigation side, most effort has been put into designing cryptographically
provably secure protocols for many of the applications of genetic data. Some of the most
recent publications are exceptionally well suited for the DTC area as, for example, a
paper by Cristofaro et al. [25], which allows for a privacy-preserving genetic relatedness
test. In the same vein, Baldi et al. propose techniques for paternity tests, personalized
medicine, and genetic compatibility tests based on private set operations [8]. Another
recent topic in the field focuses on protocols for similar patient queries [126]. Finally,
Karvelas et al. present a novel mechanism for the private processing of whole genomic
sequences which is flexible and supports a wide range of queries [71].
Other countermeasures rely on differential privacy techniques. For instance, Johnson
et al. have presented a set of privacy-preserving data mining algorithms, facilitating
genome-wide association studies while guaranteeing differential privacy [68]. Fredrikson
et al. study so-called model inversion attacks, in which an adversary, given a machine
learning model and demographic information, predicts a patient’s genetic informa-
tion [40]. They demonstrate that, although differential privacy is able to prevent this
kind of attacks, it would simultaneously expose patients to an increased risk of mortality.
Thus, it is unacceptable to apply differential privacy in this case, which stands in con-
trast to our results in Chapter 4, thus proving that, in some cases, differentially-private
mitigations are a viable option.
3.2 Linkability and Inference
Recently, some researchers also started to explore new privacy issues stemming from
various other types of biomedical data. Similarly to our work on genotype inference
from DNA methylation profiles, Schadt et al. have shown that RNA expression data
could be used to accurately predict genotypes [107]. The authors present a Bayesian
framework that relies on the association existing between expression levels of thousands
of genes and genomic variations called expression quantitative trait loci (eQTLs). In
the same vein, Philibert et al. demonstrate how methylation array data can be used
to construct individually identifying genetic profiles (around 1,000 positions), and to
infer substance-use histories, such as alcohol or smoking [99]. They warn that such
a genotype inference could reveal personally identifying information, but they do not
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study further how genotypes could be matched to methylation profiles. They also do
not quantify with what success such an attack could be carried out, and under which
conditions. Besides also identifying CpGs correlated with genomic variants, Dyke et al.
propose high-level guidelines for methylation data disclosure that preserves privacy [33].
They notably mention the restriction of access to methylation data that are highly
correlated with the genotype. However, a concrete scenario to evaluate the extent of
the threat as well as the protection provided by their countermeasure is missing.
Franzosa et al. study whether individuals possess microbial patterns that could
be used to uniquely identify them [39]. Their results demonstrate that more than
80% of individuals can still be uniquely identified among a population of hundreds of
individuals, up to one year later in the case of the gut microbiome. Fierer et al. had
already provided some evidence on the feasibility of linking skin bacterial communities
back in 2010, but with very few individuals [38].
Gymrek et al. show that genotypes can be re-identified by querying genetic genealogy
databases (containing surnames) with short tandem repeats on the Y chromosome [53].
By combining the inferred surnames with other types of metadata, such as age and state,
they are able to trace back with high success the identities of multiple contributors in
public databases. Humbert et al. show that single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs),
which are more commonly available online, can also be exploited to infer various
phenotypic traits, such as eye color or blood type, in order to further re-identify
anonymous genotypes, by typically using side channels such as online social networks [64].
Both of these works illustrate that, once the genotype corresponding to an epigenetic
profile, such as a DNA methylation profile, has been identified, it becomes relatively
straightforward to recover the real identity of the owner of this methylation profile.
Lastly, there are several papers explicitly relying on graphical models to perform
inference and quantify genomic privacy. Humbert et al. analyze the implications of
familial relations on kin genomic privacy [61, 63]. Leveraging Bayesian networks and
factor graphs, they model the familial dependencies and infer the genomes of the relatives
of an individual whose genome or phenotype is observed by an adversary. Similar to our
approach in Chapter 7, Humbert et al. make assumptions on the independence of the
SNPs for their Bayesian network model to be separated into smaller disjoint networks.
In contrast to this, Backes et al. use Bayesian networks at scale to model the familial
relations of several generations [S3]. Based on a large network, they predict the genomic
privacy for future generations, simulating various scenarios about how many people
of each generation will share their genetic data publicly. Our approach in Chapter 7
differs from the works mentioned above by the various types of biomedical data and
the temporal dependencies between them that we take into account. Conceptually, we
also propose a method for learning the structure and the parameters of the Bayesian
networks, which were already given by expert knowledge in previous works. We also
instantiate our inference framework on a more concrete parent-child linking attack.
3.3 Membership Privacy
Homer et al. were the first to present a membership attack by relying upon allele
frequencies (i.e., means of genomic variants’ values) and the L1 distance between those
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and the actual genomic data of the victim [59]. Wang et al. extend this attack by
making use of the correlations among the different positions in the genome [125]. This
improvement on the attack allows them to use the statistics related to only a few
hundred genetic variants. Zhou et al. further analyze the theoretical complexity of
membership and recovery attacks based on summary statistics [133]. Sankararaman et
al. show empirically that the likelihood-ratio test is more powerful than the L1 distance
attack proposed by Homer et al. [106]. Moreover, they derive a theoretical bound on the
LR test that provides an excellent approximation of the empirical LR test. Our work
on membership privacy in Chapter 5 confirms that, for miRNA expression data, the
empirical LR test is better than the L1 distance attack. Our theoretical relation shows
that, in the miRNA case, for a successful attack, the number of miRNAs m has to scale
with the square of the number n of participants in the pool. However, our relation is
less accurate than theirs with respect to the empirical evaluation, especially when the
pools contain individuals carrying a specific disease. This discrepancy can be explained
by two facts: (1) the dimensions of both m and n are relatively small compared to
those in the genomic setting considered in [106], typically an order of magnitude lower
for both, and (2) miRNAs are certainly more affected by diseases than the genome is
(as the latter is very stable and only has a few out of millions of variants associated
with a given disease). Im et al. show that, if the victim’s phenotype is rather extreme
or if multiple phenotypes are available, regression coefficients can reveal the victim’s
participation in a genome-wide association study as much as allele frequencies [66].
3.4 Differentially Private Mitigations
On the defense side, various publications have studied how to properly apply noise
to summary statistics for protecting the privacy of GWAS participants. Johnson and
Shmatikov propose and implement algorithms for accurate and differentially private
computation of various statistics of interest, such as the location of the most significant
genomic variants, or the p-values of statistical tests between a given variant and the
associated diseases [68]. Uhler et al. have also proposed to rely on differential privacy
for sharing GWAS results privately. They present methods for privately disclosing allele
frequencies, chi-square statistics, and p-values [122]. Yu et al. extend these methods by
allowing for an arbitrary number of cases and controls, assess their performance and
compare it with the mechanism proposed by Johnson and Shmatikov [130]. Moreover,
Yu et al. present a differentially private mechanism for logistic regression and show
how it can be applied to the analysis of GWAS data [131]. In the pharmacogenetics
context, Fredrikson et al. show that differential privacy mechanisms can induce bad
warfarin dosing, thus expose patients to an increased risk of stroke, bleeding events,
and mortality [40]. Many of these previous works also highlight that the amount of
noise to be added to the summary statistics is non-negligible, and thus can lead to an
unacceptable loss for research utility.
Tramèr et al. [119] investigate how a relaxation of differential privacy that considers
weaker adversary can help reach a better privacy-utility trade-off for releasing differ-
entially private chi-square statistics in GWAS. In Chapter 5, we show that, given the
structure of miRNA expression data, the same relaxation does not help much to improve
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utility in our context, and we thus deduce that the traditional differential privacy model
is better suited to release miRNA expression statistics. Finally, Dwork et al. analyze the
robustness of the membership attack on noisy summary statistics, and briefly present a
generalization to real-valued data [32].
Our work on temporal linkability in Chapter 4 differs from those above in that our
differentially private protection mechanisms directly applies noise on the raw miRNA
data to guarantee a certain degree of indistinguishability between them, instead of
adding noise to summary statistics. Our second defense technique relies on sharing
a subset of miRNA data, which is closer to what Humbert et al. have developed in
the genomic-privacy context. In particular, Humbert et al. propose an optimization
algorithm that allows for sharing raw genomic variants (rather than summary statistics),
e.g., for research, satisfying the genomic privacy requirements of all individuals in a
family [62]. More generally, our work aims to protect real-valued miRNA expression
vectors, which vary over time much more than DNA data.
Comparing the work of Dwork et al. as presented above with our approach on
membership privacy in Chapter 5, our work has fewer restricting assumptions (such
as the range of the means bounded between -1 and 1 in their work). We consider a
reference population containing a substantially higher number of individuals than in
the pool, and we provide an experimental validation of our analytical results with real
data. Our theoretical relation confirms their finding, i.e., that the dimensionality of the
data (referred to as m in this work, d in theirs) for a successful attack scales with n2.
However, our empirical results demonstrate that these theoretical bounds should be
taken very cautiously, depending on the application context.
3.5 Cryptographic Solutions
Finally, there have been several works on privacy-preserving disease prediction by
relying on encrypted genomic data. Bost et al. develop three main private classification
protocols (including decision trees) that protect both the patients’ data and the classifier
model [13]. They prove their protocols to be secure in the honest-but-curious adversarial
model and evaluate its performance on real medical datasets. We build upon their
constructions for our own private random forest classifier. Wu et al. propose a novel
protocol for the private evaluation of decision trees and also provide an extension to
random forests [128]. In contrast to our work, their extension only applies to affine
aggregation functions, which are suitable for regression problems, but not for general
classification tasks. Thus, their protocol is not able to return the plurality vote. Duverle
et al. propose a new protocol that allows for privately computing statistical tests on
patients’ data by relying on exact logistic regression [28]. Their performance evaluation
shows that they can perform statistical tests with more than 600 SNPs across thousands
of patients in several hours.
Ayday et al. have developed schemes for private disease susceptibility tests by using
homomorphic encryption and proxy-encryption [5, 6]. The considered tests are based
on linear combinations of the SNPs (and other environmental and clinical factors in [6])
contributing to a given disease and do not involve complex machine-learning classifiers.
Danezis and De Cristofaro improve upon the protocol of [5] by using an alternative
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SNP encoding and make the patient-side computation more efficient [21]. McLaren
et al. use a similar security architecture as the one initially proposed by Ayday et
al. to develop a practical privacy-preserving scheme of genome-based prediction of
HIV-related outcomes [88]. All these papers – with the exception of the work of Wu
et al. – assume an honest-but-curious adversary, which is considered realistic in the
healthcare environment.
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4.1. MOTIVATION
4.1 Motivation
In contrast to the DNA sequence, which mostly stays constant over time, most other types
of biomedical data are variable. This especially holds for epigenetics (or epigenomics),
transcriptomics, and proteomics, which aim to bridge the gap between the genome and
our health status. These are also influenced by environmental factors (e.g., pollution,
diet, lifestyle) and play a crucial role in the development of most common diseases.
Although these types of data are closely linked to a person’s health status, their
growing importance leads biomedical researchers to publish their study results and
datasets in publically available biomedical databases, such as the Gene Expression
Omnibus (GEO) [44] and the ArrayExpress [3] databases. These databases contain
millions of biomedical samples in a pseudonymized form.
Given the easy accessibility of such data, an adversary might attempt to link samples
belonging to the same person – despite the temporal variability – in order to obtain a
complete profile of his victims. In this chapter, we focus on the temporal linkability
of microRNAs (abbreviated miRNAs), one of the most important elements of the
epigenome discovered in the early 1990s. Studies of miRNA expression profiles have
shown that dysregulation of miRNA is linked to neurodegenerative diseases, heart
diseases, diabetes and the majority of cancers [84, 127, 70, 102, 37].
Prior to our publication, it was often believed in the biomedical community that the
miRNA expression levels are varying sufficiently to invalidate any linkability attempts
over time, thus naturally protecting personal privacy. Our evaluation, however, showed
the contrary: despite their temporal variability, microRNA expression profiles are still
identifiable and linkable after time periods of several months.
4.2 Contributions
In this chapter, we study the temporal linkability of personal miRNA expression
profiles, by presenting and thoroughly evaluating different attacks and proposing defense
mechanisms to enhance unlinkability.
In particular, we first study an identification attack, which pinpoints a specific
miRNA expression profile in a database of multiple expression profiles by knowledge
of the targeted profile at another point in time. Second, we study a matching attack,
which tracks a set of miRNA expression profiles over time. We rely on principal
component analysis to pre-process the miRNA expression levels, and on a minimum
weight assignment algorithm for the matching attack. We thoroughly evaluate these
linkability attacks by using three different longitudinal datasets: (1) the blood-based
miRNA expression levels of athletes at two time points separated by one week, (2) the
plasma-based miRNA expression levels of the same athletes at two time points separated
by one week, and (3) the plasma-based miRNA expression levels of patients with lung
cancer over more than 18 months and eight time points. Our experimental results show
that blood miRNA expression profiles are about twice as easy to track over time than
plasma miRNA profiles. Furthermore, the matching attack is more successful than the
identification attack: We reach a success rate of 90% with blood and a success rate of
48% with plasma miRNAs in the matching attack whereas, in the identification attack,
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we reach a success rate of 76% with blood and 28% with plasma miRNAs. Moreover, we
demonstrate that 10% of the miRNAs are already sufficient to achieve similar success
rates as with all miRNAs. With the third dataset, we also observe that the attack
achieves a similar success up to 12-month time periods.
We present two protection mechanisms to improve the unlinkability of miRNA
expression profiles: (1) hiding a subset of the miRNA expressions, e.g., those that are
not relevant for medical practice, and (2) disclosing perturbated miRNA expression
profiles by adding noise in a differentially private and distributed manner. While the
first countermeasure is useful especially in a clinical setting, in which the disease-relevant
miRNAs are already known, the second countermeasure is intended to be better suited
for the biomedical research community. In this context, as one of the objectives is to
discover associations between miRNAs and diseases, it is impossible to restrict the
released data to only a few miRNAs.
We evaluate our protection mechanisms with the first aforementioned blood-based
miRNA profiles of athletes and a fourth, also blood-based, miRNA dataset of more
than 1,000 participants that includes information about 19 diseases (at a single point
in time). The former is used to measure how temporal linkability is reduced with our
countermeasures, whereas the latter helps us evaluate the evolution of accuracy (i.e.,
utility) in predicting patients’ diseases from their miRNA expressions. The experiments
show that it is possible to decrease linkability by at least 50% for almost no loss
of accuracy (< 1%) for the majority of diseases with the perturbation mechanism.
Moreover, our results demonstrate that the perturbation mechanism provides better
privacy-utility trade-offs than the hiding method in 17 out of 19 of diseases while allowing
more flexibility in the data usage for biomedical researchers. This finding is reinforced
by the fact that an adversary could use correlations between miRNA expressions to
infer more miRNA expressions than those shared by our first countermeasure.
4.3 Threat Model
We assume the adversary gets access to miRNA expression profiles of individuals at
different points in time. Such epigenetic data is increasingly available in public research
databases, such as the Gene Expression Omnibus (GEO) [44] or ArrayExpress [3]
databases. Moreover, such data could be leaked through a major security breach, e.g.,
of a hospital server. Health data is also increasingly available on the black market. For
instance, cyber attacks against healthcare companies have increased by 72% from 2013
to 2014 [117]. Also, 91% of healthcare companies have experienced a violation of their
databases over the last two years, and only 32% feel they have adequate resources to
defeat these incidents [89]. Real-world cyber attacks show us that health data can be
hacked en masse [56, 100] or that attacks can be more targeted towards high-profile
victims [123]. Very sensitive medical data of thousands of patients can also end up
online, due to a human mistake [11].
In a typical scenario, the adversary would get access to miRNA expression levels
of one or multiple individuals from a (private) health insurance or hospital database
and wants to match them with a (public) research dataset of miRNA expression levels
at another point in time. A particularly sensitive scenario would be the matching of
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non-anonymized healthy miRNA samples with miRNA profiles that are known to be
associated with diseases. Also, note that researchers have demonstrated that RNA
expression profiles could be matched to genotypes by relying on expression quantitative
trait loci (eQTLs) [107]. Therefore, if the adversary can also access the genotypes of
the victims, these genotypes provide him with further means for de-anonymizing the
corresponding (micro)RNA expression profiles [53, 64]).
4.4 Linkability Attacks
We study the extent of the linkability threat (as described in Section 4.3) by means of
two attacks. In this section, we describe the mathematical principles our attacks are
based on.
The first attack, called identification attack, refers to a scenario in which the adversary
knows the miRNA expression profile of a targeted individual and aims at finding the
corresponding miRNA expression profile in a database of n miRNA expression profiles,
e.g., later in time. The second attack, called matching attack, refers to the case where
the attacker has access to two databases of miRNA profiles collected at different points
in time and wishes to match their elements.
4.4.1 Pre-processing
For both of our attacks, since there are more than 1000 known miRNAs with real-valued
expression levels, we apply a pre-processing step using principal component analysis
(PCA) with whitening. In particular, we apply the probabilistic PCA model proposed by
Tipping and Bishop [118], which relies on singular value decomposition. This PCA step
projects the high-dimensionality miRNA expression vectors to smaller-dimensionality
uncorrelated components. The whitening step divides the resulting PCA components by
the number of samples multiplied by the singular values in order to provide uncorrelated
expression vectors of unit variance. We then make use of the Euclidean distance between
the miRNA expression vectors projected on the first c principal components.
4.4.2 Identification Attack
In the identification attack, we assume the adversary has had access to the miRNA
profile xt1k , a vector containing the miRNA expressions of an individual k at time t1,
and he wishes to identify this individual in a database of n miRNA expression profiles
{xt2i }ni=1 collected at time t2 6= t1. After having extracted the c principal components
from the whole dataset by using PCA, the adversary ranks the n profiles (projected on
the c components) {x¯t2i }ni=1 by decreasing distance to the targeted miRNA profile (also
projected on the c components) x¯t1k and picks the profile with minimum distance to the
targeted profile. Formally, the adversary will select the profile x¯t2i∗ where
i∗ = arg min
i
∥∥∥x¯t2i − x¯t1k ∥∥∥2 .
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Figure 4.1: The bipartite graph representation of a matching attack.
4.4.3 Matching Attack
In the matching attack, the adversary has access to two databases of miRNA expression
profiles at two different points in time t1 and t2. We assume that the databases are of
sizes n1 and n2, both strictly greater than 1. First, if n1 = n2 = n, the adversary will
assign one miRNA profile at time t1 to exactly one profile at time t2. In this case, the
best assignment σ∗ is the one that minimizes the sum of the distances between every
matched pair:
σ∗ = arg min
σ
n∑
i=1
∥∥∥x¯t2σ(i) − x¯t1i ∥∥∥2.
This problem boils down to finding a perfect matching on a weighted bipartite graph
with n vertices on both sides representing the miRNA profiles and a weight on each
edge representing the Euclidean distance between any pair of miRNA profiles (vertices)
projected on the first c principal components. Figure 4.1 exemplarily depicts the
representation of the matching attack as a bipartite graph problem. We want to find
the matching among n! possible assignments that minimizes the sum of the weights
between vertices. Fortunately, in literature, there exist several algorithms that find the
minimum weight assignment in polynomial time. We use the Blossom algorithm [34],
because it only has a complexity of O(n3) and it can also be applied to general graphs.
If n1 6= n2, we fill the smaller side of the bipartite graph with dummy vertices, so
that both sides have an equal number of vertices. Then we assign infinite weight to all
edges from actual vertices to these dummy vertices in order to ensure that the dummy
vertices will be the least likely assigned vertices.
4.5 Dataset Description
Unlike in other fields of privacy research, where large amounts of data can be collected
in a small amount of time and at low cost, in the health-privacy field, we face the exact
opposite: measuring the miRNA expression levels of one single sample already costs
several hundred dollars. Longitudinal epigenetic data are particularly valuable, since
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patients have to regularly provide their biological samples over a long period of time.
Therefore, the four datasets used throughout the chapter, and described hereunder,
represent very rich data.
We start by describing our three longitudinal datasets. The first dataset contains
the blood-based miRNA expression levels of 29 well-trained male athletes (15 endurance
athletes and 14 strength athletes) at two points in time, while the second dataset
contains the plasma-based miRNA expression levels of those athletes at the same points
in time.1 None of the athletes is known to be affected by a disease. The samples were
taken prior and post exercising (period of one week), similar to the data previously
presented in [7]. The athletes followed a 6-day training with two training sessions a
day, except at day 4 when only one session was scheduled. The tests were conducted
at Saarland Unversity (Germany) for the endurance athletes, and at Ruhr University
Bochum (Germany) for the strength athletes. These datasets are part of a publication
of Hecksteden et al. [57] and are publicly available as an additional file.
In order to confirm our results, we make use of a third, independent dataset. This
dataset contains the miRNA expression data of plasma of 26 lung-cancer patients (9
females and 17 males) over a period of more than 18 months [78]. The samples were
taken at eight points in time: before surgery (tumor resection), two weeks after surgery
(abbreviated A.S. in the graphs), and 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, and 18 months after surgery.2 The
patients’ ages range from 47 to 79. This dataset is freely available in the GEO database
(see accession number GSE68951).
All three longitudinal datasets include the expression levels of 1,189 miRNAs for
each individual at every time point.
Our fourth dataset contains the expression levels for 848 miRNAs collected from
blood samples for each of 1,049 individuals [73] at only one time point. 94 of these
individuals are considered to be healthy and are used as a control group in Section 4.7.
Most of the rest represent cases, i.e., individuals carrying one out of the following
19 different diseases: 124 have Wilms tumor, 73 lung cancer, 65 prostate cancer, 62
myocardial infarction, 47 chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), 45 sarcoidosis,
45 ductal adenocarcinoma, 43 psoriasis, 37 pancreatitis, 35 benign prostate hyperplasia,
35 melanoma, 33 non-ischaemic systolic heart failure, 29 colon cancer, 24 ovarian cancer,
23 multiple sclerosis, 20 glioma, 20 renal cancer, 18 periodontitis, and 13 stomach tumor.
The dataset can also be found in the GEO database under accession number GSE61741.
Note that a miRNA expression generally takes values between 0 (meaning the
miRNA is not expressed at all) and tens of thousands. As we will mention later, we
typically filter out miRNA whose median expressions among all individuals are smaller
than 50, since these are non-expressed or not expressed enough to be significant.
An overview and comparison with the datasets in the other chapters can be found
at the end of this thesis.
1We selected blood and plasma since these two body fluids are likely candidates as source for
biomarkers in future applications.
2Note that for the last two points in time, we have the miRNA profiles of 25 and 22 patients,
respectively.
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Figure 4.2: Success rate of the identification attack for the athletes dataset. (a) Propor-
tion of successfully identified pairs plotted against the number of PCA dimensions (in
{1, . . . , 58}). (b) Probability density function (PDF) and cumulative distribution function
(CDF) of obtained ranks. (c) Proportion of successfully identified pairs plotted against
the number of miRNA expression profiles.
4.6 Experimental Results
We evaluate how successful both our attacks are in breaking the privacy of our three
longitudinal datasets. We implement the attacks in Python and make use of the libraries
Scikit-learn [98, 15] (for PCA) and NetworkX [54] (for the graph matching).
4.6.1 Identification Attack
In this subsection, we evaluate the success of an adversary who aims at identifying
the miRNA profile of a targeted individual in a longitudinal dataset. As mentioned in
Section 4.5, the first two longitudinal datasets contain miRNA expression levels of 29
individuals collected at a time interval of one week.
First, we compare the success rate for correctly identifying samples between these two
longitudinal datasets. Figure 4.2(a) indicates that the blood-based miRNA expression
levels are easier to identify over time than the plasma-based miRNA expression levels.
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When identifying samples by their blood miRNA expression levels, we can reach a
maximum success rate of 76% for the blood with 22 or 23 PCA dimensions. The
maximum success rate for the plasma is 28% with 17, 18, 19 or 31 PCA dimensions.
Note that both achieve their highest success with a number of PCA dimensions around
20.
Next, we rank the miRNA profiles at time t2 in order of increasing distance to the
targeted profile xt1k . Figure 4.2(b) shows the rank of the correct sample x
t2
k by using
22 PCA dimensions for the blood and 18 PCA dimensions for the plasma. The correct
profile is ranked within the top 2 profiles in more than 40% of the cases for the plasma,
whereas the correct sample is ranked within the top 2 samples in 80% of the cases for
the blood.
In order to get an impression of the attack performance on larger datasets, we also
analyze the success of the identification attack with respect to the number of participants
in the dataset, i.e., we vary the number of profiles among which the attacker has to
identify the targeted miRNA profile, again using 22 PCA dimensions for the blood and
18 PCA dimensions for the plasma. Intuitively, when the number of miRNA samples
increases, the success rate of the attacker should decrease. In this experiment, we adjust
the number n of miRNA profiles between 2 and 29 and evaluate the attacker’s success on
a subset of our datasets. In particular, for each number of profiles n, we randomly choose
1000 different combinations (or fewer if necessary) of n out of 29 miRNA profiles and
run the identification attack on every sample within this subset. Figure 4.2(c) depicts
the average success rates for each number of profiles n. As expected, the success rate
monotonically decreases with the number of participants for blood and plasma samples.
For plasma, however, this decrease is much sharper, confirming that the blood’s miRNA
expression levels provide means for easier identification. From the curves’ slopes, we can
predict that, for larger datasets, blood-based samples will still be subject to a relatively
high identification success.
In order to validate our findings, we also evaluate our experiments on our other
longitudinal, independent dataset containing plasma miRNA profiles from 26 individuals
with lung cancer collected over up to eight different points in time.
First, we evaluate the attacker’s success with respect to a varying number of PCA
dimensions. Figure 4.3(a) depicts the minimum, average and maximum success rate of
an attacker when identifying the samples between different points in time, irrespective
of the time period between them. The maximum success rate for the identification
attack is 42% and is achieved for 25 and 39 PCA dimensions. The usage of 22 PCA
dimensions yields the highest average success rate of 22%. The highest minimal success
rate in the dataset is achieved for 17 PCA dimensions (12%).
These results are similar to what we obtained in our experiments for the plasma-
based athletes dataset: The best results are achieved for a number of PCA dimensions
around 20 in both datasets. The highest average success rate lies 6 points below the best
success rate for the athletes dataset. This could be explained by longer time periods
in this dataset. However, for some time periods, we can achieve one and a half the
success rate of the first dataset. When comparing the top 10 miRNAs contributing to
the first PCA dimension in this dataset and in the athletes’ plasma dataset, we find an
overlap of 80% between these miRNAs. This overlap indicates that approximately the
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Figure 4.3: Success rate of the identification attack for the lung cancer dataset. (a)
Success rate aggregated over all identifications between any t1 and t2 plotted against
the number of PCA dimensions. (b) Success rate of identifying the miRNA profiles
between time pairs t1 and t2. (c) Success rate plotted against the time period between
t1 and t2.
same set of miRNAs can be used to differentiate plasma expression profiles between
individuals in both datasets. Thus, we can conclude that, while miRNA expression
levels are directly linked to health status, the health status only affects a subset of the
miRNAs, which has only little effect on the temporal linking.
To further investigate the effect of different time periods on the attacker’s success,
we plot the maximum success rates between all possible, ascending combinations of
time points in Figure 4.3(b). With only a few exceptions, the best success rates are
achieved for consecutive time points. The only two exceptions are found for t1=before
the surgery and t1=the sixth month after the surgery. In general, however, we notice a
tendency of slight decrease in success over an increasing time period.
In order to verify this finding, we group the results by the period between t1 and
t2 (Figure 4.3(c)). Note that, since we do not know the time period between before
the surgery and after it, we leave out all results that use samples collected before the
surgery. Clearly, the best achievable success rate drops for increasing time periods.
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This decrease over larger periods of time can partially explain the lower average success
rate in this dataset compared to the athletes’ dataset (considering a much smaller time
period).
Next, we computed the guessing entropy [86, 16] for the identification attack. The
guessing entropy E[G(X)] is the expected number of guesses an adversary would need to
identify the correct sample at a different point in time. For the identification attack it is
given by E[G(X)] = ∑ni=1 i ·Pr [X = i], where X denotes the rank of the correct sample
at time t2 and Pr [X = i] denotes the empirical probability that the correct sample is
ranked at the ith position.
For blood-based samples of our athletes dataset, the attack can achieve a guessing
entropy just below 4, clearly outperforming random guesses, which would yield an
entropy of 15 guesses on average. For plasma-based samples of the same dataset, the
attack yields an entropy of approximately 9 guesses. This result is consistent with
the results on the lung cancer dataset, where, on average, an adversary would need
just fewer than 9 guesses (compared to a guessing entropy of 13.5 for random guesses).
Moreover, for some t1 and t2, the attack is even able to achieve a guessing entropy
smaller than 6.
4.6.2 Matching Attack
We evaluate here the success of the adversary, who tries to link all participants over time,
again for the three aforementioned longitudinal datasets. Starting with the athletes’
datasets, we compare the success rate of matching the blood and the plasma over all
possible PCA dimensions for 29 participants. In Figure 4.4(a), we notice the same
behavior as in the identification attack: The blood-based miRNA expression levels are
much easier to link over time than the plasma-based levels. We even reach a higher
maximum absolute success rate than in the identification attack: 90% with 39 or 40
PCA dimensions for the blood and 48% success with 34 PCA dimensions for the plasma
samples.
The lower success rate of the identification attack is due to the fact that it is
evaluated for each sample individually, thus allowing multiple samples at t1 to be linked
to the same (potentially wrong) sample at t2. Since our matching attack rules out those
cases by forcing each profile at t2 to be matched to exactly one profile from t1, it also
decreases the number of wrongly matched samples.
Next, we also analyze the success of the attack with respect to the number of
participants to be matched together. We suppose that the more miRNA profiles there
are, the more challenging it should be for the adversary to match them at different time
points. Again, we vary the number of participants n between 2 and 29 at both time
points, again randomly sampling 1000 combinations (or fewer, if there are fewer than
1000 combinations) and averaging the result. Figure 4.4(b) shows the expected trend of
decreasing success for the blood miRNA samples. The plasma scenario monotonically
decreases between 2 and 25 participants and then slightly increases until 29. This artifact
could be explained by the smaller number of random combinations, and thus experiments,
when n > 26. We also find that the blood attack faces a rather linear decrease in success,
whereas the plasma success rate decreases much faster. By extrapolating this linear
31
CHAPTER 4. LINKABILITY OF MIRNA EXPRESSION PROFILES
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Number of PCA dimensions
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Pr
o
p
o
rt
io
n
o
f
co
rr
e
ct
ly
m
a
tc
h
e
d
p
a
ir
s
Blood
Plasma
(a)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Size of the datasets
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
Pr
o
p
o
rt
io
n
o
f
co
rr
e
ct
ly
m
a
tc
h
e
d
p
a
ir
s
Blood
Plasma
(b)
020040060080010001200
Number of used miRNAs
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Pr
o
p
.
o
f
co
rr
e
ct
m
a
tc
h
in
g
Blood
Plasma
(c)
Figure 4.4: Success rate of the matching attack for the athletes dataset. (a) Proportion
of successfully matched pairs plotted against the number of PCA dimensions. (b)
Proportion of successfully matched pairs plotted against the number of miRNA profiles.
(c) Proportion of successfully matched pairs plotted against the number of revealed
miRNAs.
trend, we can expect a success rate as high as 60% with 120 participants in the datasets.
Therefore, we conclude again that the blood has miRNA expression levels that allow for
much easier tracking over time than the plasma, which is consistent with the results of
the identification attack.
Figure 4.4(c) investigates how the attack success evolves when revealing only a subset
of the miRNA expression levels. We gradually drop individual miRNAs in random
order and compute the attack success. The figure shows the success rate (for each
possible number m ∈ {1189, 1188, . . . , 2, 1} of miRNAs) averaged over 50 randomly
chosen orderings of miRNAs. We notice that the attack success is very stable, especially
for the blood samples, from 1189 to 200 miRNAs. For the blood, the success decreases
below 80% the first time when there are fewer than 100 miRNAs available to the
adversary. We further study the implications of this robustness in the context of our
countermeasures in Section 4.7.
We also made use of our third longitudinal dataset containing plasma miRNA
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Figure 4.5: Success rate of the matching attack for the lung cancer dataset. (a) Success
rate aggregated over all matchings between any t1 and t2 plotted against the number
of PCA dimensions (in {1, . . . , 60}). (b) Success rate of matching the miRNA profiles
between time pairs t1 (various curves), t2 (x-axis value). (c) Success rate plotted against
the distance between t1 and t2.
expression profiles of 26 individuals over up to eight different time points (cf. Section
4.5). In Figure 4.5(a), we see that the average success rate reaches its maximum at a
number of PCA dimensions very close to the number of dimensions for the athletes
dataset, i.e., 34. However, this maximum is approximately 30%, which is smaller than
the 48% reached for the first dataset. A greater period between time points could
explain this behavior, and we also see that we still can reach a maximum success rate
of 55% between some time points, with 39 PCA dimensions. We explore the time effect
in more detail in the following figures.
Figure 4.5(b) depicts the maximum success rate between any pair of time points t1,
t2. For instance, the solid red line shows the success rates between t1=before surgery
and all others. It is difficult to detect any trend with respect to the time period in
the different curves, except a slight decrease when the time period is higher or equal
to 15 months. This is confirmed by Figure 4.5(c) that depicts the maximum, average,
and minimum success rate with respect to the period between t1 and t2. We notice a
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decreasing rate between 3 and 9 months, an increase to 12 months, and finally a clear
decrease towards 15 and 18 months.
4.7 Mitigations
In this section, we propose and evaluate two main protection mechanisms for preventing
miRNA expression data from being tracked over time. The proposed techniques are
based on well-established privacy-enhancing methods, previously applied in other privacy
contexts, such as location privacy. The first approach relies on a quite straightforward
technique: releasing only a subset of the miRNAs. We can already see from Figure 4.4(c)
of Section 4.6 that the matching attack is quite robust to a decrease in the number of
miRNAs. Nevertheless, we show hereafter how we can keep a high utility in combination
with unlinkability of expression profiles over time by revealing a small subset of miRNAs.
The second countermeasure consists in adding noise to the released miRNA expression
vectors, independently for every individual. This method shows very promising results,
reaching an even better privacy-utility trade-off than the hiding mechanism. Furthermore,
we also investigate the effect of correlations between miRNA expression levels and present
the privacy evolution when the adversary can infer missing miRNAs by using these
correlations.
For evaluating the privacy provided by our protection mechanisms, we focus on
the matching attack against blood-based miRNAs, as this constitutes the worst-case
attack from a privacy perspective, as shown in Section 4.6. Moreover, we assume the
attacker is able to select the number of PCA dimensions that maximize his success.
This provides us with a conservative measure of privacy, showing the worst-case privacy
levels individuals can expect.
4.7.1 Baseline Utility
Before presenting the proposed countermeasures and their efficiencies, we must carefully
define the context in which they should apply. Indeed, we can rarely have both perfect
privacy and maximum utility, so that we often aim for a trade-off between these two.
Therefore, the efficiency of the defense mechanism cannot only be judged based on the
privacy metric, but must also relate to the utility brought in the context in which the
data is used.
According to biomedical experts, miRNA expression profiles have strong potential
to help predict various severe diseases, from cancer to Alzheimer’s disease. Biomedical
researchers typically rely on standard machine learning algorithms to identify which
miRNAs are playing a significant role in the disease of interest. They are dealing with
binary classification between cases (carrying the disease) and controls (healthy) and
most often rely on support vector machines (SVMs). In particular, they typically use
radial basis function SVMs and select a subset of features by subsequently adding
miRNAs in order of their significance values (e.g., p-values computed by the Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney (WMW) test) [77] or equivalently in order of their area under the ROC
curve (AUC). Given samples of cases and controls, the accuracy is then defined as the
number of correctly classified samples divided by the total number of samples. Note
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Disease Maximum accuracy
with the best subset of
expressed miRNAs (#
miRNAs)
Accuracy with
all expressed
miRNAs
Periodontitis 0.941 (37) 0.88
Renal cancer 0.988 (32) 0.962
Wilms’ tumor 0.95 (150) 0.937
Benign prostate hyperplasia 0.921 (105) 0.883
Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease 0.932 (70) 0.886
Colon cancer 1.0 (30) 0.997
Ductal carcinoma 0.938 (55) 0.92
Glioma 0.927 (19) 0.83
Lung cancer 0.899 (60) 0.848
Melanoma 0.996 (185) 0.992
Multiple sclerosis 0.992 (40) 0.979
Myocardial infarction 0.893 (400) 0.884
Nonischaemic systolic heart failure 0.9 (135) 0.871
Ovarian cancer 0.919 (18) 0.876
Pancreatitis 0.941 (130) 0.899
Prostate cancer 0.923 (90) 0.91
Psoriasis 0.914 (350) 0.902
Sarcoidosis 0.977 (200) 0.97
Tumor of stomach 0.969 (160) 0.89
Table 4.1: Accuracy of the SVM algorithm in classifying individuals between cases
(carrying the disease) and controls (healthy), for 19 diseases, without countermeasure.
that we compute the average accuracy over a repeated k-fold cross-validation.
In this chapter, we define the utility as the accuracy of the SVM classifier, as defined
above. We use a 10-fold cross-validation with 5 repeats (using R [103] and the caret [76]
library) and determine the miRNAs’ p-values by using the WMW test and adjusting the
significance values for multiple tests using the Benjamini-Hochberg adjustment. The
WMW test statistic is applied for each miRNA individually in order to test whether
this miRNA has similar expressions between cases and controls (null hypothesis). The
p-values then provide us with the relevance of the miRNA to the disease of interest. In
contrast to the t-test, the WMW test can be applied to unknown distributions. This
way, we follow the standard procedure of biomedical research. Table 4.1 shows the
accuracy of our SVM algorithm applied to our 1000+ participants dataset to predict 19
diseases, without any obfuscation. The maximum accuracy here is what we refer to as
the baseline utility in our evaluation.
Note that, before running the SVM algorithm, we filter out non-expressed miRNAs,
i.e., those with a median level of expression smaller than 50 over the 1000+ individuals,
which leaves us with 446 expressed miRNAs.
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4.7.2 Hiding MicroRNA Expressions
The first countermeasure that we study is miRNA expression hiding. This obfuscation
technique has the advantage to be non-pertubative, i.e., to preserve the correct values
of all revealed miRNA expressions. However, as we have seen in Section 4.6, the attacks
are extremely robust against removal of miRNAs. In the following, we want to find an
optimal trade-off between the diagnosis accuracy, i.e., the utility, and the unlinkability
of the data, i.e., the privacy. To this end, we make use of both our blood-based datasets,
the 1000+ dataset with blood-based miRNA expressions to run our SVM algorithm and
the athletes’ dataset with blood-based miRNAs to evaluate the level of privacy. Note
that we filter both datasets’ miRNAs in order to obtain the same set of 446 miRNAs in
both cases. While we measure the utility in terms of accuracy of the SVM, the privacy
is measured in terms of the maximum achievable success rate (over all possible PCA
dimensions) of our matching attack.
Figure 4.6 shows the evolution of privacy and utility for a range of 1 to 100 disclosed
miRNAs, for 6 different severe diseases.3 We focus on this range of miRNAs as: (1) for
more than 100 miRNAs, the attack success rate is approximately the same as the one
without countermeasure, and (2) the SVM can already achieve very high accuracy with
up to 100 miRNAs. We gradually reveal the miRNAs in decreasing order of significance
(based on p-values), as computed in Section 4.7.1.
Figure 4.6 demonstrates that there exists a trade-off between the utility of miRNA
expressions and the privacy of the contributors’ data. Note that we also depict the
relative decrease in accuracy compared to the maximum SVM accuracy computed
in Section 4.7.1 and the relative decrease in the attack success (increase in privacy)
compared to the attack success with all miRNAs, i.e., 90%. We see that the relative
decrease in accuracy is almost always smaller than 10%. The only exceptions to this are
pancreatitis and melanoma, for fewer than 3 disclosed miRNAs. Moreover, regarding
the privacy, the figures show that we can never reduce the attack success by more than
50% when revealing more than 20 miRNAs. Nevertheless, within the range of 3 to 20
disclosed miRNAs, we can find, for all diseases, a satisfactory trade-off between utility
and privacy.
In particular, for glioma, we can decrease the success of the linkability attack
and thus improve the privacy by 80.8% when using 4 miRNAs, while reducing the
classification accuracy by only 1.1%. Similarly, for multiple sclerosis, 7 miRNAs provide
an increase in privacy of 53.8%, while the decrease in accuracy only amounts to 0.9%.
For renal cancer and 10 miRNAs, we are able to achieve an improvement in privacy
of 69.2% and a decrease of accuracy of only 1.7%. There are only two diseases for
which it is very difficult to have both unlinkability and very high utility: melanoma
and pancreatitis. For melanoma, we notice that the success of the matching attack
exhibits a fast increase with very few miRNAs, and already exceeds 50% starting with
only 7 miRNAs. For pancreatitis, the SVM’s accuracy is relatively low (compared to
the maximum) for the first 20 miRNAs. Thus for both diseases, either privacy or utility
would have to be sacrificed for the other.
3These are representative of the behavior of all 19 diseases we tested our privacy-preserving mecha-
nisms on.
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Figure 4.6: Evolution of privacy (unlinkability) and utility (classifier accuracy) plotted
against the number of released miRNAs for the following diseases: (a) Pancreatitis, (b)
Glioma, (c) Multiple sclerosis, (d) Tumor of stomach, (e) Melanoma, (f) Renal cancer.
The relative decrease success curve refers to the decrease in success of the matching
attack compared to the success without countermeasure. Similarly, the relative de-
crease accuracy curve refers to the decrease in accuracy of the SVM classifier with
respect to the case without the protection mechanism.
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Figure 4.7: Correlations between miRNAs. Evolution of privacy and utility, when miRNAs
correlated with the revealed miRNAs are taken into account for the attack. This provides
an upper bound on the best linkability of miRNA expression profiles, i.e., worst-case
privacy level. (a) Glioma, (b) Multiple sclerosis, (c) Renal cancer.
MiRNA Co-expression. Like between positions in the genome, there exist correla-
tions between miRNA expressions: Around 40% of miRNAs are not independently
expressed [90]. This means that the adversary, by knowing these correlations, could
increase his knowledge about the non-disclosed miRNA expressions. In order to evaluate
the importance of such correlations, we first compute the Pearson’s correlation coeffi-
cients and their corresponding p-values in all 99,235 pairs of the 446 expressed miRNAs
in our fourth dataset. Filtering out all correlations with p-values greater than 0.001
(after Bonferroni correction for multiple correlations testing) or correlation coefficient
smaller than 0.5 leaves us with 47% of miRNAs not independently expressed. Figure 4.7
shows the updated attack success by taking into account all significant correlations
as defined above. In our experiments, we take a quite conservative approach: We
assume that the adversary can perfectly infer the miRNAs correlated with those that are
gradually disclosed. The dotted curve provides an upper bound estimate on the success
rate. A tighter bound could be derived by knowing more precisely the probabilistic
dependencies between miRNAs. This is left for future work.
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For Figure 4.7, we make use of the three diseases of Figure 4.6 that gave the
best trade-off between privacy and utility, i.e., glioma, multiple sclerosis and renal
cancer. We observe that the success rate when the adversary knows miRNAs correlated
with disclosed miRNAs is much higher than without them, except for the very first
miRNAs in Figure 4.7(c). It shows that the most significant miRNAs for the SVM
classification are co-expressed with others, which penalizes privacy significantly. Making
use of the best subsets of miRNAs found above without correlations, containing 4
miRNAs for glioma, 7 for multiple sclerosis, and 10 for renal cancer, we evaluate the
new privacy levels when miRNA correlations are taken into account. For glioma, instead
of improving unlinkability by 80.8%, the 4 miRNAs and their correlated miRNAs yields
an improvement in privacy of 34.6%. For renal cancers, the privacy enhancement drops
from 69.2% to 38.5% and, for multiple sclerosis, using 7 miRNAs and their co-expressed
miRNAs yield an attack success rate almost equal to the highest rate with the full set
of miRNAs. However, we can find new, better trade-offs: e.g., disclosing 5 miRNAs for
multiple sclerosis still provides the same high SVM accuracy (decrease of 0.9% compared
to the baseline) while reducing the attack success by 23%. Note that we do not make
use of the correlated miRNAs for the SVM algorithm as we are not certain about how
they correlate with the disclosed ones.
4.7.3 Noise Mechanism
As we have noticed in the first protection mechanism, it is possible to hide the vast
majority of miRNAs while retaining a fair level of prediction accuracy. This is typically
very useful in the clinical setting where medical practitioners already know the miRNAs
to test for predicting a specific disease. However, such a privacy-preserving mechanism
could dramatically jeopardize miRNA utility for biomedical research. Indeed, as we
have seen in our previous experiments, the majority of miRNAs need to be masked in
order to gain a significant amount of unlinkability, which is not possible if researchers
want to test for associations between miRNAs and diseases. Therefore, we additionally
present and study a countermeasure where contributors of miRNA expressions directly
apply random noise to their vectors of expression levels before providing them to the
research community (possibly online), in a fully distributed manner (i.e., independent
from other contributors).
The idea behind adding noise to the raw expression data is to provide indistin-
guishability between different expression vectors and consequently reduce the tracking
capabilities of the adversary. Following the generalized notion of differential privacy [19]
previously applied to location privacy [2], we state that a mechanism A achieves
epigeno-indistinguishability if and only if, for all m-miRNA expression vectors x1, x2,
Pr [A(x1) ∈ S] ≤ exp(d2(x1,x2))× Pr [A(x2) ∈ S] ,
where S is any subset of the set of possible responses and d2(·, ·) denotes the Euclidean
distance. In the following, we assume that the set of possible responses lies in the same
m-dimensional real-valued space Rm as the set of original expression vectors. Before
defining our mechanism A(·) for achieving epigeno-indistinguishability, let us first give
some intuition about the mechanism. The noise mechanism is such that the probability
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of reporting a noisy expression vector A(x) differs by at most a factor exp(d2(x1,x2))
when the actual, non-obfuscated miRNA expression vectors are x1 and x2. This can
be achieved by relying on the multivariate Laplacian mechanism that adds noise y
according to the following probability density function g(y) = 1αe−‖y‖2 , where α is a
normalization factor ensuring that the integral over all y ∈ Rm equals one.
Sampling noise from the distribution g(y) can be carried out efficiently by generalizing
the method used for the planar Laplacian mechanism in [2]. First, we sample the
magnitude ‖y‖2 of the noise from a gamma distribution with shape m and scale 1/.
Second, we randomly generate the direction yˆ = y/‖y‖2 of the noise by uniformly
sampling points on the surface Sm−1 of a hypersphere [75]. To do so, we can generate m
independent Gaussian random variables z1, z2, . . . , zm, and let zˆi = zi/
√
z21 + · · ·+ z2m
for i = 1, . . . ,m. Then the distribution of the vector zˆ = (zˆ1, . . . , zˆm) is uniform over
the surface Sm−1, and thus we can set the direction yˆ := zˆ. Each person i contributing
his miRNA expression profile xi will then share, instead of the actual expression data,
the noisy vector A(xi) = xi + y, where y is independently generated for all participants
i = 1, . . . , n.
Following this approach, in our evaluation, we first add noise to our dataset of 1000+
individuals (considering only the 446 miRNAs as before). Then, in the second step, we
calculate the p-values on the noised data (since the researchers would be provided with
exactly this data) and train the SVM as previously by subsequently adding miRNAs
in the order of their p-values. Similarly, we evaluate the success of our attack on the
athletes’ dataset, when considering the same 446 miRNAs, but after adding noise.
Moreover, we repeat both our experiments 50 times and average the results over all
runs.
Figure 4.8 shows the evolution of the SVM accuracy and linkability (success of
the attack), with respect to the amount of noise, tuned by , that is added to each
contributor’s miRNA expression profile. As privacy is measured on the same dataset
for all six figures, it evolves in a very similar way. Even if the noise is randomly
generated, the differences average out with the Monte Carlo method we use. We clearly
see that with  = 1, there is almost no privacy gain compared to the attack without
countermeasure, whereas for  = 0.001, the attack success drops by almost 90%. As for
the first countermeasure, there is a utility-privacy trade-off to be found between these
two extreme values.
In Figure 4.8(a), we can observe that, for pancreatitis,  = 0.075 is a good trade-off,
with an accuracy decrease of only 0.8% and an unlinkability improvement of 40%. For
glioma (Figure 4.8(b)), the best trade-off is certainly at  = 0.05, with an accuracy
decrease of 1.2% and an unlinkability improvement of 51%. For multiple sclerosis,
we reach the best trade-off at  = 0.025 with an accuracy decrease of 0.65% and an
unlinkability improvement of 63%. For tumor of stomach, we can reach an accuracy
decrease of only 0.2% and still improve the unlinkability by as much as 70% with
 = 0.01. For renal cancer, we have to sacrifice a bit more of utility, 2.3%, for a privacy
increase of 61%, with  = 0.025. The only disease for which it is quite difficult to get
both satisfactory unlinkability and excellent accuracy is melanoma (Figure 4.8(e)). This
is consistent with the hiding mechanism presented in Section 4.7.2, where we observed
(in Figure 4.6(e)) a fast and sharp increase in the attack success.
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Figure 4.8: Evolution of privacy and utility (classifier accuracy) plotted against the noise
(tuned by ) added to the individual miRNA expression profiles, for the following diseases:
(a) Pancreatitis, (b) Glioma, (c) Multiple sclerosis, (d) Tumor of stomach, (e) Melanoma,
(f) Renal cancer.
4.7.4 Comparison of Protection Mechanisms
In order to compare both approaches, we decide upon a utility or a privacy requirement,
fix it, and then evaluate the best privacy, respectively utility, achieved with both coun-
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termeasures. We carry out this evaluation on all 19 diseases for different requirements
of utility and privacy.
First, we start by fixing the utility, more precisely the relative accuracy decrease
compared to the baseline accuracy. The privacy is measured in terms of the decrease in
the success of the matching attack. For a given maximal decrease in accuracy ∆maxacc ,
we select the optimal number of miRNAs m∗ and the optimal amount of noise ∗ that
maximize the privacy increase ∆mpriv and ∆priv. In case of the hiding mechanism, we
select m∗ = arg maxm ∆mpriv such that ∆macc < ∆maxacc . In case of the noise mechanism,
we select ∗ = arg max ∆priv such that ∆acc < ∆maxacc , respectively.
Considering ∆maxacc ∈ {0.5%, 1%, 2%, 3%, 4%, 5%} for all 19 diseases, we mostly
experience that the noise mechanism provides a better privacy improvement compared
to hiding a subset of miRNAs (all results are listed in Table 4.2 and 4.3, Section 4.10).
In particular, 90 out of 114 cases (combinations of disease and ∆maxacc ) yield a better
privacy with the noise mechanism. When examining a maximal decrease in accuracy of
2%, the hiding technique provides a better privacy for only 2 diseases, namely glioma
and renal cancer. Interestingly, these two diseases stand out also for other values of the
maximal accuracy decrease, providing better privacy with the hiding technique in 10
out of 12 cases. However, for all other diseases, adding noise in a distributed manner to
individual expression profiles provides better utility for similar levels of privacy. For
example, for lung cancer, we are able to achieve an increase in privacy of 79.3% while
maintaining a decrease in accuracy of 0.8% using noise with  = 0.005. The best we can
achieve for the hiding technique here is either a decrease in accuracy of 0.97% and an
increase in privacy of only 46.2% or a larger decrease in accuracy of 1.9% and a privacy
improvement of only 50%.
Next, we discuss the results for a fixed minimal improvement of the privacy and
compare the corresponding minimal decrease in accuracy in both countermeasures. We
now fix the minimal increase in privacy (i.e., the minimal decrease in the attack success)
∆minpriv and minimize the decrease in accuracy: arg minm ∆macc such that ∆mpriv > ∆minpriv
and arg min ∆acc such that ∆priv > ∆minpriv, respectively. We run experiments for values
of ∆minpriv from 10% up to 90%, in steps of 10% (all results are provided in Table 4.4 and
4.5, Section 4.10).
We again observe that, for most of the evaluated cases, the achieved accuracy is
better when adding noise compared to when hiding miRNAs. In particular, this holds
true for 143 out of 171 cases, clear exceptions being again glioma and renal cancer.
For those two diseases, the hiding technique provides better accuracy than the noise
mechanism in 87.5% of the cases. When fixing the minimal increase in privacy to 70%,
only these two diseases provide better results with the hiding technique. For instance,
with renal cancer, we achieve 60.8% improvement in privacy with a decrease in accuracy
of 2.3% using noise with  = 0.025, whereas we can obtain an increase in privacy of
69.2% and a decrease in accuracy of only 1.7% when using the hiding technique. For
the majority of diseases, however, it is clearly the noise mechanism that provides much
higher utility. For example, for lung cancer, an increase in privacy of at least 70% is
achievable with a decrease in accuracy of only 0.2% with the noise mechanism, while
the hiding technique yields a decrease in accuracy of 11.2%.
In summary, we find that the noise mechanism presented in Section 4.7.3, providing
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epigeno-indistinguishability, is able to achieve a better privacy-utility trade-off than the
hiding mechanism for the vast majority of studied diseases (17 out of 19). We have
also shown in Section 4.7.2 that the privacy improvement with the hiding mechanism
could actually be too optimistic due to the correlations existing between miRNAs. This
is another argument to favor the noise mechanism rather than the hiding technique.
Moreover, the p-values used to rank the miRNAs in the hiding mechanism actually
require that, at some point in time, some entity gets access to the full set of miRNAs
of a significant number of individuals in order to measure these p-values. The noise
mechanism is fully distributed and does not need to rely on a trusted entity at any
point in time. Finally, it allows for more flexibility as it enables, e.g., the biomedical
research community to access all miRNA expression levels of contributors.
4.8 Limitations
Unlike other fields of privacy research, where large amounts of data can be collected in
a small amount of time for a low amount of money, here we face the exact opposite:
measuring the miRNA expression levels for one single sample already costs several
hundred dollars. This means that the total value of our datasets is of more than half a
million dollars. Moreover, in order to gather longitudinal epigenetic data, real patients
have to regularly provide their blood samples over a long period of time. For instance, in
the case of our lung cancer dataset, patients’ blood had to be collected every 3 months
over a period of 18 months.
Although the number of participants in our three longitudinal datasets may look
small at first sight, this number is currently certainly very substantial, given that these
datasets must contain expression profiles of individuals at multiple points in time. Other
datasets that include a much larger number of participants, such as our 1000+ dataset,
do not fulfill the requirement of multiple time points. We counterbalance the relatively
small number of participants in our longitudinal datasets by making use of different
datasets that show very similar behavior (plasma-based miRNAs).
4.9 Conclusion
To the best of our knowledge, we are the very first to demonstrate that personal
miRNA expression profiles can be successfully tracked over time. Our study sheds
light on a widely overlooked problem, namely privacy risks stemming from epigenetic
data, and brings this issue to the attention of both the biomedical and computer
security research communities. In addition to the in-depth evaluation of the temporal
linkability of miRNA expression profiles, we propose two defense mechanisms based on
well-established privacy-enhancing methods: (1) hiding a subset of the expression data,
and (2) adding noise to the released expression profiles. We thoroughly evaluate the
impact of these countermeasures on biomedical utility by studying how much accuracy
decrease they induce in a typical machine-learning algorithm for predicting diseases.
We observe that, for the majority of the 19 diseases studied in our experiments, the
noise mechanism provides a better privacy-utility trade-off than the hiding method.
Moreover, we highlight that the noise mechanism can be applied directly by the data
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∆maxacc 0.5% 1.0% 2.0%
Disease ∆mpriv ∆priv ∆mpriv ∆priv ∆mpriv ∆priv
Periodontitis 26.9% 74.1% 26.9% 79.2% 50.0% 79.2%
Renal cancer 30.8% - 30.8% 3.6% 69.2% 5.2%
Wilms tumor 3.8% 6.4% 7.7% 9.5% 7.7% 40.1%
Benign prostate hyperplasia −3.8% 10.6% 3.8% 70.5% 11.5% 72.2%
Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease
(COPD)
0.0% 2.7% 0.0% 5.5% 0.0% 12.5%
Colon cancer 19.2% 11.4% 30.8% 30.5% 30.8% 60.2%
Ductal adenocarcinoma 0.0% 50.6% 3.8% 50.6% 7.7% 62.5%
Glioma 65.4% 5.2% 65.4% 5.2% 80.8% 68.5%
Lung cancer 11.5% 74.1% 46.2% 79.3% 50.0% 79.3%
Melanoma 0.0% - 0.0% 3.8% 0.0% 5.9%
Multiple sclerosis 19.2% 49.5% 53.8% 62.6% 53.8% 62.6%
Myocardial infarction 3.8% 52.4% 3.8% 52.4% 3.8% 60.5%
Non-ischaemic systolic heart failure −3.8% 80.0% 0.0% 80.0% 46.2% 80.0%
Ovarian cancer 26.9% 78.5% 26.9% 78.5% 42.3% 78.5%
Pancreatitis 19.2% 10.3% 26.9% 39.8% 26.9% 53.5%
Prostate cancer −3.8% - −3.8% - 3.8% 4.0%
Psoriasis 0.0% 6.5% 0.0% 31.4% 3.8% 74.0%
Sarcoidosis 0.0% 69.3% 3.8% 74.0% 50.0% 79.8%
Tumor of stomach 15.4% 69.8% 34.6% 69.8% 65.4% 79.4%
Table 4.2: Relative increase in privacy for both defense mechanisms in relation to a
fixed maximal decrease in accuracy ranging from 0.5% to 2.0%. For “-” cells, we did not
achieve the targeted accuracy with any tested . A negative value means that the
attack success rate could even exceed the success rate incorporating all miRNAs.
contributors, independently of other contributors, and provides more flexibility for the
biomedical community. Our work demonstrates that achieving indistinguishability by
adding noise is a promising technique that could be applied to other types of biomedical
data in the future.
Our results provide enough evidence about the extent of the threat to remove
miRNA expression data from publicly accessible databases. Due to the limited number
of individuals present in our datasets, we could not rely on supervised learning algorithms,
which would undoubtedly further improve the tracking capabilities of the adversary.
4.10 Additional Tables
Tables 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 contain the detailed results of our comparison of protection
mechanisms.
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∆maxacc 3.0% 4.0% 5.0%
Disease ∆mpriv ∆priv ∆mpriv ∆priv ∆mpriv ∆priv
Periodontitis 88.5% 83.6% 88.5% 83.6% 88.5% 83.6%
Renal cancer 73.1% 60.8% 73.1% 72.7% 80.8% 78.8%
Wilms tumor 7.7% 61.5% 7.7% 70.4% 11.5% 74.3%
Benign prostate hyperplasia 46.2% 79.2% 57.7% 79.2% 65.4% 79.2%
Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease
(COPD)
0.0% 12.5% 15.4% 50.3% 23.1% 69.8%
Colon cancer 57.7% 60.2% 73.1% 70.5% 73.1% 73.8%
Ductal adenocarcinoma 42.3% 62.5% 50.0% 69.5% 50.0% 74.2%
Glioma 80.8% 80.8% 80.8% 87.5% 80.8% 87.5%
Lung cancer 50.0% 79.3% 50.0% 79.3% 50.0% 79.3%
Melanoma 3.8% 10.3% 38.5% 40.2% 38.5% 60.7%
Multiple sclerosis 61.5% 62.6% 61.5% 73.7% 61.5% 73.7%
Myocardial infarction 38.5% 60.5% 42.3% 74.6% 42.3% 74.6%
Non-ischaemic systolic heart failure 46.2% 84.7% 46.2% 84.7% 46.2% 84.7%
Ovarian cancer 42.3% 84.3% 50.0% 84.3% 50.0% 86.2%
Pancreatitis 26.9% 53.5% 57.7% 62.2% 65.4% 71.2%
Prostate cancer 42.3% 6.2% 42.3% 10.1% 42.3% 38.5%
Psoriasis 19.2% 80.1% 23.1% 80.1% 61.5% 80.1%
Sarcoidosis 92.3% 79.8% 92.3% 79.8% 92.3% 79.8%
Tumor of stomach 65.4% 79.4% 65.4% 84.6% 65.4% 84.6%
Table 4.3: Relative increase in privacy for both defense mechanisms in relation to a fixed
maximal decrease in accuracy ranging from 3.0% to 5.0%. A negative value means that
the attack success rate could even exceed the success rate incorporating all miRNAs.
∆minpriv 30.0% 40.0% 50.0%
Disease ∆macc ∆acc ∆macc ∆acc ∆macc ∆acc
Periodontitis 1.9% −1.9% 1.9% −1.9% 2.6% −1.9%
Renal cancer 0.0% 2.3% 1.7% 2.3% 1.7% 2.3%
Wilms tumor 5.2% 1.4% 5.2% 1.7% 5.5% 2.2%
Benign prostate hyperplasia 2.7% 0.5% 2.7% 0.6% 3.5% 0.6%
Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease
(COPD)
7.9% 3.3% 12.0% 3.3% 12.0% 3.3%
Colon cancer 0.7% 0.8% 2.4% 1.3% 2.4% 1.3%
Ductal adenocarcinoma 2.8% 0.1% 2.8% 0.4% 5.2% 0.4%
Glioma 0.0% 1.2% 0.0% 1.2% 0.4% 1.2%
Lung cancer 0.7% −1.5% 1.0% −1.5% 6.6% −1.5%
Melanoma 3.7% 3.4% 5.0% 3.4% 7.5% 4.1%
Multiple sclerosis 0.9% −0.0% 0.9% 0.1% 0.9% 0.7%
Myocardial infarction 2.8% 0.0% 3.6% 0.4% 7.2% 0.4%
Non-ischaemic systolic heart failure 2.0% −2.6% 2.0% −2.6% 8.5% −2.1%
Ovarian cancer 1.3% −0.7% 1.3% −0.7% 5.5% −0.7%
Pancreatitis 3.8% 0.8% 3.8% 1.9% 3.8% 1.9%
Prostate cancer 2.7% 4.8% 2.7% 5.0% 7.6% 5.0%
Psoriasis 4.3% 1.0% 4.3% 1.3% 4.3% 1.3%
Sarcoidosis 1.4% −0.2% 1.6% −0.2% 2.2% −0.2%
Tumor of stomach 0.9% −0.0% 1.7% −0.0% 2.0% −0.0%
Table 4.4: Relative decrease in accuracy for both defense mechanisms in relation to
a fixed minimal increase in privacy ranging from 30% to 50%. A negative value means
that the accuracy could, in this case, even exceed the baseline accuracy (utility).
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∆minpriv 60.0% 70.0% 80.0%
Disease ∆macc ∆acc ∆macc ∆acc ∆macc ∆acc
Periodontitis 2.6% −1.9% 2.6% −0.8% 2.6% 2.9%
Renal cancer 1.7% 2.3% 2.5% 3.1% 4.8% 7.0%
Wilms tumor 5.5% 2.8% 8.1% 3.2% 15.5% 11.3%
Benign prostate hyperplasia 5.0% 0.9% 5.6% 0.9% 5.6% 5.5%
Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease
(COPD)
15.4% 4.1% 15.6% 5.3% 15.6% 9.0%
Colon cancer 3.3% 1.9% 3.9% 3.3% 7.7% 9.4%
Ductal adenocarcinoma 5.2% 1.8% 6.4% 4.6% 6.4% 6.4%
Glioma 0.4% 1.4% 1.1% 2.1% 1.1% 2.8%
Lung cancer 8.1% −1.5% 11.2% 0.2% 18.2% 5.5%
Melanoma 7.5% 4.9% 7.5% 6.5% 10.0% 11.2%
Multiple sclerosis 2.3% 0.7% 8.1% 3.8% 8.1% 6.7%
Myocardial infarction 7.3% 1.3% 7.3% 3.3% 11.2% 6.7%
Non-ischaemic systolic heart failure 8.5% −2.1% 9.3% −1.5% 9.3% 2.5%
Ovarian cancer 6.7% −0.7% 9.0% −0.7% 9.0% 2.5%
Pancreatitis 4.5% 3.1% 7.9% 4.3% 7.9% 7.9%
Prostate cancer 7.6% 5.6% 7.6% 5.6% 11.5% 8.9%
Psoriasis 4.3% 1.4% 5.8% 1.4% 10.0% 2.1%
Sarcoidosis 2.2% −0.2% 2.2% 0.6% 2.2% 5.3%
Tumor of stomach 2.0% −0.0% 5.1% 1.1% 5.1% 3.3%
Table 4.5: Relative decrease in accuracy for both defense mechanisms in relation to
a fixed minimal increase in privacy ranging from 60% to 80%. A negative value means
that the accuracy could, in this case, even exceed the baseline accuracy (utility).
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Membership Privacy for miRNA
Expression Profiles
Considering Membership Privacy in miRNA-based Studies
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5.1. MOTIVATION
5.1 Motivation
During the last decades, we have experienced significant achievements in the biomedical
field. A necessary condition for such a scientific breakthrough is the availability of large
amounts of biological data. However, this availability imposes severe privacy risks for
individuals who contribute their biological samples towards improving medicine.
One of the first attacks showing the extent of this threat was proposed by Homer et
al. back in 2008 [59]. Specifically, the authors demonstrated that, given (some parts of)
the genomic data of an individual and summary statistics of a genome-wide association
study (GWAS [45]), it is possible to determine whether this individual participated in
the GWAS. Such a membership attack can have disastrous privacy implications if the
individual happens to be part of the case group (e.g., carrying a sensitive disease). This
first attack led to substantial follow-up work aiming to identify the theoretical bounds
on the attack success more precisely and to propose defense mechanisms for countering
it.
While some biomedical studies publish their whole dataset in publicly available
databases online, other studies only release summary statistics of their dataset. In the
latter case, temporal linkability attacks such as presented in Chapter 4 are not possible
anymore. However, any kind of study publishing summary statistics might still be
susceptible to membership attacks.
In this chapter, we will again focus on microRNA expression profiles. Even though
biomedical research on miRNAs is far from complete, studies of miRNA expression
profiles have already shown that dysregulation of miRNA is linked to neurodegenerative
diseases, heart disease, diabetes, and the majority of cancers [84, 127, 70, 102, 37].
Therefore, miRNA expression profiling promises to allow for a more accurate and
minimally invasive diagnosis of major severe diseases. On the downside, this also implies
that miRNA expressions can tell us much more about whether someone is affected by a
disease at a given point in time than the genome, which only informs about the risk of
getting certain diseases.1
5.2 Contributions
In this chapter, we first study whether, and to what extent, membership inference can
be successfully carried out against datasets of biomedical data other than the genome.
To this end, we focus on miRNA expression profiles for our study. Notable challenges we
needed to overcome are that miRNA expressions are real-valued rather than discrete, but
of several orders of magnitude lower in dimension and noisier than genomic data. Indeed,
whereas a genome typically contains tens of millions of single nucleotide polymorphisms
(SNPs), there are currently only around five thousand identified miRNAs.
We present two attacks, one based on the L1 distance, as proposed by Homer et
al. in their seminal work, and another based on the likelihood-ratio (LR) test, which
is optimal, in the sense that it achieves maximum attack true-positive rate at a given
false-positive level. For the latter attack, we also derive the theoretical relation between
1The only exceptions are Mendelian disorders, such as cystic fibrosis, which are primarily determined
by our genes.
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true-positive rate, false-positive rate, number of miRNAs, and number of individuals
in the dataset. This relation is especially valuable as it is independent of the actual
individual miRNA expression values and any population-wide statistics.
Our experimental results demonstrate that, in general, the L1 distance attack
performs a bit worse than the LR attack, as expected, and that the LR theoretical
relation provides bounds that are slightly lower than the power of the empirical LR
test (i.e., the LR attack with actual miRNA expression data). Finally, we show that
the membership inference attack is a lot more successful against datasets composed of
participants carrying a specific disease than against randomly generated datasets. This
is essentially due to the fact that miRNA expressions are profoundly affected by the
health status of their owner, much more than genomic data. The latter result tells us
that the theoretical relation on the LR test has to be taken very cautiously regarding
the privacy levels it provides to miRNA-based studies in practice.
Second, given the extent of the threat to membership privacy, we propose and
evaluate both a perturbative, differentially private mechanism and a hiding mechanism
for countering the membership attack. More precisely, we first study two variants of
the perturbative algorithm assuming different prior knowledge of the attacker. We show
that, in our context, it does not make a substantial difference to the membership of a
victim whether an attacker assumes bounded or unbounded priors. Then, we evaluate
the impact of both protection mechanisms (perturbative and hiding) on mitigating the
success of the attacks. For the perturbative noise mechanism, we also thoroughly study
the evolution of noise and its impact on utility, as it can lead to a prohibitive loss for
research and medical utility. One critical observation is that the differentially private
mechanism is able to reduce the attack power to nearly random guessing, whereas the
hiding method is not. Moreover, the attack is in general very robust to hiding miRNA
means. Finally, we notice that the attack and differentially private mechanism are
influenced mostly by the number of individuals in the dataset. Based on our analytical
and experimental results, given the current number of miRNAs, we recommend to only
release summary statistics of datasets including at least a couple of hundred individuals.
5.3 Threat Model
The adversary’s goal is to determine whether a specific person (referred to as victim) is
a member of a group of study, that we will refer to as a pool.
First, we assume the adversary has access to the exact miRNA expression profile
xv ∈ Rm of the victim v. Such data can be easily extracted from a blood sample of the
victim, for a few hundred dollars (and the cost will undoubtedly decrease over time).
Full individual miRNA expression data are also increasingly available in public research
databases, such as the Gene Expression Omnibus (GEO) [44] or ArrayExpress [3]
databases. Furthermore, this data could be collected by hacking a healthcare provider
server, e.g., a hospital server. Indeed, healthcare companies are facing an increasing
number of cyber attacks [89] such as the Anthem’s breach, in which the medical records
of around 80 million patients were leaked [56].
Also, note that we will assume that the victim’s profile to which the adversary has
access and the profile the victim contributed to the pool were collected at the same time.
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Although miRNA expressions can vary in time, we have shown previously that miRNA
expression profiles can be efficiently linked over time frames of up to one year [P1].
Second, we assume the adversary has access to some summary statistics released
for the pool. Formally, the pool is defined as a set P ∈ Rn×m containing the miRNA
expression profiles of n entities gathered from an underlying population U , where each
profile is a vector ofm real values representing the expression of every miRNA. Such pools
of individuals are typically used by biomedical researchers in order to infer associations
between miRNAs and diseases. If significant associations exist, the researchers publish
their results in articles (typically available online) along with summary statistics about
their pool, such as mean values of miRNA expressions. In this work, we assume mean
statistics are available to the adversary, but other statistics could also be accessed, even
further increasing the adversary’s power.
Finally, we assume the adversary also has access to general miRNA expression
statistics of the underlying population U , the so-called reference population. Currently,
these statistics have to be estimated by the adversary using a subset of U , but we expect
that population-wide statistics will soon become publicly available, as it is the case for
genomic data.
5.4 Differential and Membership Privacy
In this work, beyond presenting attacks against membership privacy in miRNA-based
studies, we also propose countermeasures, notably relying on differential privacy [29].
We review here the definitions and results concerning differential privacy and positive
membership privacy relevant to this work.
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy [29]). A mechanism A provides -differential privacy
if and only if for any two datasets H1 and H2 differing in one element, and any
S ⊆ range(A), it holds that
Pr [A(H1) ∈ S] ≤ e · Pr [A(H2) ∈ S]
In this work, we will also discuss a relaxed version of differential privacy, membership
privacy, that ideally allows for smaller utility loss and at the same time satisfactory
privacy guarantees under relaxed adversarial assumptions. Positive membership privacy,
proposed by Li et al. [80], potentially allows to bound the change in the adversary’s
belief regarding an entity’s membership in a database after observing some statistics of
the database.
Definition 2 (Positive Membership Privacy [80]). A mechanism A provides (γ,D)-
positive membership privacy (PMP) under a distribution family D, where γ ≥ 1 if and
only if for any S ⊆ range(A), any distribution D ∈ D and any entity u ∈ U , it holds
that
Pr
D,A
[u ∈ H | A(H) ∈ S] ≤ γ · Pr
D
[u ∈ H] (5.1)
Pr
D,A
[u /∈ H | A(H) ∈ S] ≥ 1
γ
· Pr
D
[u /∈ H] (5.2)
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In general, (e,D)-membership privacy and -differential privacy are equivalent for
arbitrary distribution families D and thus require the same amount of noise. However, the
required amount of noise can be reduced by restricting the distribution families, assuming
prior bounds on the probability of membership. In particular, if the membership
probability pu of an entity u to a database is restricted to pu ∈ [a, b] ∪ {0, 1}, for
0 < a ≤ b < 1, then achieving weaker differential privacy is sufficient to achieve
(positive) membership privacy, as shown by Tramèr et al. [119].
Theorem 1 (Tramèr et al. [119]). A mechanism A
provides (γ,D[a,b]B )-PMP for some 0 < a ≤ b < 1, if A satisfies -differential privacy for
e =
{
min( (1−a)γ1−aγ ,
γ+b−1
b ) if aγ < 1,
γ+b−1
b otherwise.
(5.3)
5.5 Membership Inference Attack
In this section, we first introduce the two test statistics used in our attack, one that is
based on the approach proposed by Homer et al. [59] and another that relies on the
likelihood ratio test. Then, we evaluate both approaches using a real dataset containing
more than 1,000 miRNA expression profiles [73] and compare their performance.
5.5.1 Analytical Results
The mean of miRNA expression values is one of the most frequently released summary
statistics in miRNA-based studies. Indeed, for studies which aim to discover associations
between dysregulated miRNAs and diseases, it is crucial to disclose the mean of miRNA
expression values over all case samples (individuals carrying the disease of interest to
the study) and, separately, over all control samples. Another statistic used for the same
purpose is the p-value of the t-test. We show, in the following, that, in many cases, the
average values of miRNAs are already sufficient to identify participation of a victim in
a miRNA-based pool.
The expression value of the miRNA j of the individual i is denoted by xji ∈ R.
xi ∈ Rm is the vector of all miRNA expression values, also called the miRNA expression
profile, of the individual i. Further, µj denotes the average expression value of miRNA
j in the reference population, while µˆj denotes the average of miRNA j’s expression
value in the pool.
5.5.1.1 L1 Distances Difference
In order to determine whether a victim v is part of the pool, extending Homer et al.’s
idea to real-valued miRNA expression profiles, one can simply compare the distances
between (1) xjv and µj , and (2) xjv and µˆj . By computing the difference between these
distances we obtain the following statistic:
D(xjv) = |xjv − µj | − |xjv − µˆj | (5.4)
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Under the null hypothesis, if xjv is not part of the pool, D(xjv) should approach zero.
Under the alternative hypothesis, where xjv is a member of the pool, it should be greater
than zero because the victim’s contribution xjv to µˆj will shift µˆj away from µj . When
D(xjv) is negative, xjv is further away from the pool than from the reference population,
and thus even less likely to be part of the pool.
Following from the central limit theorem, if the number of miRNAs is sufficiently
high, the sum of D(xjv) over all miRNAs j will converge to the normal distribution.
Hence, we use the one-sample t-test to determine whether the person of interest v is
part of the pool: If the test is strictly greater than a threshold, we assume v is part of
the pool and, otherwise, that v is not in the pool.
5.5.1.2 Likelihood-Ratio Test
Although the aforementioned test can be very accurate, there is no known theoretical
guarantee on the power2 of detection it can achieve. Thus, it is possible that another
approach could provide better attack power. We therefore also propose and evaluate a
test statistic based on the likelihood-ratio test (LR test).
This method has the non-negligible advantage of attaining the maximum achievable
power for a given false-positive level, thus providing a theoretical limit on the maximum
detection power of the adversary, according to the Neyman-Pearson lemma. This lemma
states that the exact LR test achieves the maximum power at a given false-positive level
in binary hypothesis testing [92]. Furthermore, in the context of genomic privacy, the
LR test has been empirically shown to be more powerful than Homer et al.’s attack,
especially for small false-positive levels [106]. Before deriving the exact likelihood-ratio
statistic for miRNA expression profiles, we have to impose some assumptions on their
characteristics.
First, we assume that miRNAs are independent3 and that the expression value of each
miRNA j is distributed according to a normal distribution (with different parameters
for the reference population and the pool). Note that the normal distribution is the
distribution that best fits the distributions observed from our miRNA expression dataset.
For the reference population, we denote the mean by µj and the standard deviation
by σj . For the pool, we denote them by µˆj and σˆj respectively. Note that a deviation
from the Neyman-Pearson lemma might occur if, for example, the miRNAs are only
approximately normally distributed.
Under the null hypothesis that the victim is not part of the pool, this victim’s
miRNA expressions are drawn from the reference population as defined above, i.e., each
miRNA expression j of individual v is drawn with the probability density:
f(xjv) =
1√
2piσj
e
−x
j
v−µj
2σ2
j (5.5)
Similarly, under the alternative hypothesis, following a similar reasoning as in the
theoretical analysis of [106], we consider the miRNA expressions of the victim to be
2Power refers to the true-positive rate, also called sensitivity.
3We make this assumption for tractability reasons, noting that about 60% of miRNAs are independent.
Moreover, such assumption leads us to an upper bound on the adversary’s power in inferring membership
of the victim.
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drawn according to the probability distribution of the pool:
fˆ(xjv) =
1√
2piσˆj
e
−x
j
v−µˆj
2σˆ2
j (5.6)
We can then derive the following likelihood ratio between the alternative and the
null hypotheses:
LR = σ
σˆ
e
x
j
v−µj
2σ2
j
−x
j
v−µˆj
2σˆ2
j (5.7)
Hence, the log-likelihood ratio over all miRNAs can then be written as:
LLR =
m∑
j=1
(xjv − µj)2
2σ2j
− (x
j
v − µˆj)2
2σˆ2j
+ log σj
σˆj
(5.8)
If the adversary has access to the average values µˆj of miRNA expressions in the
pool, as assumed in this work, he still has to derive µj , σj , and σˆj . The reference
population’s parameters µj and σj can be approximated by relying on publicly available
datasets of miRNA expression levels. In Section 5.5.3, we approximate these parameters
with our dataset of miRNA expressions. Finally, the adversary still needs to estimate
σˆj . For large n, the standard deviation should be very close to the standard deviation
in the reference population because participants in the pool are supposed to come from
the same reference population. Hence, σˆj ≈ σj is the best approximation the adversary
can make about σˆj . In our evaluation, we will compute both the LR with the exact
standard deviation σˆj and with σˆj = σj , and compare the outcomes.
We now present the theoretical approximation on the maximum achievable power
given the false-positive rate, the number of miRNAs, and the number of individuals in
the pool.
Theorem 2. Assuming ∀j : σj ≈ σˆj, the relation between the power β, the false-positive
rate α, the number of miRNAs m, and the number of individuals n in the pool is
zα + z1−β ≈
√
2m
n2
, (5.9)
where zx is the 100(1-x)th percentile of the standard normal distribution.
Proof of Theorem 2. First of all, we need to compute the statistics of the LLR defined
in (5.8) under the null and the alternative hypotheses. Focusing on a single miRNA j’s
expression (i.e., one term of the LLR sum), we have the following mean µj,0 under the
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null hypothesis:
µj,0 := E[LLRj | H0] = 12σ2j
∫ ∞
−∞
(xjv − µj)2f(xjv)dxjv (5.10)
− 12σˆ2j
∫ ∞
−∞
(xjv − µˆj)2f(xjv)dxjv + log
σj
σˆj
∫ ∞
−∞
f(xjv)dxjv (5.11)
= 12 −
1
2σˆ2j
∫ ∞
−∞
(xjv − µˆj)2f(xjv)dxjv + log
σj
σˆj
(5.12)
= 12 −
1
2σˆ2j
∫ ∞
−∞
(xjv − µj −
xjv − µj
n
)2f(xjv)dxjv + log
σj
σˆj
(5.13)
= 12 −
σ2j
2σˆ2j
+
σ2j
nσˆ2j
− σ
2
j
2n2σˆ2j
+ log σj
σˆj
. (5.14)
From (5.12) to (5.13), we assume that the pool is constituted of the victim v and
n− 1 individuals drawn as under the null hypothesis, i.e., µˆj = (n−1)µj+x
j
v
n . Using our
assumption ∀j : σˆj = σj , we obtain
µj,0 =
1
n
− 12n2 =
2n− 1
2n2 . (5.15)
Following the same reasoning, replacing µj by nµˆj−x
j
v
n−1 , we get the following mean under
the alternative hypothesis:
µj,1 := E[LLRj | H1] = 2n− 12(n− 1)2 (5.16)
The variances of the LLR under the null and the alternative hypotheses are equal to:
σ2j,k := E[LLR2j | Hk]− µ2j,k, k ∈ {0, 1} (5.17)
E[LLR2j | Hk] can be derived similarly to the means, by using the central moments
(E[(X −E(X))c]) of the normal distribution up to order c = 4. We obtain the following
standard deviations:
σj,0 =
2n− 1√
2n2
, (5.18)
σj,1 =
2n− 1√
2(n− 1)2 (5.19)
Note that the mean and variance statistics do not depend on miRNA j’s values. Then, for
moderately largem, it is known that the exact LLR statistics are approximately Gaussian,
which allows us to use the relationship mµj,0 + zα
√
mσj,0 = mµj,1− z1−β
√
mσj,1, where
zα and z1−β are the quantiles of level 1− α and β of the normal distribution. Thus, we
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obtain the following relations:
σj,0zα + σj,0z1−β =
√
m(µj,1 − µj,0) (5.20)
1√
2n2
zα +
1√
2(n− 1)2 z1−β =
√
m
( 1
2(n− 1)2 −
1
2n2
)
(5.21)
(n− 1)2zα + n2z1−β =
√
2m(n− 12) (5.22)
zα + z1−β ≈
√
2m
n2
(5.23)
The theoretical relation does not depend on the average values µj , µˆj of the miRNA
expressions, nor does it make any assumptions about their values. It only requires m
to be relatively large. Theorem 2 shows us that, for a successful attack, the number
of exposed miRNAs m has to scale with the square of the number of participants in
the study (n2), which is better from a privacy point of view than with genomic data
where it has to scale linearly with n [106]. Nevertheless, this does not imply that
participants in miRNA-based studies are fully protected against membership inference
attacks: First, as we will see in our dataset, the number of participants in pools can
be lower than 20 in current practice. Second, biomedical researchers continuously keep
discovering new miRNAs and, thereby, implicitly increase the number m of available
statistics [94]. Finally, real case groups can have expression means that are further
away from reference population means than what we assume in our theoretical analysis.
This can be explained by the fact that miRNA expressions are profoundly affected by
diseases.
5.5.2 Dataset Description
The dataset was first presented and used by Keller et al. in [73] and is publicly available
in the gene expression omnibus (GEO) database under reference GSE61741. It is the
same dataset as the one we used in Chapter 4 to evaluate the accuracy of a diagnosis in
the presence of our privacy-preserving techniques. It contains the miRNA expression
profiles of 1,049 individuals and, hence, can be considered a very rich dataset in the
biomedical field. Every profile contains a set of 848 miRNA expressions. 94 of the 1,049
individuals are healthy people whereas the others are affected by one out of 19 diseases:
124 people have Wilms tumor (D1), 73 lung cancer (D2), 65 prostate cancer (D3), 62
myocardial infarction (D4), 47 chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) (D5),
45 sarcoidosis (D6), 45 ductal adenocarcinoma (D7), 43 psoriasis (D8), 37 pancreatitis
(D9), 35 benign prostate hyperplasia (D10), 35 melanoma (D11), 33 non-ischaemic
systolic heart failure (D12), 29 colon cancer (D13), 24 ovarian cancer (D14), 23 multiple
sclerosis (D15), 20 glioma (D16), 20 renal cancer (D17), 18 periodontitis (D18), and 13
stomach tumor (D19).
Before running our experiments, we filter out non-expressed miRNAs, i.e., those
with a median level of expressions over all individuals smaller than 50, which leaves us
with 466 expressed miRNAs. This preprocessing phase is standard in the biomedical
research field.
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5.5.3 Experimental Results
We evaluate our attacks on the aforementioned dataset in two different settings: (1) we
randomly pick a varying number n of individuals from the dataset to form a pool, and
(2) we consider every case group (carrying a disease) described previously as a pool.
The reference population is estimated using the entire dataset, i.e., all 1,049 individuals.
While the first setting allows us to evaluate the attack success independent of any
effects that might be caused by diseases, the second setting is actually more realistic.
Indeed, biomedical publications usually include the mean values of cases carrying specific
diseases.
We evaluate each attack on aforementioned pools, using each of the 1,049 individuals
as a potential victim. Given an attack and a pool, we obtain a test statistic Tv for every
victim v. We then say v is more likely to be part of the pool than to be part of the
reference population if the test statistic is higher than a given threshold th, i.e., Tv > th.
Depending on whether v is part of the pool or not, we classify the result as true-positive
(v is part of the pool and Tv > th), false-positive (v is not part of the pool and Tv > th),
true-negative (v is not part of the pool and Tv ≤ th) or false-negative (v is part of
the pool and Tv ≤ th). These metrics are then used to compute the true-positive and
false-positive rates for varying thresholds.
Random Pools. In the first setting, we randomly select 50 subsets of n different
individuals among the 1,049 in our dataset and average the results.
All figures in this section will depict the receiver operating characteristic (ROC)
curves that compare the false-positive rate, on the x-axis, with the power of the attack,
on the y-axis. We show four different ROC curves for (1) the attack based on the
difference of the L1 distances, (2) the likelihood-ratio attack knowing all the population
and pool statistical parameters, i.e., µ, µˆ, σ, σˆ (referred to as LR exact), (3) the LR
attack not knowing σˆ, and approximating it as σˆ ≈ σ (corresponding to our assumed
threat model), and (4) the theoretical LR relation derived in Theorem 2 also assuming
σˆ ≈ σ. The figures are shown with a logarithmic x-axis, representing the false-positive
rate in the range [10−3, 1].
In Figure 5.1, we depict three diagrams of randomly constructed pools for n ∈
{35, 65, 124}. We select these numbers because they are representative for our dataset
and also correspond to the numbers of cases of three disease-specific groups shown in
Figure 5.2. For n = 35, the power of the LR test is more than 40% for a false-positive
rate of 10%. As expected, increasing the size of the pool results in a loss of power.
The more participants contribute to the pool’s statistics, the more challenging it is to
identify whether the victim participated in this pool.
In all cases, the exact LR test performs best, most likely due to the availability of
all statistical parameters, followed by the LR test corresponding to our threat model.
The L1 distance test achieves the least power of the empirical tests.
Finally, we observe that the theoretical LR curve is quite close to the empirically
evaluated LR curve when n = 35, but also that it degrades faster when n increases.
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(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 5.1: ROC curves for pools of n randomly chosen individuals: (a) n = 35, (b) n = 65,
(c) n = 124.
Case Groups. Figure 5.2 depicts ROC curves for six different case groups of individuals
carrying a specific disease. Specifically, we select six case groups ranging from the smallest
(stomach tumor) to the largest (Wilms tumor) number of individuals and use them as
pools. Note that these groups are fairly representative for all of the 19 case groups.
We first observe that, as previously, the exact LR test performs best, followed by the
realistic LR test and L1 distance test in most cases. We also notice that the empirically
evaluated attacks perform significantly better than the theoretical approximation of the
LR test for almost all case groups.
If we compare the performance on randomly constructed pools in Figure 5.1 and
on case groups in Figure 5.2 for the same number of individuals n, the attack on case
groups yields higher power for the same false-positive level. For instance, we observe a
power of around 60% at a false-positive rate of 10% for Wilms tumor (Figure 5.2(f))
against a power of around 25% at the same false-positive rate when the individuals are
randomly picked to be part of the pool (Figure 5.1(c)).
Furthermore, as shown by our dataset, it often happens that the case group is very
tiny. Then, in the case of stomach tumor, for example, the power reaches 100% at a
small false-positive rate of 3.5%, and 77% at a false-positive rate of 0.9% (Figure 5.2(a)).
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Figure 5.2: ROC curves for case groups of n individuals carrying: (a) stomach tumor
(D19, n = 13), (b) renal cancer (D17, n = 20), (c) benign prostate hyperplasia (D10,
n = 35), (d) ductal adenocarcinoma (D7, n = 45), (e) prostate cancer (D3, n = 65), and
(f) Wilms tumor (D1, n = 124).
This demonstrates that one should be very careful when releasing summary statistics
about disease-related case groups in miRNA studies, as attacks against such pools
clearly outperform the theoretical LR power. This is certainly due to the fact that
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miRNA expressions are highly correlated with the overall health status of their owners,
and more precisely with their disease status. Note that while case groups affect the
inference success, the inference result cannot be used to classify individuals as healthy or
diseased. Bioinformaticians usually carry out such classifications using more advanced
techniques such as support vector machines [77].
In any case, we strongly discourage researchers from publishing the exact statistics
of disease-specific case groups, at least for pools smaller than a few hundred participants
(which we have shown not to be resistant to membership inference attacks). Instead, we
suggest applying probabilistic sanitization before disclosing the summary statistics or
reducing the number of released means drastically.
Finally, note that an attack aiming at discriminating between two different pools,
i.e., classifying whether an individual is part of one of two pools, would be even more
successful than ours, as shown in the context of genomic privacy in [106]. For instance,
the authors of this paper showed that, if the sizes of both pools were equivalent, then
the number of genomic variants needed to achieve a given power and false-positive rate
dropped by four compared to the more complex membership attack in which there is
no information about the presence of the victim in any of the pools.
5.6 Membership Protection
In this section, we discuss and evaluate the sanitization of miRNA expression statistics,
aiming at protecting the membership of any entity in the pool. To this end, we employ
two different techniques, namely (1) adding noise to achieve differential privacy and (2)
publishing only a subset of miRNA expression statistics.
In particular, we first analytically examine the technique based on adding noise,
before we empirically evaluate the effect of both of our techniques on the privacy of
contributors and the utility for research.
5.6.1 Analytical Results
For the analytical examination of the differential privacy approach, we first determine a
suitable noise distribution for the mean statistic, then present utility bounds based on
this noise distribution, and finally evaluate the discrepancy between noise magnitudes
under two adversarial assumptions and different parameters.
A standard method to achieve differential privacy for real-valued functions is to
add Laplace noise: We replace the original mechanism for computing mean values
favg : H → Rm by the sanitized mechanism f ′avg = favg + (y1, . . . , ym) that adds noise yi
to each miRNA expression mean distributed by a suitably scaled Laplace distribution
Lap(b). As shown by Dwork et al. [30], we achieve -differential privacy for favg by
adding Laplace noise scaled with b = ∆(favg) , where ∆(favg) is the global sensitivity of
favg, defined as follows.
Definition 3. For the statistic favg : H → Rm that releases the means of m miRNA
expression values over n samples, where the expression value of miRNA i has range δi,
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the global sensitivity ∆(favg) is determined by
∆(favg) = max
H1,H2∈H
‖favg(H1)− favg(H2)‖1
= max
H1,H2∈H
m∑
i
|favg,i(H1)− favg,i(H2)| =
m∑
i
δi
n
,
where H1 and H2 are two datasets differing in one element.
Applying this definition, for every miRNA i in {1, . . . ,m} and pool containing n
individual samples, the noise yi added to the mean to achieve -differential privacy is
drawn from Lap(
∑m
k=1 δk
n ).
Note that the range δk of miRNA k’s expression is the global range of its expression
values, not the range within the pool only. In our evaluations, we approximate this
range by the difference between the minimum and maximum expression values found in
our whole dataset.
One of the main criticisms of differential privacy is that adding noise to the original
statistics negates its utility. We now derive a bound for the probability that the most
noise added to any element favg,i of favg exceeds a value z. Note that, as shown by
Ghosh et al. [46], using a geometric noise mechanism can lead to slightly better utility
bounds. However, in our specific use case, the high sensitivity of our release mechanism
will dominate any practical utility concerns, and we thus stick to the simpler Laplacian
mechanism.
Theorem 3. Let favg : H → Rm and let f ′avg = favg + (y1, . . . , ym), yi ∼ Lap(∆(favg) ).
Then, ∀z ≥ 0
Pr
[
|favg,i(H)− f ′avg,i(H)| ≥ z
]
≤ e
− nz∑m
k=1 δk
Proof of Theorem 3. By Theorem 3.8 in [31], it holds that
Pr
[
|fi(H)− f ′i(H)| ≥ ln
( 1
α
)(∆(f)

)]
≤ α
for some probability α ∈ (0, 1]. Note that, instead of considering the L∞ norm of the
whole output of f as in the original result, we bound the difference for any of the output
values fi.
By setting z = ln
(
1
α
) (
∆(f)

)
, replacing ∆(f) by the formula derived in Definition 3,
and solving it for α, we get our upper bound.
Given that the range of some of the miRNA expressions in our dataset is very high, the
sensitivity ∆(favg) =
∑m
i
δi
n of the mean statistic will be very high too. Figure 5.3(a),
which represents empirical complementary cumulative distribution function of the
miRNA expression means, helps to understand this behavior. Indeed, it shows that
the majority of expression values’ means are smaller than 200, but also that some are
higher than 10,000. Similar substantial discrepancies occur for the expression ranges δi.
As the sensitivity is, for every miRNA, by definition, the sum over all miRNA ranges,
it affects the noise distribution added to every miRNA. The probability bound on the
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Figure 5.3: Comparison of initial miRNA expression means and typical noise distributions
with and without bounded priors. (a) Empirical complementary cumulative distribution
function (CCDF), (b) Probability upper bound η that the noise added to our statistic favg
is greater than or equal to y, given the membership-privacy parameter γ1 = 1.5 and
γ2 = 5 and the pool sizes n1 = 100 and n2 = 1000, (c) Probability upper bound η given
the differential-privacy parameter  ∈ {1, 10, 50, 100} and the pool size n = 100.
maximum noise added to favg,i is thus large unless the pool contains a large number of
samples n, or  is large.
We now evaluate whether providing (γ,D[a,b]B )-positive membership privacy by con-
sidering a weaker adversary can help reduce the amount of noise in our context. To
achieve membership privacy for bounded prior membership probabilities, we can derive
 according to Theorem 1 from γ and the priors a and b. Contrary to the application
example in [119], in which the adversary aims to distinguish the membership between a
case group of size n and a control group of size N − n, our adversary has to determine
membership in a pool without knowing a priori that the victim is either in the case
group or in the control group. Therefore, our priors are not the probabilities of being
in the case group or in the control group knowing that the victim is part of the N
individuals contributing their data to the study,4 but rather the probability that an
individual contributed his data to a pool, given that he is part of a given population,
4Under this assumption, the probability of being in the case or control group is typically 0.5 [119].
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
D a, b γ = 1.3 γ = 1.5 γ = 5
D19 0.0003 0.2624 0.4056 1.6104
D17 0.0013 0.2627 0.4061 1.6145
D3 0.009 0.2651 0.41 1.6464
Table 5.1: Privacy parameters for the diseases stomach tumor (D19), renal cancer (D17),
and prostate cancer (D3 – male only) achieving γ-membership privacy under prior
probability determined from disease prevalence rate in the US (collected on [17]).
much larger than N .
Here, we assume the adversary only knows the country in which the victim lives
and relies on the nation-wide disease-prevalence statistics as background knowledge.
Table 5.1 presents the prior probabilities, for a victim living in the US and for three
cancers present in our dataset, and the resulting values of the privacy parameter  for
each disease and typical values of γ. We notice that, for these values of γ, the resulting
 values do not differ a lot between different diseases, even though the prevalence rate,
or prior, of D3 is 30 times higher than D19’s rate/prior. This can be explained by the
relatively small absolute priors given by the prevalence rates.
Figure 5.3(b) illustrates the dependence of the utility bound provided in Theorem 3
on the number of individuals in the pool, and on the values of membership privacy
parameter γ. We depict the probability upper bound from Theorem 3 (referred to as η in
the figure) for the general differential privacy case (i.e.,  = ln(γ)) and for the case with
bounded priors, given membership-privacy parameters γ1 = 1.5 and γ2 = 5, and pools of
sizes n1 = 100 and n2 = 1000. For the case with bounded priors (so-called “bounded” in
the figure), the privacy parameter  corresponding to the membership-privacy parameter
γ has been derived from the priors of disease D3, as provided in Table 5.1.
We make the following observations from Figure 5.3(b). First, for prior membership
probabilities that are relevant for our use case, using the privacy parameter with
bounded priors determined by Theorem 1 does not make a noticeable difference to using
traditional differential privacy (with unbounded priors). Using the privacy parameter
determined for the other two diseases (D19 or D17) in Table 5.1 leads us to the same
conclusion. Therefore, we suggest making use of traditional differential privacy as it
provides privacy guarantees against a stronger adversary. For this reason, we focus on
traditional differential privacy in our empirical evaluations.
Second, the accuracy of the noised summary statistic increases exponentially with
the sample size n. This is consistent with the result of Theorem 2. In other words, the
higher n is, the less powerful is the membership attack, and the less noise needs to be
added to the summary statistics for guaranteeing differential privacy. We can therefore
only encourage biomedical researchers to increase the size of their miRNA pools, which
will benefit privacy as well as accuracy and significance of their results.
Finally, for the pool sizes, we observe in our dataset, the expected accuracy of
our noisy summary statistic f ′avg will be very low unless we significantly increase the
privacy parameter . Figure 5.3(c) shows how our utility bound evolves depending on
the parameter . By comparing the noise values y with the CCDF of Figure 5.3(a), we
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(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 5.4: Membership inference attacks in the presence of a differentially private
mechanism. AUCs and noise-to-mean ratios for three case groups: (a) stomach tumor
(D19), (b) renal cancer (D17), (c) prostate cancer (D3).
clearly notice that the noise is too large with respect to most of the miRNA means for
the chosen (low) privacy parameters. Since  is a parameter that can be freely chosen by
the designer of the sanitization mechanism, we will, in our evaluation in the following
section, examine how far we can increase  while at the same time ensuring that the
attacks presented in Section 5.5 are countered. In any case, given the sensitivity of the
mean statistics of miRNA expressions, we can expect that  will have to be large to
reach a level of noise that is not too high. Then, if  is large (and consequently γ is
very large), there is again almost no utility difference between providing membership
privacy with bounded or unbounded priors (i.e., differential privacy).
5.6.2 Experimental Results
In this section, we evaluate first the impact of the differentially private mechanism on
the membership attack and on the utility. Then, we evaluate the effect of hiding a
certain number of released miRNA expression means.
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Differentially Private Mechanism. We follow the approach presented above for
ensuring -differential privacy. That is, we generate the noise vector y from m randomly
generated Laplacian samples drawn from L(
∑m
k=1 δk
n ) and add its value to the vector of
miRNA expression means: µˆ′ = µˆ+ y.
We repeat this process 1000 times, evaluate each run as presented in Section 5.5.3,
and derive the average ROC curve and its resulting area under the curve (AUC) for
 between 1 and 104. Note that an AUC of 0.5 represents a similar performance as
randomly guessing whether the victim is part of the pool or not, meaning best privacy.
On the contrary, an AUC of 1 represents the worst outcome from a privacy perspective:
100% power at any false-positive level.
In this subsection, we focus on three case groups related to cancer that represent
the groups for which the membership attack was most successful (see Figure 5.2).
Figures 5.4(a)–(c) show the AUC of the L1 distance and LR attacks, and the noise-to-
mean ratio 1m
∑m
i=1
|yi|
µˆi
resulting from the noise mechanism. This ratio can be viewed as
an indicator of the utility of the published statistics: A ratio of 0 means that all utility
is preserved, whereas a ratio of 1 means that, on average (over all runs and miRNAs),
the added noise is equivalent to the initial mean.
First of all, we observe that, for all three depicted case groups, when noise is added
to the actual means, the L1 distance test can perform better than the LR test. In
other words, the L1 distance test is more robust to noise than the LR test. While
this observation might seem counter-intuitive at first glance, especially because of the
Neyman-Pearson lemma, it becomes more apparent when revisiting the impact of the
noise on the tests: The L1 distance test is influenced by the noise in a linear shift of
the distance between the victim and the mean values of the pool. However, for the
LR test, this distance is scaled quadratically. Hence, the LR test is more sensitive to
noise than the L1 distance test. Moreover, this observation does not invalidate the
Neyman-Pearson lemma but changes the assumptions imposed on the data.
In general, the figures show that there is no ideal  value achieving both membership
privacy and full utility. In order to achieve perfect privacy against the membership
attack with the L1 distance,  must be smaller than 10. Choosing the privacy parameter
 = 10, however, can significantly decrease the utility of the miRNA expression means,
from approximately 100% added noise (compared to the mean) for stomach tumor
(Figure 5.4(a)) to around 10% added noise for prostate cancer (Figure 5.4(c)). We
observe that the number of participants n in the pool plays a positive role on the privacy-
utility trade-off, confirming our analytical findings. Indeed, as already mentioned, a
higher value of n reduces the noise for the same  value and reduces the success of the
membership attack in general.
Hiding Mechanism. Considering that the differentially private method adds too much
noise when n is relatively small (typically smaller than 50, like for the stomach tumor
and renal cancer case groups), we also propose a non-perturbative mechanism that
discloses only a subset of miRNA expression means. Ideally, this protection mechanism
could obfuscate miRNA means irrelevant to the research study, such as miRNAs that
are found not to be associated with the disease of interest.
In our experiments, we randomly select the subset of miRNAs to be hidden, in order
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Figure 5.5: Membership inference attacks in the presence of a hiding mechanism. AUCs
for three case groups: (a) stomach tumor (D19), (b) renal cancer (D17), (c) prostate
cancer (D3).
to have a general idea on the impact of hiding miRNA means. To this end, we first
randomly sample 50 different orders of the 466 miRNAs. Then, for each of these 50
ordered sequences, we decrease the number of released miRNA expression means from
all miRNAs (m = 466) to m = 1. Finally, we average the attack results over the 50
samples for every number m. Figures 5.5(a)–(c) show the AUCs of the attacks presented
in Section 5.5.
In contrast to the differentially private mechanism, the hiding of miRNA expression
means preserves the guarantees of the Neyman-Pearson lemma and the assumptions
of our data model. Hence, the LR attack always outperforms the L1 distance attack.
We also observe that the AUC of the theoretical LR test slightly underestimates the
success of the attack, as already noticed in Section 5.5.3, due to the disease-specific
pool. Moreover, we notice that theoretical AUC curves are shaped like
√
m, as expected
from relation (5.9) of Theorem 2. This decreasing success of the attack is also observed
in both empirical curves, but in a sharper manner and with a significant decrease with
very few miRNAs. The empirical LR curve especially shows almost maximal AUC for
m = 50. This demonstrates that, in practice, due to the type and behavior of miRNA
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data, the LR attack is very robust against a decreasing number of released miRNA
means. This robustness should again warn privacy designers about the theoretical
relation that underestimates the actual attack success with disease-specific pools.
Concerning the general impact of the hiding mechanism on privacy, we notice that it
does not substantially improve the situation if more than 50 miRNA means are disclosed.
The number of published miRNA expressions has to be very small in order to achieve low
AUCs, typically smaller than 10. In comparison to the differentially private mechanism,
the AUCs with hiding never reach a point near random guessing (i.e., 0.5). Hence, while
this protection mechanism might be more desirable for biomedical researchers because
it does not perturb the released data, it is not able to fully protect membership privacy.
5.7 Conclusion
This work sheds further light on privacy risks stemming from miRNA expression data,
showing that it is possible to detect membership in datasets of miRNA-based studies
by relying on their published mean statistics. In particular, we present two attacks, one
based on the L1 distance and the other based on the likelihood-ratio test, known to
be optimal. The theoretical limit derived for the latter attack has nevertheless to be
taken very cautiously: Indeed, miRNA expressions are substantially more affected by
the health status than genomic data. Therefore, as miRNA-based studies very often
include individuals carrying specific diseases, their statistics are more different from
healthy general population statistics. This, in turn, increases the adversary’s power
to detect membership of a given individual. Our experimental results confirm this by
clearly showing that membership is much easier to detect in disease-specific datasets
than in random ones.
Moreover, we propose and thoroughly study two protection mechanisms: The first
protection mechanism is based on the notion of differential privacy, perturbing the
released miRNA expression means, whereas the second technique only releases a subset
of the miRNA expression means. We observe that the differentially private mechanism
is able to protect the privacy, effectively decreasing the attack success to nearly random
guessing. However, the amount of noise introduced by this protection mechanism
might render the released statistics useless, in particular for small datasets. In general,
we recommend the following approach for ensuring membership privacy for study
participants and preserving the biomedical utility of the data: Having a large number of
participants, at least a few hundred and, if necessary, slightly perturbing the summary
statistics in a differentially private manner.
Possible future directions include the derivations of theoretical bounds on the attack
power with noisy statistics. It would also be important to evaluate the impact of
correlated miRNAs. Finally, it could be interesting to formally quantify the increased
power of the attack when the adversary does not aim to detect membership in one pool
but instead wants to detect membership between two pools.
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Genotype Inference from DNA
Methylation Profiles
Quantifying and Mitigating Privacy Concerns with meQTLs
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6.1. MOTIVATION
6.1 Motivation
The previous chapters have focused on privacy threats arising from microRNA-expression-
based studies specifically, only considering a single type of biological data available to
an adversary. Biological organisms, however, typically involve a multitude of highly
complex processes, each of which is defined by an interaction between different types of
biological data. As a consequence, different types of biomedical data are often correlated,
and there exist causal dependencies between them.
In this chapter, we study such an interdependency for two of the most important
elements in the human body: the human DNA and DNA methylation. DNA methylation
is not only one of the most important, but also the probably best understood epigenetic
element influencing human health. It is an essential regulator of gene transcription.
Aberrant DNA methylation patterns (such as hypermethylation and hypomethylation)
have been associated with a large number of cancer types [36, 23, 124]. Because of its
crucial role in human health, DNA methylation data might constitute highly sensitive
data as well, whose privacy should be protected using dedicated legal or technical means.
Similarly to other epigenetic data, DNA methylation data vary quite significantly
over time, mainly because they are profoundly influenced by environmental factors.
This variability may explain why DNA methylation data are simply released (without
identifiers) on open online platforms with nonrestricted access. In order to prevent
privacy breaches, the genomic data corresponding to the DNA methylation data are
generally not made publicly available and follow stricter privacy rules.
It is well-known that DNA methylation is also influenced by genetic factors [87].
As a consequence, correlations between DNA methylation and the genome could be
exploited in order to re-identify anonymous DNA methylation profiles by using some
public genomic database (e.g., OpenSNP [95]). Unfortunately, previous work has only
tackled potential re-identification risks and countermeasures from a relatively high-level
qualitative perspective (see Chapter 3). In this chapter, we provide the first detailed
quantitative assessment of the identification risks inherent to DNA methylation data and,
moreover, propose a provably secure technical mechanism to enable privacy-preserving
methylation-based diagnosis.
6.2 Contributions
Specifically, we present a Bayesian inference framework to predict part of the genotype
from DNA methylation data. We then propose an algorithm that matches DNA
methylation profiles to genotypes, maximizing the posterior probabilities, given these
methylation profiles. By using a rich methylation-genotype dataset, we show that only
a few tens of methylation regions are sufficient to accurately match DNA methylation
to genotypes. Furthermore, we present a statistical method that enables us to reject the
small fraction of cases where the matching algorithm does not provide 100% accuracy,
e.g., when the genotype corresponding to the methylation profile is not part of the
genotype dataset. We also observe that, in such cases, if a relative is part of the
genotypes’ dataset, it is the one (wrongly) matched to the methylation profile. By
including all genotypes contained in phase 3 of the 1000 Genome Project, we show that
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the attack success is very robust to an increase in the size of the genotype dataset.
Accuracy, false-positive rate, and true-positive rate remain constant for a size of the
genotype dataset varying from 75 to 2579.
Given the extent of the threat, we propose a novel cryptographic scheme for privately
classifying tumors, which allows for a privacy-preserving medical diagnosis in a standard
clinical setting. With our method, neither can a curious third-party running the machine-
learning algorithm learn the personal DNA methylation data, nor can the data owner
(e.g., the patient) learn the detailed machine-learning model. In particular, we adapt
existing homomorphic schemes in order to evaluate random forests with encrypted data
privately. We prove the resulting scheme secure in the honest-but-curious adversarial
model, which constitutes the state-of-the-art adversary model in this problem setting.
We evaluate the classifier performance on real methylation data and show that it can
precisely classify brain tumors in 9 subtype classes based on 900 methylation levels in
less than an hour, which represents an entirely tolerable computational time for the
considered application scenario.
6.3 Threat Model
We assume that the adversary gets access to one or multiple individual profiles of
genome-wide DNA methylation levels, as well as to a set of genotypes. There are around
28 million CpG sites per individual and about 150 million known genomic variants
to which the adversary can potentially have access. Then, we study various scenarios
that could occur in practice. A typical example is to map a given anonymized DNA
methylation profile to a genotype in order to re-identify it. Indeed, genomic data can
facilitate de-anonymization, because there are already many profiles publicly available
online with real identifiers, but also because it includes information about phenotypic
traits and kinship that can be further matched to side channels such as surname-genome
associations databases [53] or online social networks [64]. Moreover, the genome is very
stable over our whole lifetime, and thus cannot be revoked.
Note that we assume the adversary to have no prior knowledge about the presence
of the target’s genotype in the set of genotypes. Thus, the adversary also wants to
determine whether the genomic profile that most likely matches to the DNA methylation
profile belongs to the same person. In other words, the adversary also tests if the owner
of the DNA methylation profile is also part of the genomic dataset. We also study if
familial relationships can mislead the adversary about the genotype corresponding to
the methylation profile.
In the private classification model, we consider an honest-but-curious adversary as
this assumption is standard in previous works on privacy-preserving medical diagnosis
in a clinical setting [13, 5, 88, 21]. Indeed, it seems reasonable to assume that involved
parties in the healthcare setting, such as hospitals or medical practitioners, will follow
the protocol honestly. We leave the strengthening of our protocols to work with active
adversaries for future investigations.
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6.4 Attack Methodology
We present here our de-anonymization attack from a theoretical perspective. The
attack relies upon the matching of one or multiple DNA methylation profiles to their
corresponding genotypes. To do so, the adversary first infers the probability of a
genotype, given only methylation data, and second maps the methylation profile to
the genotype that maximizes the average posterior probabilities between genotypic
positions and methylation sites. During these steps, the adversary takes advantage of
the correlations between methylation profile and genotype. Once the best matching
has been found by the adversary, he also wants to make sure that the methylation and
genotypic samples in the matching pair belong to the same person. Indeed, it could
be that an individual is part of the DNA methylation dataset, but not of the genotype
dataset, or vice versa. To verify this, the adversary relies on a test statistic related to the
matching score that provides him with a degree of certainty about whether the matching
between methylation data and genotype is significant enough to be considered correct.
If there is not enough certainty, the adversary can conclude that the corresponding
genotype is most likely not part of the dataset.
6.4.1 Learning the Attack Model
The probabilistic relationships between methylation levels and genotypes are derived
by relying on a separate training dataset W = {(mi,gi)}li=1 containing l pairs of DNA
methylation profiles and their corresponding genotypes. In practice, methylation profiles
mi and genotypes gi have tens of millions of different positions. Thus, the training
phase aims: (1) to determine the meQTLs (cf. Chapter 2), i.e., the positions q in the
genotype influencing the methylation levels in a region r, and (2) to learn the magnitude
of this influence.
During this training phase, we want to select a subset of n positions in the genome
that are highly correlated with certain regions in the DNA methylation pattern. To this
end, for each methylation region mri of an individual i in the region r, we determine the
single most correlated genotype gqi at position q. In case more than one methylation
region is most correlated with the same genotype, we pair the highest correlated
methylation region with the given meQTL first, and then pair the other methylation
region with the second most correlated meQTL, and so on and so forth. In order to keep
the search tractable, we follow standard biomedical practice and restrict the distance
between genotype position and methylation region as described later in Section 6.5.
Eventually, selecting only the n highest correlations, this provides us with a set of
meQTL-methylation region position pairs Q = {(qj , rj)}nj=1, where ∀(qj , rj), (qk, rk) ∈
Q : qj 6= qk ⇔ rj 6= rk.
Once we have identified the positions in the genotype that influence most the DNA
methylation, we are interested in inferring the posterior probability of every meQTL
gij , given the corresponding methylation region mij , Pr
[
Gi = gij |M i = mij
]
. In this
probability, Gi denotes the discrete random variable of the meQTL at position qi, where
gij ∈ {0, 1, 2} for any qi and individual j, andM i denotes the continuous random variable
representing the methylation levels averaged over all CpG sites within region ri, where
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mij ∈ [0, 1] for individual j. The Bayes theorem states that:
Pr
[
Gi = gij |M i
]
=
p(M i | Gi = gij) Pr
[
Gi = gij
]
∑
gij
p(M i | Gi = gij) Pr
[
Gi = gij
] (6.1)
The prior genotype probabilities Pr
[
Gi = gij
]
can be retrieved from population
statistics databases, such as dbSNP [111, 24]. Alternatively, they can be directly
estimated on any dataset of populations with similar ethnicity background. Moreover, we
can learn the conditional probability distributions p(M i | Gi = gij), for all gij ∈ {0, 1, 2},
by relying on our training dataset W, focusing only on the meQTL-methylation pairs
contained in Q. In this process, we must select the continuous distribution function
that best fits the data. We discuss what distribution function fits best in Section 6.6.
6.4.2 Matching Attack
After having trained p(M i | Gi = gij) for all pairs in Q on the training dataset W, we
can predict the posterior probabilities Pr
[
Gi = gij |M i
]
of the n meQTLs in Q given
methylation profiles in another dataset, referred to as the test set in the following. The
test set consists of two independently chosen subsets: (1) a set G = {(gu)}ngu=1 containing
ng ≥ 1 genotypes, and (2) a set E = {(mv)}nmv=1 containing nm ≥ 1 methylation profiles.
These represent the two databases the adversary has access to. Note that individuals in
G and E may be different, and that the adversary wants to infer the links between G
and E . In this endeavor, the adversary must compute, for all meQTLs in Y and ng×nm
pairs of individuals in the test set, the posterior probabilities of the actual value of the
genotypes, given the methylation sites (by using the previously learned probabilities),
i.e., pij,k := Pr
[
Gi = gij |M i = mik
]
.
We derive a match score wj,k between individuals j and k by averaging the conditional
probabilities pij,k over all n meQTL-methylation pairs in Q, i.e., wj,k = 1n
∑n
i=1 p
i
j,k. We
then select the matching α∗ over (max(ng, nm))! /(max(ng, nm)−min(ng, nm))! possible
assignments that maximizes the sum of the individual match scores:
α∗ = arg max
α
max(ng ,nm)∑
j=1
wj,α(j), (6.2)
with wj,α(j) = −∞ if j > ng or α(j) > nm.
This problem boils down to finding the best vertex matching on a weighted bipartite
graph, with ng vertices on one side representing the genotypes of ng individuals, and
nm on the other side representing the methylation profiles of nm individuals. Each
edge between any two vertices pair (j, k) has a weight equal to wj,k. As the number
of possible assignments increases with O(max(ng, nm)min(ng ,nm)), the naive matching
approach is computationally intractable if both, ng and nm, are big. As in Chapter 4, we
rely on the blossom algorithm [34] in our experiments, because it only has a complexity
of O((ng + nm)3) and it can also be applied to general graphs. Of course, if nm = 1
or ng = 1, there is no need to use any maximum weight assignment algorithm, as one
can simply select the genotype sj , respectively methylation profile ek, maximizing wj,1,
respectively w1,k, and the complexity is then linear in ng, respectively nm.
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6.4.3 Statistical Validation of the Best Match
In order to evaluate the significance of the match score between genotype gj and
methylation profile mk, we rely on the z-test and the corresponding z-score, defined
as zj,k = (wj,k − µ(wk)) /σ(wk), where wk is the vector of match scores between the
methylation profile of individual k, ek, and all genotypes in G, µ(wk) is its mean, and
σ(wk) is its standard deviation. The z-score can be similarly derived between the
genotype gj of individual j and all methylation profiles in E . The only requirement is
that the cardinality of the set over which we compute the mean and variance is large
enough. The z-score allows us to determine, once a methylation profile is mapped to a
genotype, whether these two profiles correspond to the same individual. Indeed, the
pair that maximizes the match score might not be the one between the profiles of the
same individual, especially when the individual’s data is not part of one of the sets E or
G. In this case, we should be able to detect that the mapped pair does not include the
same individual. This is done by validating the mapped pair for a z-score higher than a
given threshold.
If nm-by-ng matching becomes computationally infeasible, it is worth noting that it
is also possible to map methylation profiles one-by-one to genotypes, i.e., carry out nm
times a one-by-ng matching, the complexity of which is then linear in nmng. Moreover,
the adversary may have access to multiple methylation profiles of the same person,
but at different points in time. In this case, it can also be beneficial to rely on the
one-by-ng matching, which allows multiple methylation profiles to be mapped to the
same genotype, contrary to the bipartite graph matching. In case the adversary is
certain that there is only one methylation profile per individual, the nm-by-ng matching
outperforms the one-by-ng matching (see Section 6.6), but if he is not sure about the
number of methylation profiles per individual, the nm-by-ng matching becomes more
challenging to use.
6.4.4 Comparison with Previous Chapters
The matching task at hand exhibits considerable parallels to the scenarios described
in Chapter 4. A nm-by-ng matching corresponds to a matching attack in our previous
work, while a one-by-ng matching corresponds to the scenario of an identification attack.
However, in this work, we do not aim at linking profiles of the same datatype over
time but provide an approach for linking profiles of different types of biomedical data.
Moreover, both our works differ significantly in the methodology applied.
6.5 Dataset Description
The dataset that was used in this study consists of meQTLs determined from a set of 75
individuals, 42 of which have parental relations (21 mother/child pairs) for which whole
blood was available. The DNA methylation was determined using whole genome bisulfite
sequencing (WGBS), allowing a genome-wide measurement of the DNA methylation
levels for all 28 million CpG dinucleotides. The sequencing data were processed using
an in-house processing pipeline consisting of alignment of the sequencing reads, quality
assessment, and methylation calling. Then, the genotype was determined at known
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SNP loci listed in the dbSNP [111, 24] database version 141, using the Bis-SNP tool,
which calls SNP genotypes from WGBS data [82]. For the majority of individuals (67
out of 75), samples collected at the birth of the child, referred to as t0, were available,
but also at later times: one year (t1), up to 8 years (t8) for some individuals after birth.
Such a longitudinal dataset containing individuals with parental relations represents
a unique and valuable data source in the biomedical community. Note that this dataset
cannot be released publicly yet, but will be made available to researchers in the near
future.
On a subset of these samples, we selected the CpGs based on their high variance
across the dataset. CpGs showing a very stable methylation profile across the subset
of samples were discarded, as they are not expected to be under the influence of
meQTLs. meQTLs were determined using a Spearman rank correlation test [115] (false
discovery rate threshold after Benjamini-Hochberg correction [10] of 1%) for all SNPs
located within 50 kb (kilobases) up-/downstream of the CpG showing highly variable
methylation. This filtering process eventually output 568,103 meQTL-methylation pairs
containing 502 methylation regions and 544,762 different SNPs. This implies an average
number of approximately 1132 meQTLs per methylation region.
6.6 Attack Evaluation
We present here our main experimental results, using the dataset described in the
previous section. As explained in Section 6.4, the training phase relies on two different
steps: (1) identify the meQTLs, i.e., the positions in the genotype that influence the
methylation levels, and (2) quantify the magnitude of this influence. As we carry out
the first step similarly for all experiments, this can also be seen as a data preprocessing
step, which filters out non-relevant genotypic positions and methylation regions.
6.6.1 Generic Training Phase
We focus here on the meQTL-methylation pairs with a Spearman rank correlation
coefficient larger than 0.49 (FDR threshold after Benjamini-Hochberg correction of 1%).
This provides us with 326 methylation regions and 9,532 pairs, i.e., around 29 meQTLs
per methylation region. Then, we keep only one most correlated meQTL for each
methylation region, resulting in 326 pairs, as expected. Filtering out the meQTLs for
which no information was available on dbSNP, we are left with 314 meQTL-methylation
pairs. Finally, since we have to compute the variance (see below) of the conditional
probability p(M i | Gi = gij) for all possible values of gij , we filter out meQTLs that do
not have at least two samples per genotype value gij . This eventually leads us to a total
of 293 meQTL-methylation pairs for the whole dataset.
Normal Distribution Function. The first step towards precisely modeling the influence
of meQTLs on methylation regions is the selection of the continuous distribution function
that best fits the observed data. We rely on the normal distribution which happens to
be well suited from both, a visual and statistical perspective. First, in order to evaluate
if the normal distribution approximation was statistically significant, we applied the
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Figure 6.1: Example of the empirical distribution pˆ(M ij | Gij) of methylation levels condi-
tioned on genotype values gij = {0, 1, 2} for the pair with meQTL rs10928633 (in chromo-
some 2, position 138625907) and methylation region [138625907, 138626564] in the same
chromosome. Yellow color (top-left plot) is pˆ(M i | Gi = 0), red color (top-right plot) is
pˆ(M i | Gi = 1), and blue color (bottom-left plot) is pˆ(M i | Gi = 2).
one-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to all 293 meQTL-methylation region pairs and
possible genotype values, gij ∈ {0, 1, 2}. The null hypothesis (the samples belonging to
the normal distribution) was only rejected in a minority of cases at significance level
0.05 (134 out of 879). When we manually examined those few cases by plotting their
histogram, we found that all of those cases contained either a very few outliers, or
almost all of the methylation levels belonged to the same bin in the histogram and thus
were almost the same.
We also visually inspected the empirical conditional distributions pˆ(M i | Gi = gij)
for gij ∈ {0, 1, 2} and reached the same conclusion. Figure 6.1 exemplarily shows Q-Q
plots as well as the empirical distribution of methylation levels, given each possible
genotype of a representative pair (qi, ri) in our dataset. Moreover, it also displays the
corresponding normal distributions induced by the unbiased estimators of the mean
and standard deviation. The Q-Q plots depict on the x-axis the theoretical quantiles
of a standard normal distribution. The y-axis displays the normalized quantiles of the
sample distribution for each Gij = gij . Given the minor discrepancies between the points
and the diagonal, we can expect that the normal distribution will be a sufficiently good
fit for the attack. Second, the part of the figure at the bottom right confirms that
the normal distribution is indeed a good approximation for the conditional probability.
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More importantly, it also shows that the overlap between the distributions conditioned
on different genotype values is small, which can be used to recover the correct genotype,
given the methylation level. This gives the intuition behind our re-identification attack.
6.6.2 Experiment-specific Training and Testing Sets
In this second phase, we quantify the magnitude of the influence of each meQTL on its
corresponding methylation region. From now on, in order to illustrate the performance
of the attack under different scenarios, we build our training dataset from different
subsets of the whole dataset described in Section 6.5. We consider three different
training/testing experimental setups. In the first scenario, referred to as (i), we select
one methylation profile per individual, i.e., 75 profiles, as follows: We pick the 67 profiles
available at time t0 and, in addition, the profiles of individuals not yet selected at t0
(because of absence of data) at the smallest time point as possible: 1 at t1, 1 at t3, 3
at t4, 2 at t5, and 1 at t6. We further select the 75 genotypes corresponding to these
methylation profiles. Then, we randomly choose 37 pairs for the training set, and 38 for
the testing set, or attack set. We repeat the random splitting 100 times.
In the second setup, (ii), we want to make sure that there are no individuals in the
training and testing sets who have familial relationships, i.e., we want to avoid a child
being in the training set, and his mother being in the test set, or the other way around.
We also aim at 37 samples in the training set and 38 in the test set. Thus, we first
randomly select from 2 to 18 mother-child pairs to be included in the training set, which
leads us to 4 to 36 samples. Then, we randomly select the remaining samples among the
isolated individuals (i.e., those who have no child or mother in our dataset) to attain 37
samples. We repeat this random selection 100 times and select the 38 remaining profiles
to be part of the test set. This process ensures that there is no individual in the test set
who is member of the same family as somebody in the training set.
The third experimental setup, (iii), is used for the scenarios where we want to map
more than one methylation profile at a time with the genotypes. In both previous
settings, we consider nm = 1 and ng = 75 (or more, as we will see later), but we repeat
the attack with all 38 methylation profiles independently. Now, we want to match
nm > 1 methylation profiles to ng = 75 genotypes. We then select our samples in order
to maximize the number of methylation profiles in the test set, as follows. We select all
individuals at time t1 and at time points t > t1 that do not have methylation profiles at
t0 and t1. This gives us 16 methylation profiles at t1 plus 7 at later time points, thus 23
methylation profiles for the training set. Then, for the test set, we select all methylation
profiles at t0 whose owners do not overlap with those in the training set. This leads to
52 methylation profiles for the test set.
Note that the requirement of having two samples per genotype value to learn the
variance of the normal distribution reduces the number of meQTL-methylation pairs
when we apply it to the training set and not the whole dataset. The total number of
pairs ranges from 237 to 248 with a median value 240 in setup (i). It ranges from 208
to 236 with a median of 222.5 for (ii), and it is of 187 pairs for setup (iii) for which
there is only one run and the number of samples in the training set is smaller (due to
stronger constraints).
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Figure 6.2: Matching of (a) one and (b) 52 methylation profiles among 75 genotypes:
Average accuracy of the matched pairs, and true-positive, false-positive rates for a
varying z-score threshold.
6.6.3 Results
We start by showing the performance of the attack with all available meQTL-methylation
pairs (given the constraints above), nm = 1, and ng = 75. We include all 75 individual
genotypes to be potentially matched to the methylation profiles as we assume that
this can only make the attack harder for the adversary than considering just the 38 or
52 genotypes corresponding to the methylation profiles of the test set. Of course, we
only select the 38 methylation profiles present in the test set to run our experiments.
Therefore, we try to match one methylation profile with 75 genotypes, 38 times, over
100 runs, i.e., 3,800 times, and average the results.
Figure 6.2(a) shows: (1) the matching accuracy, i.e., the fraction of matched pairs
containing genotypes and methylation profiles of the same individual, (2) the true-
positive rate (TPR) after applying the z-score test, i.e., the number of correct matchings
divided by the sum of the number of correct matching pairs and the number of matching
pairs that are wrongly identified as non-matching, and (3) the false-positive rate (FPR)
after applying the z-score test, i.e., the number of false mappings that are identified
as correct divided by the sum of the latter value and the number of correct mappings
identified as false. We could have also depicted other metrics, such as accuracy after
z-score, but we consider the TPR and FPR as sufficient metrics to depict the success of
the matching attack.
First, Figure 6.2(a) shows that, on average, the attack accurately matches the
methylation profile to its corresponding genotypes around 97.5% of the time. Then, we
notice that there exists a z-score for which we always reject all wrongly matched pairs
(FPR = 0 for z-score approximately greater than 5), and never reject those that are
correct (TPR = 1 for z-score approximately smaller than 5.5). This means that for the
2.5% of the pairs that are wrongly matched, we are able to identify that they are false
positives. Finally, we notice that the matching accuracy is the same for both scenarios
(i) and (ii) and that the FPR and TPR are also very similar.
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Figure 6.3: Matching of (a) one and (b) 52 methylation profiles among 75 genotypes
with an increasing number of observed meQTLs/methylation regions (in descending
levels of correlation): average accuracy of the matched pairs and true-positive rates
at various false-positive levels.
Figure 6.2(b) shows the attack when there is more than one methylation profile to
match to the genotypes. Given the experimental setup (iii), we have 52 methylation
profiles that we match against the whole 75 genotypes. First of all, we notice that the
matching accuracy is 100%, i.e., that the attack correctly matches the 52 pairs. Then,
by looking at the z-score to validate the matched pairs, we note that it starts rejecting
valid pairs from around 5.2. As we only have correctly matched pairs after the matching
algorithm, there is no point in displaying the FPR, because there is no wrong pair to
reject. We conclude from Figure 6.2(a) and 6.2(b) that the attack is more successful
when matching more than one methylation profile to multiple genotypes.
Next, we evaluate the impact of reducing the number of use methylation-meQTL
pairs on the attack success. In this endeavor, we gradually use an increasing number of
observed methylation-meQTL pairs, from 1 to 237, in decreasing order of correlation.
Figure 6.3(a) shows the evolution of the matching accuracy and of the TPR after
applying the z-test, for three possible FPR values: 0, 0.05, and 0.1. First, we notice
that we reach the maximum matching accuracy with only 20 methylation-meQTL pairs
and almost 90% accuracy with 10 pairs. Second, we see that we attain a TPR of 0.6 at
an FPR of 0.05 when we apply the z-test (at 10 pairs). Furthermore, we reach a 0.95
TPR at 0.05 FPR with 20 methylation-meQTL pairs, and 0.99 with 30 pairs.
When evaluating the same experiment with a fixed threshold of 5.5 (as found suitable
in Figure 6.2(a)), we notice that 80 methylation-meQTL pairs are necessary to achieve
a TPR of almost 0.9 and an FPR of 0. This arises from the fact that a larger number
of methylation-meQTL pairs provides more information and thus gives a more accurate
match score, which also allows for higher z-score thresholds to perform better.
Similarly, Figure 6.3(b) shows the evolution of the various metrics with respect to
an increasing number of observed methylation-meQTL pairs, for nm = 52. The less
smooth behavior of the curves is due to the fact that we have one run here, compared
to 100 runs in the case where nm = 1. We notice that the matching accuracy and TPR
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Figure 6.4: (a) Identification of one methylation profiles among 74 genotypes with an
increasing probability of the correct matching genotype being present in the dataset:
Average accuracy of the matched pairs, true-positive and false-positive rates. (b)
Analysis of the wrongly matched first-degree relatives in the aforementioned scenario.
reach highest values for a number of methylation-meQTL pairs that is lower than when
nm = 1. Precisely, the attack achieves full accuracy and TPR at 0 false-positives with
only 13 pairs. Again, we see that matching more than one methylation profiles to their
corresponding genotypes induces higher attack success.
We evaluate now how the attack performance evolves when the genotype corre-
sponding to the targeted methylation profile is not present in the genotype dataset. We
have ng = 74 genotypes if the targeted genotype is not present and, for the sake of
comparison, we keep the same number when it is present, by removing another of the
74 genotypes at random. Figure 6.4(a) shows the evolution of this performance with
respect to an increasing probability that the targeted genotype is in the dataset, from 0
to 1, by intervals of 0.01. For each probability value x, we randomly sample a value v
between 0 and 1, uniformly, and keep the targeted genotype in the dataset if and only if
v < x. We repeat this sampling process 100 times, evaluate our attack, and average its
outcomes. As expected, the matching accuracy increases with the probability that the
correct genotype is present in the dataset, since the adversary cannot find the correct
genotype if it is not there. The crucial point here is that the adversary can detect that
the genotype is not present for any presence probability. Indeed, with the appropri-
ate z-score (between 4.9 and 5.4), the adversary always rejects the wrongly matched
genotypes (FPR=0) while accepting the correctly matched genotypes (TPR=1).
We also investigate the effect of a relative’s genotype being in the genotype dataset,
with a varying presence probability of the targeted genotype, as in Figure 6.4(a). The
relative here is either the mother or the child. Figure 6.4(b) shows the percentage of
times the relative’s genotype is matched to the methylation profile, in absolute value,
and relative to the condition that the matched pair was wrong. It also shows the
percentage of times this wrongly matched pairs were rejected by the z-test. First, we
observe a linear decrease of the probability of being matched to the relative with respect
to the presence probability. We also see that this curve does not start at 1 but at
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Figure 6.5: Identification of one methylation profiles among an increasing number of
genotypes, from 75 to 2579: Average accuracy of the matched pairs, true-positive and
false-positive rates and minimum z-score threshold for a null false-positive rate.
around 0.7. This means that, when the targeted genotype is not in the dataset, the
wrongly matched genotype is in 70% of the cases the relative’s genotype, and in the
30% remaining cases the one of an unrelated individual.
In order to better understand these proportions, we display the fraction of familial
matches among all wrong matches (green dashed curve). We observe that this fraction
increases with the presence probability. In order to understand this behavior, we must
recall that the matching accuracy also increases with the presence probability. This
means that the fewer wrong matched pairs there are, the more likely these are pairs
containing the genotype of a relative and not of an unrelated individual. Also, it means
that, when the chance that the targeted genotype is present in the dataset is high, the
only genotype that can mislead the adversary’s matching is the relative’s genotype in
the vast majority of cases.
Finally, we study the robustness of our attack for an increasing number of genotypes,
from 75 to 2579, by including the 2504 genotypes of the 1000 Genomes Project (phase
3) [65]. Figure 6.5 shows the evolution of the matching accuracy, of the false-positive
and true-positive rates after the z-test, and of the minimum z-score for reaching a null
FPR. First, we notice that the matching accuracy remains constant, at 97.5%, for every
genotype dataset size ng. Moreover, there always exists a z-score that enables us to
reject all wrongly matched pairs while keeping all correctly matched pairs. We notably
notice that this z-score evolves quite a lot until around ng = 1000 and that it tends to
converge to a fixed value when ng gets closer to 2579. We conclude from this figure that
the attack is very robust to an increase in the number of genotypes we have to match
the methylation profile to.
We also evaluated this experiment with fixed thresholds on the z-score. When less
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than 100 genotypes are present, a threshold of 5.5 provides a TPR of 1 and FPRs below
0.05. When more than 100 genotypes are part of the test set, a threshold of 6 achieves
the same effect. Since these observations conform with previous experiments, we believe
that an adversary is able to determine a suitable threshold from her training data.
6.7 Private Classification with Random Forests
As we have shown, publicly releasing methylation profiles has a hugely detrimental
effect on the patients’ privacy, with a risk close to 100% to have one’s methylation data
re-identified. Therefore, we first strongly recommend reconsidering if the existing DNA
methylation datasets should remain publicly available in online databases. Moreover, it
is vital to understand the needs of the medical community for designing appropriate
protection mechanisms that provide the doctors and patients with privacy guarantees
and diagnosis utility. In this section, we propose a novel cryptographic scheme for
privately classifying tumors based on random forests. We first describe the preliminaries
on random forests and then present our private random forest-based classifier.
Random forests are a promising technique used in the medical community for
classifying diseases [58]. This ensemble method bases its classification on a multitude
of classification trees in order to prevent overfitting and to reduce the prediction
variance [41]. For example, Danielsson et al. developed a random forest classifier
tool enabling the identification of pediatric brain tumor subtypes with an accuracy of
98% [22].
In practice, when diagnosing a patient’s disease, a sample is taken from the patient
by a medical practitioner. Then, the sample needs to be analyzed either by the hospital
or by a medical laboratory, resulting, e.g., in the DNA methylation profile of the patient.
The actual classification based on these data can then be outsourced to a third-party
company providing data-driven medicine, such as Sophia Genetics [114]. The DNA
methylation profile is sent to the third party, which then provides the physician or
hospital with the diagnosis. While the business model of this third party is inherently
protected by keeping the classification model secret, the patient’s privacy is clearly at
risk, as his data are available to the third party.
Hence, when classifying a patient’s disease, two privacy goals must be achieved: (1)
protecting the company’s classification model, and (2) protecting the patient’s data from
the third-party company. Note that, in order to construct its classifier, the company
must have access to a training set of DNA methylation data in clear. Our scheme
protects the data on which only classification has to be carried out (e.g., for diagnostic
purposes). Finally, our scheme is flexible in the sense that it can release two outcomes:
(1) only the class with the plurality vote (most frequently chosen by the random forest
algorithm), or (2) the class of every tree in the random forest, which enables the medical
practitioner to carry out a more fine-grained analysis of the distribution over the possible
classes.
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Figure 6.6: Example of a binary classification tree with classes Y = {y0, y1, y2}, thresholds
w0, w1, w2 and an input vector v.
6.7.1 Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly introduce the concepts of classification trees and random
forests.
6.7.1.1 Classification Trees
Classification trees (or decision trees) are a predictive tool that is popular in machine
learning. They are used to classify an input v into a set of different classes Y =
{y0, . . . , yk}. As the name suggests, a classification tree can be represented by a simple,
usually binary, tree, in which each interior node corresponds to an input value vi. The
two edges of each interior node partition the node’s input domain into two distinct sets.
Each leaf node of the tree is labeled with a class yj . It is worth noting that a single
class may occur at more than one leaf.
In order to classify an input using a classification tree, one starts at the root node
and walks down the tree until a leaf node is reached. At each interior node, the
decision which edge to select is determined by the partition to which the corresponding
input value belongs. Finally, the class label of the leaf node determines the result of
the classification task. In the following, we will focus on the most common form of
classification trees as implemented in many libraries: binary classification trees in which
the partitioning at each interior node is given by a comparison of the input value with
a threshold wi. The model of such a classification tree is completely described by the
structure of the tree, the input values vi corresponding to each node, as well as the
thresholds wi applied at each node.
6.7.1.2 Random Forests
Classification trees usually suffer from a high prediction variance and can easily suffer
from overfitting to their training set. In order to reduce the prediction variance, random
forests put together multiple noisy, but approximately unbiased classification trees.
In general, a random forest consists of k classification trees, where the number k is
subject to tuning. The training of a random forest is performed on a training dataset
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T = {(x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn)}, consisting of n samples together with their corresponding
class label. During the training, each tree is grown on n randomly chosen (with
replacement) training samples, using only a randomly chosen set of input predictors
(components of the training samples) P ⊆ {1, . . . , len(x)}. It is this random subset of
input predictors that distinguishes random forests from simple tree bagging and ensures
the trees to be de-correlated so that the same input predictors are not used in all of the
trees. This step is important to reduce the correlation of the trees, which then enables
further reduction of the prediction variance [41].
Given a random forest model and an input v, the classification algorithm evaluates
each of the model’s trees individually. Then, depending on the application, implementa-
tion or preference, the resulting class can be determined by plurality vote (or majority
vote for binary classification), averaging class predictions, or providing class probabilities
in terms of relative vote counts.
6.7.2 Private Classification with Random Forests
Next, we introduce our construction that allows for secure evaluation of random forests
between a third party and a querier. More specifically, we do not want the querier
(referred to as client) to learn the structure of the trees, nor should the third party
(referred to as server) learn anything about the input sample or the result of the
classification.
We build our construction on top of the work of Bost et al. [13] and extend it to
work with random forests. In their work, they introduced three major classification
protocols, namely for hyperplane decision, Naïve Bayes, and classification trees. They
all satisfy the constraint to keep both the classifier model and the data confidential.
Since classification trees are an essential component of random forests, we first discuss
the details of the classification tree protocol, before extending it to random forests.
It is important to note that the classifier is trained upfront on data in the clear,
whereas only the actual classification of new samples is performed securely on encrypted
data.
6.7.2.1 Cryptosystem and Notation
In the following, we will rely on three different additively homomorphic public-key
cryptosystems. An additively homomorphic public-key encryption scheme allows, given
the two encrypted messages Enc(a) and Enc(b), to compute Enc(a+ b) using a public-
key operation on the encrypted messages. Moreover, one of our cryptosystems is a
leveled fully homomorphic encryption, which also allows performing a bounded number
of multiplications in sequence, i.e., to compute Enc(a · b) on the encrypted messages.
Bounded means that the cryptographic scheme allows to evaluate polynomials only up
to a certain multiplicative depth L. Below, we list the cryptosystems we use and also
mention the corresponding plaintext spaces M :
1. the QR (Quadratic Residuosity) cryptosystem of Goldwasser-Micali [50] (M = F2,
bits),
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2. the Paillier cryptosystem [96] (M = ZN with N being the public modulus of
Paillier),
3. a leveled fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme based on the Brakerski-
Gentry-Vaikuntanathan [14] scheme as implemented by HELib [55] (M = F2).
We denote the client in our protocols by C and the server by S. [b]A denotes a bit b
encrypted by the QR scheme under party A’s key (so only A can decrypt the message
using her secret key). Similarly, [[m]]A denotes an integer m encrypted by the Paillier
scheme, and [[[b]]]A denotes a bit b encrypted by the leveled FHE scheme. SKsA is used
for party A’s secret key for the encryption scheme Paillier (s = P ), QR (s = QR) or
leveled FHE (s = FHE), and PKsA is the respective public key. For a distribution D,
a← D means that we assign a a random sample from that distribution.
6.7.2.2 Cryptographic Assumptions and Adversarial Model
The security of our protocol relies on the semantic security [49] of the cryptosystems
we use and, hence, also on the well-studied assumptions underlying those systems,
namely the Quadratic Residuosity assumption, the Decisional Composite Residuosity
assumption, and the Ring Learning With Errors (RLWE) assumption.
We prove our protocol to be secure in the two-party computation framework for
passive adversaries (or honest-but-curious [49]), by relying on modular sequential
composition of smaller protocols as described below.
6.7.2.3 Building Blocks
Specifically, we will reuse existing building blocks from the work of Bost et al. and also
design a new one that is needed for our protocol: changing encryption ownership. Their
work already introduced several smaller building blocks, such as different comparison
protocols on encrypted data, or a protocol to evaluate the arg max function on encrypted
data. Those building blocks that are necessary for our own construction are briefly
reviewed hereunder before we introduce our own building blocks as well as the full
construction.
Comparison Protocols. Bost et al. introduce five slightly different comparison pro-
tocols, two of which we will need in our construction. Let A,B be two parties. A has
PKPB,PK
QR
B and B has the corresponding secret keys SKPB,SK
QR
B .
The first comparison protocol (referred to as (i) later) assumes that A has two values
[[a]]B, [[b]]B. This protocol then allows comparing a and b, so that A learns [a ≤ b]B , and
B learns nothing about the comparison.
The second comparison protocol, (ii), works the same way, the only difference being
that B also learns a ≤ b.
More details, as well as the other comparison protocols, can be found in [13].
arg max on Encrypted Data. Based on their comparison protocol (ii), Bost et al.
develop a protocol to compute the arg max on encrypted data. Let A,B be two parties.
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A has k encrypted values ([[a1]]B, . . . , [[ak]]B) (where k is also known to B) and wants to
know the arg max over unencrypted values (i.e., the index i of the largest value ai), but
neither party should learn anything else.
Hence, this protocol allows to compute arg max1≤i≤k ai, given only the values
encrypted under B’s key. In particular, during the computation, B should neither learn
the values ai, nor should B learn the order relations between the ai’s. The full details
of this protocol are described in [13].
Changing the Encryption Scheme. In order to convert ciphertexts from one of the
cryptosystems to another, Bost et al. rely on a simple protocol to change the encryption
scheme. Since this protocol is crucial for essential parts of our construction, we will
provide a more detailed description of the protocol.
First, we consider the case, for which Ms1 = Ms2 = F2, i.e., the two cryptosystems
have the same message space: Let A,B be two parties, A having PKs1B ,PK
s2
B and a
ciphertext c = Encs1(x). B has the corresponding secret keys SKs1B , SK
s2
B . The goal is
to re-encrypt x using the cryptosystem s2, without B learning x.
Intuitively, the protocol works as follows: First, A uniformly picks a random noise
r ← Ms1 , encrypts it using PKs1B and adds it to the ciphertext c, before sending the
result to B. B then decrypts the ciphertext to x+ r ∈Ms1 , re-encrypts it using SKs2B
and sends Encs2(x+ r) to A, who can strip off r using the homomorphic property of
s2. B only obtains x+ r, which hides x information-theoretically (this can be seen as a
one-time pad).
In our construction, for Ms1 6= Ms2 , we only require the transformation from
Ms1 = F2 to Ms2 = ZN , i.e., from FHE to Paillier. Hence, we will only discuss this case
in more detail. In this case, the beginning of the protocol remains the same, and A
obtains [[x ⊕ r]]B with x, r ∈ F2. The important difference compared to the previous
case now arises when A wants to strip off r ∈ Ms1 = F2 from the encryption. Since
the additive operation on F2 is ⊕ and on ZN is +, we have to emulate ⊕ in Paillier’s
message space. This can be easily done by computing:
[[x]]B =
{
[[x⊕ r]]B if r = 0
g([[x⊕ r]]−1B ) mod N2 if r = 1
Before giving the result to an adversary, who knows [[x ⊕ r]]B, but not SKPB, the
obtained result has to be refreshed to preserve semantic security. A pseudocode
implementation as well as the security and correctness proofs of this protocol can be
found in [13].
Private Evaluation of Classification Trees. The most useful protocol to us is the
one for privately evaluating a classification tree. Here, the main idea is to represent
the classification tree as a polynomial P , the output of which is the result of the
classification.
Let bi be the boolean outcome of a comparison between the input value vj of
the ith node and the corresponding threshold wi, i.e., wi < vj . Then, given the
class labels Y = {y0, . . . , yk}, one can express a classification tree by a polynomial.
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The polynomial is constructed recursively by a procedure F(T ). If T is a leaf node,
F(T ) = y, where y is the class label at the leaf T . If T is an internal node, and
T1 is the child tree in case the corresponding b is true, and T2 is the child tree in
case b is false, then F(T ) = bF(T1) + (1 − b)F(T2) is the polynomial that evaluates
T1 if b and T2 otherwise. For the example in Figure 6.6, this polynomial would be
P (b0, b1, b2, y0, y1, y2) = b0(b1 · y1 + (1− b1)(b2 · y2 + (1− b2)y1)) + (1− b0)y0.
Using this polynomial, Bost et al. then introduce a protocol to evaluate the tree,
while revealing only the outcome and the number of comparisons. Let S and C denote
the server and client respectively. First, S and C make use of the comparison protocol
(i), so that S learns the bits [bi]C for every node. Then, they interact in the protocol to
change the encryption scheme from QR to FHE, thus obtaining [[[bi]]]C .
The server S can then evaluate the polynomial P using the homomorphic properties
of the FHE scheme. However, since the plaintext space is only F2 and the class labels
potentially take more than one bit, we would have to evaluate the polynomial for each
bit individually. Fortunately, the so-called SIMD slots of the FHE scheme (described
in detail in [112]) allow the scheme to encrypt a vector of bits in one ciphertext and
evaluate the polynomial on the whole vector at once, in parallel. Hence, for each class
label yi, the server encrypts its bit representation yi0, . . . , yil using these SIMD slots to
[[[yi0, . . . , yil]]]C and can evaluate the polynomial for each bit in parallel.
The client can later decrypt the resulting class label and convert it back to the normal
integer representation. A more detailed explanation as well as proofs of correctness can
be found in [13].
Changing Encryption Owner. Next, we will introduce our own protocol to change
the ownership of an encryption, which we will need in order to apply the arg max
protocol in a way that only the client learns the result of the plurality vote.
Given two parties A and B, out of which A holds the encrypted message [[x]]B, we
want B to hold the same encrypted message, but this time under A’s key. However,
neither A nor B should learn the message x itself. In the following, we design a protocol
to meet this goal and give the security proof in Section 6.9.
Let A have PKPB,SKPA, [[x]]B and B have SKPB,PKPA. Then A first blinds the encrypted
message by uniformly sampling a random noise r from the plaintext space, encrypting
it and adding it to the ciphertext. Then, A also encrypts r using her own secret key
and sends both [[x+ r]]B and [[r]]A to B. B then decrypts the first ciphertext to x+ r,
which hides x in an information-theoretic way and encrypts it again, using PKPA. Then
B strips off r using the sent encryptions without learning r itself and obtains [[x]]A.
The complete protocol is shown in Algorithm 6.1.
Theorem 4. The protocol in Algorithm 6.1 is secure in the honest-but-curious model.
The proof of the theorem is given in Section 6.9, since we introduce additional
notation not required to understand the general idea. Thus, we decided to postpone
the proof and first focus on our protocol instead.
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Algorithm 6.1 Changing Encryption Owner
Input: A : ([[x]]B, SKPA,PKPB), B : (PKPA,SKPB)
Output: B : [[x]]A
1: A: uniformly pick a random noise r ←MP = ZN (Paillier’s message space), encrypt
it using PKPB and compute [[x+ r]]B
2: A: encrypt r using SKPA to [[r]]A
3: A: send ([[x+ r]]B, [[r]]A) to B
4: B: decrypt [[x+ r]]B to get x+ r and encrypt it using PKPA to [[x+ r]]A
5: B: compute [[x]]A = [[x+ r]]A · [[r]]−1A using the homomorphic property
6.7.2.4 Private Random Forests
Now that we introduced all building blocks necessary to privately evaluate a random
forest, we first give an intuition of our protocol before presenting its pseudocode in
Algorithm 6.2.
Naively, one could just evaluate each tree of a random forest individually, given
the protocol introduced by Bost et al., and return the outcomes to the client. The
client is then able to compute the plurality vote or any metric she is interested in. This,
however, will not only leak the number of trees but most likely also the number of nodes
within each tree to the client. Indeed, the scheme of Bost et al. reveals the number of
comparisons, thus the number of inner nodes to the client. We modify this idea to only
leak the total number of trees and the total number of nodes. Moreover, we extend it
by giving the option to only reveal the plurality-vote class to the client. Thus, we do
not evaluate one tree after another, but we perform the evaluations of all trees in a
batch, e.g., running the comparison protocol for the bi’s of all trees in a row. This way,
the client cannot distinguish between different trees during the evaluation.
In order to allow the protocol to only reveal the plurality-vote class, we have to
modify the protocol further. Intuitively, for the server S to determine the plurality-vote
class, S needs to be able to count the votes for each class without learning the actual
outcomes of the trees. We can achieve this by slightly changing the way the class
labels are encoded into the SIMD slots: Instead of encoding each integer class label
as its binary representation, we encode a class label yi by only setting the ith bit to
1. While encoding k labels into a binary representation needs only dlog2(k)e+ 1 bits,
our method will take exactly k bits. However, if enough SIMD slots, compared to the
number of classes, are available, this should not have a substantial effect on the protocol
performance. More specifically, a class label yi is now encoded as (yi1, . . . , yik) with
yij = 1 if i = j and 0 otherwise.
After obtaining the outcomes of all trees, the server and client interact to change
the encryption schemes from FHE to Paillier, resulting in Paillier ciphertexts for each
outcome and class label [[yij ]]C for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, where yij = 1 if the
outcome of the ith tree was class j and yij = 0 otherwise. This encoding allows to sum
up all votes for each class (or vote count), so that the server obtains [[∑ni=1 yij ]]C using
Paillier’s homomorphic property.
However, we cannot directly apply the arg max protocol as this would reveal the
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Algorithm 6.2 Evaluate a Random Forest
Input: Client C : (SKPC ,SK
QR
C , SKFHEC ,PKPS ,v), Server S :
(PKPC ,PK
QR
C ,PKFHEC ,SKPS ,F = {t1, . . . , tn})
Output: Client C : the outcome of evaluating F on v in terms of a plurality vote or
the individual votes
1: S: produces the polynomials P1, . . . , Pn for each tree in {ti}ni=1
2: C: sends the encrypted query [[v0]]C , . . . , [[vm]]C to S
3: S and C perform the comparison protocol (i) on a shuﬄed order of the nodes, so
that S obtains [bi]C for every node in the trees
4: S: changes the encryption obtaining [[[bi]]]C
5: S: computes each class label yi by setting only the ith bit to 1 and encrypts the
class labels using FHE and SIMD slots to [[[yi1, . . . , yik]]]C with yij = 1 if i = j and 0
otherwise
6: S: evaluates the polynomials using the fully homomorphic encryption, obtaining
the encrypted outcomes {[[[yj1, . . . , yjk]]]C}nj=1 for each tree
7: if C is allowed to get all individual outcomes then
8: S: rerandomizes the encrypted outcomes, shuﬄes their order and sends them to
C, who can decrypt them
9: else
10: S: rerandomizes the encrypted outcomes and changes their encryption scheme to
Paillier, resulting in [[yij ]]C for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}
11: S: sums the bits for each class separately, obtaining [[∑ni=1 yij ]]C = ∑ni=1[[yij ]]C
for every j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, effectively computing the vote counts of each class
12: S and C change the ownership of the vote counts, so that C obtains [[∑ni=1 yij ]]S
using our protocol
13: C and S perform the arg max protocol, so that C learns only the outcome of the
plurality-vote class
14: end if
classification result to the party holding the ciphertexts, i.e., the server. Hence, we
leverage our encryption ownership protocol to transfer the vote counts to the client
under the server’s key. The client thus has [[∑ni=1 yij ]]S , which allows him to determine
the plurality-vote class by applying the arg max protocol.
The complete protocol is provided in Algorithm 6.2.
Theorem 5. The protocol presented in Algorithm 6.2 is secure in the honest-but-curious
model.
We refer again to Section 6.9 for the proof.
6.8 Evaluation of the Private Classifier
Now that we have introduced our protocol for private classification on random forests, we
will evaluate its performance on a dataset and classifier used in practice. More specifically,
we base our performance evaluation on MethPed [22, 1], a random forest classifier for
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the identification of pediatric brain tumor subtypes based on DNA methylation data,
which is available as an R package. From this package, we extract their random forest
model and feed it into our protocol implementation for the performance evaluation.1
MethPed, in its standard configuration, trains a random forest model of 1000 trees
based on its original training data, consisting of 472 clinically diagnosed brain tumor
cases after data cleaning and k-nearest neighbor imputation of missing values [1]. The
DNA methylation samples have been collected from several datasets, all of which are
publicly available on the GEO database (GEO accession numbers GSE50022, GSE55712,
GSE36278, GSE52556, GSE54880, GSE45353 and GSE44684). The random forest is
then trained on a total of 900 methylation sites that were shown to yield the highest
predictive power in a large number of regression analyses.
Our protocol implementation is based on the original implementation of the work of
Bost et al.2. We extended it by implementing the protocol for changing the encryption
scheme from FHE to Paillier, as well as by adding our own protocol for changing
the ownership of the encryption. Moreover, we fully implemented the random forest
classification protocol (Algorithm 6.2) and tested its correctness on sample inputs.
Then, we ported the MethPed classifier into our implementation and included two
methylation samples to evaluate the classifier on. The implementation of our private
random forest classifier is written in C++ using GMP [52, 48], Boost [12], Google’s
Protocol Buffers [51], and HELib [55]. The source code of our implementation can be
found at https://github.com/paberr/ciphermed-forests.
In order to represent the methylation levels as integers in our protocol, we multiply
them by 108 and store the result as an integer. Since the data we used is available at a
precision of eight digits after the decimal point and methylation values are bounded by
the range [0, 1], we do not lose any precision.
6.8.1 Evaluation Setup
To evaluate the performance of our protocol, we ran the client and server of the
classification task on different machines, both, on the same network and on different
networks. One client was run on a local computing server with approximately 775 GB
RAM and four Intel Xeon E5-4650L processors, providing 64 cores (with hyperthreading
enabled) running at 2.60 GHz. Another client was run on an Amazon AWS instance of
the type r4.2xlarge with 61 GB RAM and 8 Intel Xeon E5-2686 v4 vCPUs and a
network bandwidth up to 10 gigabits located in Frankfurt, Germany. The server was run
on a local computing server with approximately 1.55 TB RAM and four Intel Xeon E7-
8867 processors, providing 128 cores (with hyperthreading enabled) running at 2.50 GHz.
Since our current implementation does not make use of any multithreading technique,
we used the large number of cores to run multiple experiments, i.e., classification tasks,
at once.
Similar to Bost et al., we also used 1024-bit cryptographic keys and chose the
statistical security parameter λ to be 100. HELib was configured to use 80 bits of
1The R implementation and the used methylation sites are available at http://bioconductor.
org/packages/devel/bioc/html/MethPed.html.
2Available at https://github.com/rbost/ciphermed.
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Figure 6.7: Duration of different protocol steps on the (a) client and (b) server side for
varying number of trees and both protocol variations.
security, roughly corresponding to a 1024-bit asymmetric key [13].
6.8.2 Performance Evaluation
We evaluate our protocol for a varying number of trees
n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 9, 10, 20, . . . , 90, 100, 200, . . . , 400, 500}
and two independent classification queries provided in the MethPed R package [1]. We
restricted the number of trees to a maximum of 500 in order to keep the computational
costs low. We still can estimate the cost of running our protocol with 1000 trees by
the general trend as seen in the following. Moreover, we evaluate both versions of our
protocol, the first revealing only the plurality-vote class to the client, and the second
revealing one outcome per tree to the client. For n ≤ 100, we classify each of the samples
five times, resulting in a total of 10 executions for each of our protocol instantiations. For
n > 100, we classify each of the samples only once, due to the increased computational
costs. The trees used for the classification consist of between 16 and 37 inner nodes,
with an average of around 25 inner nodes.
In the following figures, a solid line is used for operations common to both of our
protocol instantiations, a dashed line is used for the instantiation returning the plurality-
vote class, and a dotted line is used for the one outputting the outcome for each tree.
The performance evaluation of common operations groups together the results of both
instantiations, yielding 20 executions if n ≤ 100, and 4 executions if n > 100.
Figure 6.7(a) depicts the performance evaluation on the client side, both axes scaled
logarithmically. Generally, the computational costs of most of our protocol steps scale
approximately linearly in the number of trees. Only changing the ownership of the
encryption and performing the arg max seem to have a constant execution time. These
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Figure 6.8: (a) Data exchange and number of interactions for varying number of trees
and both protocol variations. (b) Total duration of a classification task and accuracy of
the random forest for varying number of trees and both protocol variations.
two blocks scale linearly with the number of class labels, which are fixed (to the 9 types
of brain tumors) in our experiments.
Next, we compare the execution time of both protocol instantiations. We see that
changing the encryption scheme of the outcomes from FHE to Paillier and retrieving
all the outcomes in the FHE cryptosystem take almost the same amount of time, since
essentially the same operations are required. Performing the plurality vote protocol
then only adds a constant computational burden on the client’s side, thereby increasing
the total computation time only to a negligible degree.
In Figure 6.7(b), we analyze the same scenarios on the server side. Unsurprisingly, the
relationships between the number of trees in the random forest and the computational
costs are the same as for the client. It is worth noting that the computationally most
expensive operation is by far the FHE evaluation of the polynomials. Evaluating the
polynomials takes almost an order of magnitude more time than the second most
expensive protocol step. Thus, minimizing the number of trees and potentially also
the number of inner nodes is a major concern when applying our protocol. Moreover,
parallelizing the evaluation of the polynomials is a possible improvement, which we did
not explore in our implementation.
In terms of the amount of exchanged data and the number of interactions, both
protocol instantiations seem to be more or less equivalent as shown in Figure 6.8(a).
Revealing the individual outcomes to the client is not noticeably different from performing
the plurality vote protocol. While time is certainly the primary concern when running
a classification task, the amount of data exchanged over the network should not be
underestimated. For example, evaluating 50 trees involves transferring around 0.67 GB
of data over the network. Increasing the number of trees to 100 involves around 1.33
GB of data exchange.
Finally, in Figure 6.8(b), we study the total time to run the protocol on the server
side (excluding the time for sending packets over the network) in comparison with the
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accuracy of the random forest built on the given number of trees. The accuracy was
determined based on the out-of-bag samples during the training phase and averaged
over 10 different runs. Since our private classification uses the same precision for the
methylation values as the R implementation and builds on exactly the same trees, the
accuracy provided by our private classification technique is also the same. While the
computational costs clearly increase approximately linearly in the number of trees, the
accuracy does not. While 1000 trees provide an accuracy of 98.3%, 50 trees are already
sufficient to provide an accuracy of 97.6% at only an estimated 5% of the computational
cost. We also depict the communication time between our Amazon AWS instance and
the local computing server for a smaller range of number of trees. Evaluating 50 trees
takes in total less than an hour, even when including the time for sending and receiving
packets over the internet. We also evaluated the timing on the client’s side, which
exhibits the same behaviour as on the server’s side.
We emphasize that our current implementation does neither aim at minimizing the
number of interactions, nor does it make use of pipelining of interactions. Based on the
measured throughput between the Amazon AWS instance and our computing server,
we additionally depict the estimated optimal communication time over the network
in Figure 6.8(b). Improving the transmission of data can potentially decrease the
communication time for 500 trees down to 50 seconds.
Since, in the current medical scenario, it usually takes at least one day for a laboratory
to analyze a sample, we assume a similar computational limit on the classification. Given
such a limit, we conclude that a laboratory offering the privacy-preserving analysis
using our protocol would be able to provide a good trade-off between computational
costs and accuracy. Moreover, the structure of random forests offers a great potential
to parallelize some of the operations (e.g., the polynomial evaluation), which we leave
to future research.
We note that both protocol instantiations take approximately the same time to
run. While returning the selected class for a number of 50 trees is about 2 minutes
faster than returning the plurality vote, this difference only accounts to about 6 minutes
for 100 trees and to about 23 minutes for 500 trees. Hence, we suggest selecting the
instantiation based on the output the client needs and the information the server agrees
to reveal. If the client wants a fine-grained output to analyze the distribution of the
different classes, then he may request to get access not to the plurality-vote class, but
to the selected class of each tree. However, this will leak more information about the
underlying random forest model than only disclosing the plurality-vote class.
6.9 Proofs
This section is devoted to proving the security of our scheme in the presence of honest-
but-curious participants. Although we assume the same security model as in the work
by Bost et al. [13], we commence discussing the necessary concepts.
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6.9.1 Secure Two-party Computation Framework
Both, our protocol to change the ownership of an encryption and the protocol to privately
evaluate a random forest model are two-party protocols. Let the two parties be denoted
by A and B. In order to show that all computations are done privately, we assume the
honest-but-curious (semi-honest) model as described in [49].
Let f = (fA, fB) be a (probabilistic) polynomial function and Π be a protocol
computing f . Using A’s input a and B’s input b, the two parties want to compute
f(a, b) by applying the protocol Π with the security parameter λ.
We denote the view of a party P ∈ {A,B} during the execution of Π by the tuple
VP (λ, a, b) = (1λ; a; rP ;mP1 , . . . ,mPt ) where r is P ’s random tape and mP1 , . . . ,mPt are
the messages received by P . We define the outputs of parties A and B for the execution
of Π as OutΠA(λ, a, b) and OutΠB(λ, a, b). The global output is defined as the tuple
OutΠ(λ, a, b) = (OutΠA(λ, a, b),OutΠB(λ, a, b)).
To ensure the private, secure computation, we require that whatever A can compute
from its interactions with B can be computed from its input and output, yielding the
following security definition.
Definition 4. A two-party protocol Π securely computes the function f if there exist
two probabilistic polynomial time algorithms SA and SB (also called simulators) such
that for every possible input a, b of f ,
{SA(1λ, a, fA(a, b)), f(a, b)} ≡c {VA(λ, a, b),OutΠ(λ, a, b)}
and
{SB(1λ, b, fB(a, b)), f(a, b)} ≡c {VB(λ, a, b),OutΠ(λ, a, b)}.
≡c means computational indistinguishability against probabilistic polynomial time adver-
saries with negligible advantage in the security parameter λ.
6.9.2 Cryptographic Assumptions
In this section, we briefly review the cryptographic assumptions underlying the cryp-
tosystems we use.
Assumption 1 (Quadratic Residuosity Assumption [50]). Let N = p× q be the product
of two distinct odd primes p and q. Let QRN be the set of quadratic residues modulo
N and QNRN = {x ∈ Z∗N | x is not a quadratic residue modulo N , but JN (x) = +1}
be the set of quadratic non residues, where JN (x) is the Jacobi symbol.
{(N,QRN ) | |N | = λ} and {(N,QNRN ) | |N | = λ} are computationally indistin-
guishable with respect to probabilistic polynomial time algorithms.
Assumption 2 (Decisional Composite Residuosity Assumption [96]). Let N = p× q
with |N | = λ be the product of two distinct odd primes p and q. We call z a N th
residue modulo N2 if there exists y ∈ ZN2 such that z = yN mod N2. N th residues
and non N th residues are computationally indistinguishable with respect to probabilistic
polynomial time algorithms.
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Assumption 3 (RLWE [14]). Let f(x) = xd + 1 where d = d(λ) is a power of 2.
Let q = q(λ) ≥ 2 be an integer. Let R = Z[x]/(f(x)) and let Rq = R/qR. Let
χ = χ(λ) be a distribution over R. The RLWEd,q,χ problem is to distinguish between
two distributions: In the first distribution, one samples (ai, bi) uniformly from R2q . In
the second distribution, one first draws s← Rq uniformly and then samples (ai, bi) ∈ R2q
by sampling ai ← Rq uniformly, ei ← χ, and setting bi = ai · s + ei. The RLWEd,q,χ
assumption is that the RLWEd,q,χ problem is infeasible.
6.9.3 Modular Sequential Composition
In order to ease the security proof of our construction, we rely on sequential modular
composition as defined in [18]. The idea is that two parties run a protocol Π and
use calls to an ideal functionality f while running Π. This can be imagined as A
and B privately computing f by sending their inputs to a trusted third party T and
receiving the results from it. If we can now show that Π respects security and privacy
in the honest-but-curious model and if we have a protocol ρ that securely and privately
computes f in the same model, we can replace f by executions of ρ in Π. The resulting
protocol Πρ is then still secure in the aforementioned model.
We call (f1, . . . , fm)-hybrid model the semi-honest model augmented with an in-
corruptible trusted party T for evaluating the functionalities. The parties A and B
run a protocol Π that contains calls to T for these functionalities. For each call, the
parties send their input to T and wait until they receive the respective results. It is
crucial that both parties must not communicate until receiving the result since we only
consider sequential composition here. T does not keep state between different calls to
the functionalities. Therefore the protocol may contain multiple calls even for the same
function, which are all independent.
Let Π be a two-party protocol in the (f1, . . . , fm)-hybrid model and ρ1, . . . , ρm be
secure protocols in the semi-honest model computing f1, . . . , fm. We define Π{ρ1,...,ρm}
as the protocol where all ideal calls of Π have been replaced by executions of the
corresponding protocol: if party Pj needs to compute fi with input xj , it halts, starts
an execution of ρi with the other party, gets the result βj from ρi and continues as if βj
was received from T .
Theorem 6 (Modular Sequential Composition Theorem [18, 81]). Let f1, . . . , fm be
two-party probabilistic polynomial time functionalities and ρ1, . . . , ρm be protocols that
compute respectively f1, . . . , fm in the presence of semi-honest adversaries.
Let g be a two-party probabilistic polynomial time functionality and Π a protocol
that securely computes g in the (f1, . . . , fm)-hybrid model in the presence of semi-honest
adversaries.
Then Πρ1,...,ρm securely computes g in the presence of semi-honest adversaries.
6.9.4 Proof of Changing Encryption Owner Protocol
Proof of Theorem 4. The function f this protocol computes is:
f(([[x]]B, SKA,PKB), (PKA,SKB)) = (∅, [[x]]A)
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For the sake of simplicity, we do not take into account the randomness used for the
encryptions of r for A and c′ = x+ r for B. The distribution of these coins for one party
is completely independent of the other elements taken into account in the simulations,
so we omit them in our security proof.
A’s view is VA = (SKA,PKB, [[x]]B ; r; ∅). A does not output anything. The simulator
SA(SKA,PKB, [[x]]B) runs as follows:
1. Picks uniformly at random r˜ ←MP .
2. Outputs (SKA,PKB, [[x]]B; r˜; ∅)
Since r and r˜ are sampled from the same distribution, independent from any other
parameter,
{(SKA,PKB, [[x]]B; r˜; ∅), f([[x]]B,SKA,PKB,PKA, SKB)} =
{(SKA,PKB, [[x]]B; r; ∅), f([[x]]B,SKA,PKB,PKA, SKB)}.
Moreover, it holds that
{(SKA,PKB, [[x]]B; r; ∅), f([[x]]B,SKA,PKB,PKA, SKB)} =
{(SKA,PKB, [[x]]B; r; ∅), (∅, [[x]]A)}
and we can conclude
{SA(SKA,PKB, [[x]]B), f([[x]]B,SKA,PKB,PKA, SKB)} ≡c
{VA([[x]]B,SKA,PKB,PKA,SKB),
Out([[x]]B, SKA,PKB,PKA,SKB)}.
B’s view is VB = (PKA,SKB; [[x+ r]]B, [[r]]A). B outputs [[x]]A. We build a simulator
SB(PKA,SKB) as follows:
1. Pick uniformly at random r˜ ←MP and c˜←MP .
2. Generate the encryptions [[r˜]]A and [[c˜]] using PKA.
3. Output (PKA, SKB; [[c˜]]B, [[r˜]]A)
By semantic security of the encryption scheme (in our concrete case the Paillier cryp-
tosystem), it holds that (proof see below)
{(PKA, SKB; [[c˜]]B, [[r˜]]A), f([[x]]B, SKA,PKB,PKA,SKB)} ≡c (6.3)
{(PKA, SKB; [[x+ r]]B, [[r]]A), f([[x]]B, SKA,PKB,PKA,SKB)} (6.4)
and hence (using also the correctness of the scheme)
{SB(PKA,SKB), f([[x]]B,SKA,PKB,PKA, SKB)} ≡c
{VB([[x]]B,SKA,PKB,PKA, SKB),
Out([[x]]B, SKA,PKB,PKA,SKB)}.
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We will prove the computational indistinguishability of (4) and (5) in more detail
by giving a reduction to the semantic security. To this end, we assume that we have a
distinguisher D that can distinguish (4) and (5). In particular, given
{(PK,SK′, [[y]]SK′ , [[r]]SK), [[x]]SK}
D outputs 1 if y, r and x are independent uniformly random values and 0 if r = y − r′
for a random r′ and x = y − r = r′. Then, we construct a reduction R as follows:
1. On input PK, generate a new key pair (SK′,PK′)← KeyGen(1λ).
2. Pick uniformly at random y, r˜ ←M .
3. Choose challenger messages m0 = y − r˜, m1 = r˜ and give them to the semantic
security challenger.
4. Receive c from the challenger, compute [[r˜]]PK and query the distinguisher
D({(PK,SK′, [[y]]SK′ , c), [[r˜]]PK}),
which returns b.
5. Return b to the challenger.
Since we simulate both cases ((4) and (5)) perfectly to the distinguisher, its success
probability in distinguishing (4) and (5) transfers exactly to our reduction in the semantic
security game. Since Paillier encryption is shown to be semantically secure under the
Decisional Composite Residuosity Assumption, the distinguisher must have not more
than negligible success probability. And hence our scheme is secure.
6.9.5 Proof of Private Random Forest Evaluation Scheme
The correctness of our protocol follows from the correctness of the private classification
tree protocol in [13]. Moreover, we will provide a security proof for the protocol revealing
only the plurality-vote class. Since our second protocol instantiation – revealing all
trees’ outcomes – is essentially only a shorter version of the main protocol, we do not
provide a separate security proof for this protocol.
Proof of Theorem 5. Let A be the server S and B be the client C. We prove the security
of our protocol (see Algorithm 6.2) in the hybrid model using the following 5 ideal
functionalities, which we let execute by a trusted third party:
• the comparison protocol in step 3:
f1([[x]]B, [[y]]B, l, SKQRB ,PK
QR
B ,SKPB,PKPB) = ([x ≤ y]B, ∅)
• the protocol to change the encryption scheme in step 4:
f2([b]B,SKQRB ,PK
QR
B ,SKFHEB ,PKFHEB ) = ([[[b]]]B, ∅)
• the protocol to change the encryption scheme in step 10:
f3([[[y1, . . . , yk]]]B,SKFHEB ,PKFHEB , SKPB,PKPB) = ({[[y1]]B, . . . , [[yk]]C}ki=1, ∅)
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• the protocol to change the ownership of the encryption in step 12:
f4([[x]]B,SKPA,PKPB,PKPA, SKPB) = (∅, [[x]]A)
• the arg max protocol in step 13:
f5({[[ai]]A}ki=1, l, SKPA,PKPA, SKQRA ,PKQRA ) = (∅, arg maxi{ai}ki=1)
We will conclude using Theorem 6, our own security proofs for those steps, as well as
the proofs in [13].
The whole protocol computes the function:
f({Pi}ni=1, {wh}h, {[[vi]]B}gi=1, l,
SKPA,PKPA, SK
QR
A ,PK
QR
A ,
SKPB,PKPB,SK
QR
B ,PK
QR
B ,
SKFHEB ,PKFHEB )
where {Pi}ni=1 are the polynomials, {wh}h are the thresholds for each inner node, g is
the number of features of the client’s sample, {[[vi]]B}gi=1 is the input by the client. fA
returns nothing, while fB returns the plurality-vote class of the random forest evaluation.
A’s view is now:
VA = ({Pi}ni=1, {wh}h, {[[vi]]B}gi=1, l,
SKPA,SK
QR
A ,PKPB,PK
QR
B ,PKFHEB ;
coins;
{[bh]B}h, {[[[bh, . . . , bh]]]B}h,
{[[yij ]]B}i∈{1,...,n},j∈{1,...,k})
where coins is the random tape for encryptions and {[bh]B}h the comparison result for
each node. We simulate A’s real view with the following simulator SA:
1. Generate a random bit b˜h for each inner node in the random forest.
2. Generate random bits yij for i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
3. Generate a random tape c˜oins of the required length. The length can be de-
termined based mainly on the polynomials, which encode the number of trees,
number of classes and the number of nodes in the tree.
4. Output
H0 = ({Pi}ni=1, {wh}h, {[[vi]]B}gi=1, l,
SKPA,SK
QR
A ,PKPB,PK
QR
B ,PKFHEB ;
c˜oins;
{[b˜h]B}h, {[[[b˜h, . . . , b˜h]]]B}h,
{[[y˜ij ]]B}i∈{1,...,n},j∈{1,...,k})
99
CHAPTER 6. GENOTYPE INFERENCE FROM DNA METHYLATION PROFILES
Since c˜oins and coins come from the same distribution, H0 is indistinguishable from:
H1 = ({Pi}ni=1, {wh}h, {[[vi]]B}gi=1, l,
SKPA,SK
QR
A ,PKPB,PK
QR
B ,PKFHEB ;
coins;
{[b˜h]B}h, {[[[b˜h, . . . , b˜h]]]B}h,
{[[y˜ij ]]B}i∈{1,...,n},j∈{1,...,k})
Moreover, by the semantic security of QR and FHE (we abstain from the trivial reduction
proof here), we can deduce that H1 is computationally indistinguishable from:
H2 = ({Pi}ni=1, {wh}h, {[[vi]]B}gi=1, l,
SKPA,SK
QR
A ,PKPB,PK
QR
B ,PKFHEB ;
coins;
{[bh]B}h, {[[[bh, . . . , bh]]]B}h,
{[[y˜ij ]]B}i∈{1,...,n},j∈{1,...,k})
And by the semantic security of Paillier, we get that H2 is computationally indistin-
guishable from:
H3 = ({Pi}ni=1, {wh}h, {[[vi]]B}gi=1, l,
SKPA,SK
QR
A ,PKPB,PK
QR
B ,PKFHEB ;
coins;
{[bh]B}h, {[[[bh, . . . , bh]]]B}h,
{[[yij ]]B}i∈{1,...,n},j∈{1,...,k})
Hence, we showed that
VA({Pi}ni=1, {wh}h, {[[vi]]B}gi=1, l,
SKPA,PKPA, SK
QR
A ,PK
QR
A ,
SKPB,PKPB,SK
QR
B ,PK
QR
B ,
SKFHEB ,PKFHEB )
≡cSA({Pi}ni=1, {wh}h, {[[vi]]B}gi=1, l,
SKPA,SK
QR
A ,PKPB,PK
QR
B ,PKFHEB )
B’s view is
VB = ({vi}gi=1, l, c, n, k
PKPA,PK
QR
A ,SKPB,SK
QR
B ,SKFHEB ;
coins;
{[[
n∑
i=1
yij ]]A}nj=1, arg max
j
{
n∑
i=1
yij}nj=1)
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where c is the number of inner nodes over all trees, n is the number of trees, k is the num-
ber of classes, [[∑ni=1 yij ]]A is the encrypted vote count per class and arg maxj{∑ni=1 yij}
is the result of the arg max protocol and hence the output of B.
We simulate B by the simulator SB as follows:
1. Generate n random Paillier encryptions {[[y˜j ]]A}nj=1.
2. Generate a random value between v ← {1, . . . , n}.
3. Generate a random tape c˜oins of the required length, which can be determined
by c, n and k.
4. Output
H ′0 = ({vi}gi=1, l, c, n, k
PKPA,PK
QR
A ,SKPB, SK
QR
B , SKFHEB ;
c˜oins;
{[[y˜j ]]A}nj=1, v)
Given that c˜oins and coins both are sampled from the same distribution with the
same length, we can conclude that H ′0 ≡c H ′1, with H ′1 below:
H ′1 = ({vi}gi=1, l, c, n, k
PKPA,PK
QR
A ,SKPB,SK
QR
B ,SKFHEB ;
coins;
{[[y˜j ]]A}nj=1, v)
Next, we show the indistinguishability of H ′1 and VB by giving a reduction to the
semantic security of Paillier. To this end, we assume that we have a distinguisher D
that can distinguish H ′ and VB. In particular, given
({vi}gi=1, l, c, n, k
PKPA,PK
QR
A ,SKPB,SK
QR
B ,SKFHEB ;
coins;
{[[yj ]]A}nj=1, v)
D outputs 1 if v = arg maxj{yj}nj=1 and 0 otherwise. Then, we construct a reduction R
as follows:
1. On input PK, pick uniformly at random x, y, z ←M , such that x 6= y 6= z.
2. Order the chosen values (w.l.o.g., we from here on assume x < y < z).
3. Generate new keys PKQRA ,SKPB,SK
QR
B ,SKFHEB .
4. Choose challenger messages m0 = x, m1 = z and give them to the semantic
security challenger.
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5. Receive c from the challenger and query the distinguisher
D(∅, 0, 0, 2, 0,PK,PKQRA ,SKPB,SKQRB ,SKFHEB ; ∅; {[[y]]PK, c}, 2),
which returns b.
6. Return b to the challenger.
Since we simulate both cases perfectly to the distinguisher, its success probability
transfers exactly to our reduction in the semantic security game. Since Paillier encryp-
tion is shown to be semantically secure under the Decisional Composite Residuosity
Assumption, the distinguisher must have at most negligible success probability.
Given the correctness of the protocol as well as the computational indistinguishability
of both, simulators and views, we can apply Theorem 6. We replace the ideal calls by
our provable secure building blocks. Theorem 6 then gives us the security of our scheme
in the semi-honest model.
6.10 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have first demonstrated that DNA methylation datasets can be re-
identified by having access to an auxiliary database of genotypes. Following a Bayesian
approach, we have shown that we could reach an accuracy of 97.5% to 100% depending
on the attack scenario, with a few hundred methylation regions and genotype positions.
Then, by using a statistical test upon our matching outcomes, we have empirically
demonstrated that the very few wrongly matched pairs could be correctly identified and
rejected, yielding a false-positive rate of 0 and true-positive rate of 1 for appropriate
statistical thresholds. We have further shown that our identification attack was very
robust to a decrease of methylation-meQTL pairs. When matching 52 methylation
profiles with 75 genotypes, we could reach a full accuracy with only 13 meQTLs and
methylation regions. We have also observed that the very few wrongly matched pairs
often contain the genotype of the relative (in more than 90% of the cases). Finally, we
have shown that our attack was robust to an increase of the database size to more than
2500 genotypes.
Facing this severe threat to epigenetic privacy, we have proposed a novel crypto-
graphic scheme for privately classifying tumors based on methylation data. Our protocol
relies on random forests and homomorphic encryption, and it is proven secure in the
honest-but-curious adversarial model. We have implemented our private classifier in
C++ and evaluated its performance on real data. We have shown that it can accurately
classify brain tumors in nine classes of tumor subtypes based on 900 methylation levels
in less than an hour. This constitutes an acceptable computational overhead in the
considered clinical setting at hand. As a meta-consequence, we highly recommend
removing DNA methylation profiles from public databases as these are extremely prone
to re-identification, especially given that genotypes are also increasingly available online,
sometimes with their owners’ identifiers [95].
For future research, we plan to study if the attack is as successful when meQTL-
methylation pairs are determined from a different tissue’s data. At the defense side, we
102
6.10. CONCLUSION
would like to study other machine-learning algorithms and to propose private schemes
for those that are efficient in classification with methylation data. Differentially private
approaches could also be studied, although differential privacy may degrade utility too
much for typical medical needs [40].
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7
Privacy Risks in Interdependent
Biomedical Data
Towards a Comprehensive Methodology for Quantifying
Privacy Risks
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7.1. MOTIVATION
7.1 Motivation
In the same vein as the previous chapter, we investigate interdependencies between
different types of biomedical data. As pointed out, the main negative aspect of data-
driven medicine is its impact on privacy. Indeed, all sorts of biomedical data are
intrinsically highly privacy-sensitive, since they often closely reflect our health status
and the diseases we carry. The privacy concerns are further exacerbated by the fact
that different kinds of biomedical data are increasingly available through multiple public
databases or third-party providers. The various correlations between different types
of biomedical data, between family members, and along the temporal dimension must
be taken into account to provide guarantees that biomedical data privacy is preserved.
Although some types of biomedical data are influenced by external factors, and thus
vary over the course of time, recent research indicates that even these data still contain
enough information to jeopardize the privacy of their owners [P1].
The goal of this work is to tackle the significant privacy concern of biomedical data
from a more holistic perspective by encompassing different kinds of biomedical data
and the statistical dependencies between them in the same framework. Furthermore,
beyond genomic data, interdependent privacy risks between individuals from the same
family have not been studied. This work aims at filling this gap by proposing a generic
framework for dissecting and quantifying privacy risks in biomedical data on a large
scale.
7.2 Contributions
In particular, we present a Bayesian network model that encompasses genomic data and
epigenomic data from related individuals at different points in time. This probabilistic
graphical model enables us to consider all probabilistic dependencies between these
biomedical data, including temporal and familial correlations, and perform inference
attacks very efficiently.
Among all kinds of data considered in our framework, some data dependencies
are known from expert knowledge, such as genetic inheritance laws, while others need
to be learned from data, such as the correlations between methylation and genomic
data or those between different time points. Therefore, we develop a general algorithm
which considers both, external knowledge and data-learned dependencies, to learn the
structure of the Bayesian network automatically. Then, we apply maximum likelihood
estimation together with external knowledge to obtain the parameters, i.e., the condi-
tional probabilities of the network. Finally, we perform probabilistic inference attacks
using variable elimination to eventually get the exact posterior probabilities of targeted
variables, given observed data.
Based on the posterior probabilities output by our Bayesian network model, we
evaluate how privacy evolves with respect to various scenarios of data disclosure. We
quantify privacy levels with well-established privacy metrics, such as entropy and
estimation error, generalizing the estimation error to data other than the genome. Given
the limited genomic and epigenomic data that are available together, we evaluate the
privacy risks stemming from familial interdependencies and temporal correlations in
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separate settings.
Predicting the DNA methylation of a child given his/her genome and his/her mother’s
data (genome and DNA methylation) yields an estimation error as small as 0.1 for
almost 60% of the DNA methylation positions. When considering the prior probability
on the child’s methylation data, the same estimation error is only achieved for 10% of
the DNA methylation positions, demonstrating that the percentage of positions that
are highly at risk is multiplied by around six for an informed adversary. Moreover, we
found that observing more evidence reduces the adversary’s average uncertainty.
When predicting the DNA methylation of an individual given another DNA methy-
lation sample observed one year before, the Bayesian network allows us to achieve an
estimation error of less than 0.2 for approximately 82% of all methylation positions,
while the inference relying on the prior probability achieves the same estimation error
at only 40% methylation regions. Further examining this high performance, we found
that, even for a longer time span of four years, the estimation error remains stable.
This could typically enable an attacker to perform a temporal linkability attack against
methylation profiles in the same vein as the one proposed against microRNA expression
data, which we presented in Chapter 4.
Although we focus on a specific set of biomedical data due to the scarcity of rich
datasets, the fundamental framework underlying our Bayesian network is still general
enough to be easily extended to incorporate other types of data such as transcriptomic
data (e.g., microRNA or gene expression [107, P1]). In particular, the structure learning
algorithm we propose is not specific to our application and thus can be used in any
setting in which the Bayesian network can be constructed by learning some dependencies
from data and embedding others from expert knowledge.
Finally, we demonstrate that our Bayesian network model can also serve as a
fundamental building block to other applications: We study a linking attack that infers
the mother-child relation. More precisely, we match children’s methylation profiles to
their mothers’ (and vice versa) by comparing the posterior probabilities output by our
Bayesian network given mother’s methylation data with the real methylation profiles of
the children. We also present a strong heuristic limiting the number of DNA methylation
positions to consider, which significantly outperforms the approach with all positions
taken into account. Our results show that using our framework for this kind of attack
results in successfully linking 95% of mother-child pairs. This corresponds to only a
single incorrectly matched pair in our dataset.
From these results, it becomes apparent that interdependencies across different
biological layers, along with the temporal dimension, and in-between family members
can pose a severe privacy threat towards health data privacy if an adversary is able to
collect and leverage multiple pieces of evidence.
7.3 Threat Model
The adversary’s very general objective is to infer some hidden biomedical data, given
observed ones. To do so, the adversary first needs to construct some (graphical) model
that he will use during his attack. Therefore, we assume that the adversary has access
to a set of training samples, which consist of DNA methylation profiles and genotypes.
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The adversary’s training set may be further annotated with kinship relations between
mothers and their children, or it may contain samples from the same individuals, taken
at different points in time.
After this knowledge construction step, the adversary carries out his inference attack
by observing part of the data (e.g., a DNA methylation profile or a genome) of a target
or close relatives of the target (i.e., parents and children), potentially at a different
time point. We thoroughly analyze the adversary’s ability to predict information about
his targets and their close relatives, varying the amount of additional information the
adversary observes. Inferring genomic, epigenomic or transcriptomic information about
targets may also reveal some sensitive information about those individuals, as shown
later in the chapter. For example, both the genome and the DNA methylation contain
information about phenotypic traits and the health status of a person [113, 36, 23, 124].
Moreover, this kind of information and also the kinship between individuals can be
further matched to side channels such as surname-genome associations databases [53] or
online social networks [64].
The adversary can further use the inference attack outcome to carry out a more
tangible attack, such as linking DNA methylation profiles of a mother or a child to
the corresponding DNA methylation profiles of the child or the mother, respectively.
Our framework can in general cope with (1) any background knowledge from domain
experts, (2) any knowledge the adversary can construct based on auxiliary datasets,
and (3) any data the adversary observes during his inference attack.
7.4 The Bayesian Network Model
In this section, we formalize our approach and present the methodology that allows us
to quantify the privacy of interdependent biomedical data.
We rely on a Bayesian network model to build a general privacy framework that we
instantiate with genomic and epigenomic data. Bayesian networks allow us to perform
a wide range of inferences. Moreover, in contrast to many other machine learning
models, Bayesian networks can naturally handle missing data, i.e., they are able to
perform inferences given any observed subset of evidence. Both of these advantages
largely increase the generality of our framework. Besides, Bayesian networks allow us
to take various biological layers (from genomic to transcriptomic via epigenomic layers)
and their interrelation into account, while also providing ways to incorporate external
domain knowledge easily. Lastly, there exist efficient algorithms for parameter learning
and inference.
Our framework encompasses the three main steps in Bayesian network inference: (1)
learning the structure of the Bayesian network, (2) learning the necessary parameters of
the network, and (3) performing probabilistic inference on the network, given observed
evidence. We eventually rely on a set of privacy metrics which can be directly coupled
with the Bayesian network in order to quantify the privacy of a given individual.
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7.4.1 Bayesian Networks
Given a set of random variables, a Bayesian network is a probabilistic graphical model
encoding a complex distribution over the random variables in a directed acyclic graph
(DAG) G = (V,E). Formally, each node X1, . . . , Xl ∈ V in the graph corresponds to a
random variable. An edge Xi → Xj ∈ E between nodes Xi, Xj ∈ V corresponds to a
direct interaction between these nodes. Conversely, missing edges represent conditional
independencies between nodes.
We now recall the basic definitions relevant to Bayesian networks to define the exact
set of independencies induced by the graphical representation. These definitions will be
used in Section 7.4.3 to describe our structure learning algorithm.
A structure X → Z ← Y in a graph is called a v-structure. A trail between X1 and
Xn is a sequence of nodes connected by edges X1 
 · · ·
 Xn, where X 
 Y denotes
an edge of arbitrary direction between X and Y . Based on these notations, we next
introduce the concept of an active trail.
Definition 5 (Active Trail [74]). Let G be a DAG structure and X1 
 · · · 
 Xn a
trail in G. Let Z be a subset of observed variables. The trail X1 
 · · ·
 Xn is active
given Z if:
• Whenever we have a v-structure Xi−1 → Xi ← Xi+1, then Xi or one of its
descendants are in Z;
• no other node along the trail is in Z.
Intuitively, information can flow through the network along active trails. This notion
then allows us to formally define the set of independencies induced by a graph based on
a concept called d-separation.
Definition 6 (d-separation and Independencies [74]). Let X,Y,Z be three sets of nodes
in G. We state that X and Y are d-separated given Z, denoted by d−sepG(X,Y | Z),
if there is no active trail between any node X ∈ X and Y ∈ Y given Z.
We use I(G) to denote the set of independencies that correspond to d-separation:
I(G) = {(X ⊥ Y | Z) | d−sepG(X,Y | Z)}.
We state that a Bayesian network G is an I-map (independency map) for a probability
distribution P over the same set of random variables if I(G) ⊆ I(P ) with I(P ) being
the set of all independencies holding in P .
Let Parents(Xi) ⊆ V denote the parent nodes of Xi in a Bayesian network G,
and NonDescendants(Xi) denote the nodes in the graph that are not descendants of
Xi. Given that G is an I-map for P , the graph structure can be translated into a
factorization for the joint probability distribution as:
Pr [X1, X2, . . . , Xn] =
n∏
i=1
Pr [Xi | Parents(Xi)] .
Hence, we only need to know the distributions of these factors in order to obtain the
whole distribution. These factors are also called the parameters of the model.
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7.4.2 Notation and Networks
We now introduce the notations needed to construct the Bayesian networks for our
particular scenario.
Let V be a set of individuals containing mothers and their children, S be a set of
SNP IDs (i.e., positions on the DNA sequence), R be a set of methylation regions, and T
be a set of points in time. Let ti denote the time point at year i. We define gia ∈ {0, 1, 2}
to be the value of SNP i ∈ S for an individual a ∈ V . Similarly, mra,t ∈ [0, 1] denotes the
average methylation within region r ∈ R for an individual a ∈ V at time point t ∈ T .
LetM denote the set of mothers, each member of which has a corresponding child in V .
Also, let C be the set to represent children who have their corresponding mothers in V.
For simplicity reasons, we assume thatM∩ C = ∅. Also, note thatM∪ C ⊆ V.
Let Gi and M rt be random variables modeling the genome at position i and the
average methylation in region r at time point t. Whenever we want to specify the
set of individuals a certain random variable should capture, we will add the group of
individuals the variable should refer to as a subscript. For example, M rC,t0 denotes a
random variable of a child’s methylation in a region r at a given time point t0.
Naively encoding these settings in one Bayesian network would yield a graph with
2 · (|T | · |R| + |S|) vertices. In this work, however, we take a different approach and
separate the random variables as much as possible, designing independent Bayesian
networks. To this end, we assume we have a set Q ⊆ S ×R, containing pairs (i, r) of
SNP IDs and methylation regions, such that there are no dependencies between any
two such pairs. A similar assumption about SNPs independence has also been made in
the genomic privacy context [106, 63]. This is a key element in simplifying the network
structure as it allows us to build |Q| independent Bayesian networks. In Section 7.5, we
show that such an independency assumption can be made if the SNP-methylation pairs
are sufficiently far apart from each other.
Although our framework consisting of |Q| networks is general enough to consider all
kinds of inference tasks, we focus on two particularly interesting settings in this work:
analyzing mother-child interdependencies, and the temporal inference of methylation
values. For the interdependencies of related individuals, we thus only consider data from
a single time point t0, while, for the temporal inference, we do not consider separate
nodes for mothers and children. This also allows us to model adversaries having access
to either data of related individuals or samples of the same individuals taken at multiple
points in time.
Since we now consider separate networks, we will further simplify our notation when
referring to exactly one pair (i, r) ∈ Q and only a single time point t0 ∈ T . By G,M
we will denote the genome at a specific position and the methylation in a specific region
(at time point t0 if not stated otherwise), respectively. If we want to restrict the set
of possible individuals, we will add a subscript containing the set of individuals. For
example, GM describes the mothers’ genotypes at position i. Moreover, we will use P
or P(i,r) to denote the probability distribution over the random variables of interest,
given this specific pair in Q.
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7.4.3 Structure Learning
The first step of our approach is to construct the actual network and, contrary to
previous work where the structure is already given [61, 63], we have to learn most of
the edges (dependencies) between the nodes in the Bayesian networks.
In literature, there exist general algorithms (as listed in [74]) which learn the structure
of a Bayesian network based on data. These algorithms can generally be divided into two
categories: scoring-based algorithms and constraint-based algorithms. Scoring-based
algorithms usually aim at finding a DAG structure, such that the probability model
corresponding to the Bayesian network best fits the probability distribution of the data.
Constraint-based algorithms learn the network structure by testing for independencies
based on data and subsequently constructing an I-map for the learned independencies.
However, we cannot directly apply those algorithms, since they build the structure
solely based on data. In our case, we additionally have external knowledge about certain
parts of our model. We can classify our external knowledge into three categories: (1)
existing edges, (2) directions of edges, and (3) known independencies.
Algorithm. Since most of our external knowledge can be translated into a set of known
independency statements, we rely on an approach similar to constraint-based algorithms
for learning the structure. In particular, we first limit the set of possible Bayesian
networks by our external knowledge. Then, we use independency tests to decide which
of the unknown edges should be part of the network. In particular, we test for statistical
independence by applying the χ2-test at a significance level of α.
In this work, we introduce the novel notion of a minimal I-map given external
knowledge.
Definition 7 (External knowledge). We denote our external knowledge by the letter κ,
and state that a graph is consistent with κ if the external knowledge holds in the graph.
We denote this by writing G  κ.
A minimal I-map given external knowledge captures the idea that G should closely
reflect the independencies of P . Ideally, both sets of independencies should be the same.
Definition 8 (Minimal I-map given external knowledge). We state that a DAG G is a
minimal I-map for a set of independencies I if
1. G is an I-map for I, i.e., I(G) ⊆ I;
2. G is consistent with the external knowledge κ, i.e., G  κ;
3. and the removal of any edge from G results in either G 6 κ or it renders G not
an I-map for I.
We propose an algorithm that achieves this definition in Algorithm 7.1: We first
enumerate the set G of all graphs that contain the necessary nodes and are consistent
with our external knowledge (line 1). Then, we attempt to find a graph in G that
is a minimal I-map for a given set of independencies I. To this end, we return the
graph G∗ ∈ G, which is an I-map for I (line 5) and encodes the highest number of
independencies (i.e., the least number of edges) of all I-maps in G (line 6). If none of
the graphs in G is an I-map for I, the algorithm returns None.
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Algorithm 7.1 Build a minimal I-map given external knowledge
Input: External knowledge κ, a set of independencies I over the variables V .
Output: DAG G = (V,E), which is a minimal I-map for I given κ.
1: Let G = {G | G  κ,G = (V,E)} be the set of all directed acyclic graphs with
nodes V , for which the external knowledge holds.
2: Let G∗ = None.
3: for G ∈ G do
4: Calculate I(G) = {(X ⊥ Y | Z) | d−sepG(X,Y | Z)}.
5: if I(G) ⊆ I then
6: if G∗ is None or |I(G)| > |I(G∗)| then
7: G∗ = G
8: end if
9: end if
10: end for
11: return G∗
Theorem 7 (Correctness of Algorithm 7.1). Algorithm 7.1 returns either None if there
is no minimal I-map given κ or a DAG G∗, which is a minimal I-map for I given κ.
Theorem 7 states the correctness of our algorithm, and we prove its validity in
Section 7.8.
Scalability. The pseudocode given in Algorithm 7.1 scales with the number of possible
graphs for which the external knowledge holds. However, as the structure learning
only has to be done once, we do not consider it a time-critical step. Moreover, the
algorithm’s efficiency can be further improved, leveraging Proposition 2 from Section 7.8.
The proposition states that removing an edge e ∈ E from a graph G = (V,E) – yielding
G′ = (V,E \ {e}) – only introduces new independencies, i.e., I(G) ( I(G′).
Viewing our algorithm as a search problem starting with the full graph and sub-
sequently removing edges, we can apply classical search algorithms, such as A∗ to our
problem and only need to add new independencies. During the search, we do not need
to further follow branches for which I(G) 6⊆ I, as this criterion cannot be reached
anymore by removing edges. States that do not fulfill the external knowledge will have
to be excluded from finding the minimum across the branches, however.
Conversely, depending on the concrete scenario and the number of constraints, we
can also view our algorithm as a search problem starting with the empty graph and
subsequently add edges. Similar pruning techniques as the ones mentioned above also
apply in this case.
7.4.3.1 Mother-Child Networks
Next, we describe how the algorithm can be applied to the networks capturing the
mother-child interdependencies. The set of random variables being considered are
V = {GM, GC ,MM,MC}, and we assume the following external knowledge κ:
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GM
GC
MM
MC
ext. knowledge
Figure 7.1: The graphical model for mother-child dependencies. The full edge repre-
sents external expert knowledge that is given, and dashed edges represent depen-
dencies that need to be learned: if they exist (structure learning) and, if so, what is the
magnitude of the dependency (parameter learning).
• GM → GC ∈ E, i.e., Mendelian inheritance laws state that the genotype of the
mother influences the one of the child (i.e., it is an existing edge),
• ∀X : MX → GX /∈ E, i.e., there is never an edge from the methylation of a
mother/child to her genome,
• MC →MM /∈ E, i.e., analogously to the genome, it is impossible for the mother
to inherit methylation patterns from her child,
• ∀X,Y : {GX → MY ,MY → GX} ∩ E 6= ∅ ⇒ X = Y , i.e., there is no direct
connection between a genome and the methylation value of different individuals.
Incorporating this external knowledge leaves us with the potential DAG as shown
in Figure 7.1. While the edge between the genomes is fixed, the dashed edges are
subject to our analysis. In total, applying our external knowledge results in 24 possible
independencies and eight possible graph structures.
Next, we iterate over all 24 possible conditional independencies and leverage the χ2
test for each of these in order to obtain the set I(P ) of independencies being justified
by our data. We then run our algorithm with the given external knowledge and I(P )
and obtain the graph structure that best represents I(P ).
The algorithm hence provides us with the graph structure that best represents I(P ).
7.4.3.2 Temporal Inference
Similarly, we can use our algorithm for finding the smallest I-map given the external
knowledge for the temporal inference of DNA methylation. We consider two time points
ti and tj and the set of random variables V = {G,Mti ,Mtj}.
Below, we list the external knowledge κ incorporated for the temporal inference of
DNA methylation:
• Mti → G /∈ E, i.e., if there is an edge between the genome and the methylation,
then it should start at the genome and end at the methylation,
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G
Mti Mtj
Figure 7.2: The graphical model for temporal inference of DNA methylation.
• Mti →Mtj ∈ E ⇒ i < j, i.e., it is natural that if there are dependencies between
methylation values at different points in time, the direction of the edge should be
from the older methylation value to the newer one.
This external knowledge gives us a DAG with possible edges as depicted in Figure 7.2,
resulting in eight possible networks. The considered random variables V limit the total
number of possible independencies to six.
We test all of these independencies on the data, resulting in I(P ). This set of
independencies is then given to our algorithm together with the external knowledge κ,
resulting in a graph structure that best represents I(P ).
7.4.4 Parameter Learning
After learning the structures of all |Q| Bayesian networks, the next step is to learn the
parameters for each network. In our work, we combine two different methodologies
to estimate the parameters: Some of the parameters are given by external knowledge,
while we use a maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) on our data for the others.
Since there exist numerous population statistics on the probability of specific genomic
variants, even for ethnical subgroups, we can leverage this knowledge to model the
distribution Pr
[
Gi
]
for any Bayesian network.1 More precisely, population statistics
give us the minor allele frequency MAFi (cf. Chapter 2) for each SNP. Let pk =
Pr
[
Gi = k
]
, then we can calculate the vector (p0, p1, p2) from the minor allele frequency
as ((1−MAFi)2, 2MAFi · (1−MAFi),MAF2i ).
Modeling the distributions of DNA methylation data, however, we need to learn the
methylation related distributions from our data. While DNA methylation is captured
by a real value and thus follows a continuous distribution, the underlying distribution
Pr [M r] can be considered to be generally multimodal. Therefore, following the general
methodology in biomedical applications [132], we discretize the methylation values
into a set of bins Br = {B1, . . . , Bl}, such that
⋃l
i=1Bi = [0, 1] and ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , l} :
Bi ∩Bj = ∅ ⇔ i 6= j.
1Note that this is valid for the mother’s Gi’s in the mother-child network, and for all Gi’s in the
temporal network, as these do not have any parent in the graph (and thus Pr
[
Gi
]
is not conditioned
on any other variable).
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GM
0 1 2
GC
0 p0 + 0.5p1 0.5p1 + p2 0
1 0.5p0 + 0.25p1 0.5 0.25p1 + 0.5p2
2 0 p0 + 0.5p1 0.5p1 + p2
Table 7.1: The probability distribution Pr [GC | GM] based on the laws of Mendelian
inheritance, given external knowledge of pg = Pr [G = g].
As stated before, we rely on MLE to learn the remaining distributions in our networks.
Let A ⊆ V be a (sub)set of individuals and Z be a set or vector of conditions over random
variables and z be an assignment of values to those random variables. Furthermore,
we use za to denote the values of an individual a ∈ A for the corresponding random
variables in Z. Then, we estimate any conditional methylation distribution as follows:
Pr [M ∈ Bj | Z = z] = |{ma | a ∈ A ∧ma ∈ Bj ∧ za = z}||{ma | a ∈ A ∧ za = z}| . (7.1)
Intuitively, this corresponds to counting all samples in A for which the methylation
value is in the bin Bj and for which all conditions specified by Z = z hold. Then, this
number is divided by the number of samples for which the conditions in Z = z hold
regardless of the bin the methylation value belongs to.
Note that MLE might have to be smoothed in order to compensate for missing data.
We will address these issues in Section 7.6.2.
7.4.4.1 Mother-Child Networks
Estimating the parameters of our mother-child networks additionally requires to model
the distribution Pr
[
GiC | GiM
]
. Once more, leveraging genetic knowledge, we can rewrite
this probability as:
Pr
[
GiC = giC | GiM = giM
]
=∑
giP∈{0,1,2}
Pr
[
GiP = giP
]
Pr
[
GiM = giM
]
·
Pr
[
GiC = giC | GiM = giM, GiP = giP
]
, (7.2)
where giP denotes the genotype of the father at position i and GiP denotes the correspond-
ing random variable. Generally, we will estimate the probability of a certain genotype
independent of the sex or subgroup the individual is in and write Pr
[
Gi
]
instead of
Pr
[
GiM
]
, Pr
[
GiC
]
and Pr
[
GiP
]
. While Pr
[
Gi
]
– as stated before – is calculated from
population statistics, Pr
[
GiC | GiM, GiP
]
is exactly specified by the laws of Mendelian
inheritance. Combining these finally results in the probability distribution as shown in
Table 7.1.
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7.4.4.2 Temporal Inference
Except for Pr [G], the parameters of the temporal inference network are learned by
applying MLE, similarly to the mother-child network.
7.4.5 Bayesian Inference
For inferring the probabilities of unobserved random variables conditioned on observed
ones, typically the marginal distributions need to be computed. In our case, we rely on
variable elimination, an exact inference algorithm for Bayesian networks [74]. While the
algorithm, in general, has an exponential time complexity, the simple structure of our
Bayesian networks allows the algorithm to be efficient enough in our case. There also
exist polynomial-time algorithms for exact or approximate inference, such as junction
tree [67] or (loopy) belief propagation algorithms [97], that can be applied for larger or
more complex Bayesian networks.
Variable elimination generally works by collecting all factors required for the inference
of any marginal distribution Pr [Xi | E = e], where Xi belongs to the query variables
X and E is the observed evidence. Then, for a Bayesian network containing the nodes
V , all variables in V \ (X ∪E) are eliminated one by one using marginalization (which
corresponds to summing out variables V \ (X∪E) in our discrete scenario), resulting in
the marginal probability distributions of interest.
7.4.6 Privacy Metrics
For the purpose of quantifying the impact of the considered inference attacks, we rely
on two privacy metrics: expected estimation error and entropy [61, 63].
Expected estimation error has already been introduced in the context of genomic
data by Humbert et al. [61]. For our setting, we generalize this notion, so that it can
also be applied to other types of data, such as DNA methylation values specifically. The
estimation error quantifies the expected distance between the adversary’s estimate of
a value xˆ and the true value x. The Bayesian inference step outputs the probability
distribution Pr [xˆ | Z = z], given some observed genomic and/or epigenomic data Z,
where xˆ can take values within a set X of finite size. Then, we define the expected
estimation error as follows:
Ex(X | Z = z) =
∑
xˆ∈X
Pr [X = xˆ | Z = z] ||xˆ− x||, (7.3)
where || · || represents any distance metric, such as the L1-norm or the Euclidean distance.
In our evaluation, we rely on the former. In the context of our study, this definition
can be applied to those cases where we aim at quantifying the genomic privacy of an
individual. When considering the privacy of methylation points in a region r, however,
we have to specify the handling of the bins further. We define the mean value of a bin
B ∈ Br as µ(B) = sup(B)−inf(B)2 . Then, from the probability distribution given by the
Bayesian network model Pr
[
Bˆ | Z = z
]
and the true methylation value m being part of
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a bin B, the estimation error is calculated as follows:
EB(M r | Z = z) =
∑
Bˆ∈Br
Pr
[
M r ∈ Bˆ | Z = z
]
||µ(Bˆ)− µ(B)||. (7.4)
The second metric (i.e., entropy) quantifies the uncertainty of the adversary [26,
109] and is defined as:
Hx(X | Z = z) = −
∑
xˆ∈X
Pr [X = xˆ | Z = z] log Pr [X = xˆ | Z = z]. (7.5)
It holds that the higher the entropy is, the higher the adversary’s uncertainty is, and
the higher the privacy is.
For the binned methylation values, the definition of entropy easily translates to:
HB(M r | Z = z) =
−
∑
Bˆ∈Br
Pr
[
M r ∈ Bˆ | Z = z
]
log Pr
[
M r ∈ Bˆ | Z = z
]
. (7.6)
7.5 Dataset Description
The dataset we use is the same as previously relied upon in Chapter 6. However, we
apply a slightly different methodology here and hence end up with a different number of
pairs. To recall the properties of the dataset, it contains genotypes and DNA methylation
values of 75 individuals, 42 of which have parental relations (21 mother-child pairs). For
67 out of 75 individuals, samples collected at the birth of the child, referred to as t0,
were available. Samples one year later (t1) and four years later (t4) were also available
for 16 individuals.
Both, the longitudinal dimension of the dataset and the fact that it contains
individuals with parental relations make this dataset a unique and extremely precious
data source in the biomedical community. At the time of this writing, the dataset can
be considered to be one of the largest – if not the largest – dataset of its kind. Moreover,
collecting multiple types of biomedical data from related individuals in such regular
intervals involves a tremendous amount of money and time. Note that this dataset is
not yet publicly available, but it will be released to other researchers soon.
The DNA methylation was determined using a process called whole genome bisulfite
sequencing (WGBS), measuring the methylation levels for all 28 million CpG dinu-
cleotides based on samples taken from the whole blood. In order to determine the
methylation levels from the bisulfite-treated sequencing data, the reads (short sequences
of the genome) were aligned, followed by a quality assessment and methylation calling.
Then, the genotype was determined at known SNP positions as listed in the dbSNP
database [111, 24] (version 141). To accomplish the task of determining the genotype
from WGBS data, the Bis-SNP tool was used [82].
Next, we selected a set of 4,681,414 pairs of SNPs and methylation regions. This set
was determined using a Spearman rank correlation test [115] and a false discovery rate
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threshold for all SNPs located within 50 kb (kilobases) up-/downstream of methylation
regions. The false discovery rate threshold was set to 1% after Benjamini-Hochberg
correction [10].
For further analysis and the construction of the Bayesian networks, we assume the
selected pairs of SNP and methylation region to be pairwise independent of each other.
Therefore, we randomly sample a subset Q of 31,586 pairs such that the distance between
adjacent SNPs and adjacent methylation regions is at least 50 kb. It is well-known that
the linkage disequilibrium (i.e., dependencies between SNPs) decays with the distance
between the SNPs. While several thresholds have been proposed, the choice of 50 kb is
a sufficient threshold to assume independence, given the origin of the population we
use [104]. In order to further justify this threshold, we calculated the Spearman’s rank
correlation coefficient between the next 20 neighbouring methylation regions and SNPs
of the resulting pairs (to either side). In both cases, the correlation was below 0.2 for
more than 81% of our tests and below 0.4 for more than 97% of our tests.
We also inspected the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient between the methyla-
tion value and the genotype for each pair (i, r) ∈ Q. For about 67% of the pairs, the
correlation coefficient lies above 0.6, indicating a strong relationship between methyla-
tion and genotype for these pairs. Indeed, this percentage is also reflected in the number
of edges between methylation and genotype we will learn in the following section. It is
also worth noting that, conversely, our dataset is also diverse enough to contain also
about 33% of pairs for which the relationship between the two types of biological data
is relatively weak. This makes our dataset representative of the whole genome.
7.6 Evaluation
In this section, we first apply our structure learning algorithm to construct the Bayesian
networks. Then, we learn the parameters of the obtained networks, before quantifying
the privacy risks by performing inference under various scenarios.
7.6.1 Structure Learning
Given the set Q ⊆ S ×R of SNP-methylation pairs as determined in Section 7.5, for
each pair, we apply the algorithm presented in Section 7.4.3 for both settings we are
interested in. Independence is tested using the χ2-test at a significance level of α = 0.05.
Figure 7.3(a) shows the percentage of networks containing a specific edge for the
mother-child networks. Following the external knowledge, the predefined edge between
the mother’s and the child’s genotype appears in every network. Another interesting
observation is that, in most cases, the methylation of the mother does not seem to directly
affect the methylation of the child much. An indirect influence through the genomes
is much more common. Furthermore, the percentage of edges between the genomes
and methylation is roughly similar to the fraction of highly correlated SNP-methylation
pairs our dataset contains (cf. Section 7.5).
Figure 7.3(b) depicts the presence of edges for the Bayesian networks in the temporal
setting. The main observation here is that the percentage of edges between genome
and methylation is more or less consistent with the one in the mother-child networks.
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Figure 7.3: Distribution of edges after structure learning: (a) in the mother-child setting,
(b) for the temporal inference of methylation data.
Moreover, the DNA methylation of the same individual at different points in time shows
more direct dependencies than the methylation of related individuals in the mother-child
networks.
7.6.2 Parameter Learning
We obtain the parameters of the Bayesian networks by relying on: (1) external knowledge
(population statistics) and (2) maximum likelihood estimation on a training set.
We build the population statistics using Kaviar [47], a compilation of 162 million
positions in the human genome. Kaviar contains data from 77,781 individuals. Using
Kaviar, we estimate the prior probability of an individual carrying a specific variant
Pr
[
Gi
]
, and also calculate Pr
[
GiC | GiM
]
, given the laws of Mendelian inheritance.
For the remaining random variables, we rely on our training data to learn their
conditional probabilities. More specifically, given all samples in our dataset for which
the required data is available, we split the samples into a training set and a testing
set. We randomly allocate 70% of the samples to the training set, while the remaining
30% are allocated to the testing set used for inference in Section 7.6.3. For all of our
experiments, we repeat this process 5 times and average over the results, effectively
applying a repeated random sub-sampling validation. To discretize the methylation
values, we choose five uniformly distributed bins Br = {B1, . . . , B5}.
In both considered settings, we have specific requirements for the samples. For
example, the mother-child networks require both the mother and the corresponding
child to be present in the dataset, narrowing down the number samples that we can
train and test on. When learning conditional distributions using MLE, we cannot be
sure that we have enough samples to estimate the probability of every combination
for the random variables due to very low frequencies for some of these combinations.
Therefore, we apply Laplace smoothing [85], which mitigates the problem of assigning 0
probabilities to rare methylation values by artificially adjusting the probability. More
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Figure 7.4: Estimation error when inferring the methylation of (a) mother and (b) child;
the genome of (c) mother and (d) child.
precisely, Laplace smoothing gives us the following probability estimate:
P̂r [M ∈ Bj | Z = z] = |{ma | a ∈ A ∧ma ∈ Bj ∧ za = z}|+ γ|{ma | a ∈ A ∧ za = z}|+ γ|Br| . (7.7)
Based on cross-validation, we found γ = 0.01 to generally yield the best results.
7.6.3 Variable Prediction
Given the trained Bayesian networks, we conducted a thorough evaluation: inferring
unknown (hidden) variables while observing a subset of the remaining variables.
For each individual in the testing sets, we inferred the variables of interest given the
considered observations for each of the approximately 32,000 SNP-methylation pairs.
Then, we computed the proposed privacy metrics on the outcomes and averaged the
results over all runs for each pair separately. The resulting values are then plotted
as a cumulative distribution function (CDF), depicting the fraction of variables for
which the privacy metrics are less or equal than a particular value. As a baseline, all of
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these figures also show the estimation error and entropy when predicting the variables
based on the prior probabilities only. For the genome, this prior is computed from the
population statistics while, for the methylation, it is learned from the training data.
Mother-child Inference. In the mother-child networks, our primary focus is to infer
an individual’s methylation or genome given various observed evidence. Since plotting
all inferences in one graph would prove to be counterproductive, we focus hereafter on
the most interesting results. For completeness, Figure 7.7 and Figure 7.8 contain the
remaining experiments from our evaluation section. These figures are to be found at
the end of our evaluation section and closely reflect the conclusions drawn below.
We begin with an analysis of the estimation error. Figure 7.4(a) and Figure 7.4(b)
depict the CDFs of the privacy metrics for the methylation inference of the mother and
the child, respectively. Analogously, Figure 7.4(c) and Figure 7.4(d) depict the CDFs
for the privacy metrics induced by inferring the genomes.
In general, all predictions achieve a strong performance with small estimation
error. In almost all cases, the inferences observing at least some variables – and thus
leveraging the structure of the Bayesian networks – outperform the baseline model,
i.e., considering the prior probabilities. One of the best methylation predictions, i.e.,
Pr [MM | GM, GC ,MC ] or Pr [MM | GM] results in less than 0.1 estimation error for
almost 60% of the variables, while the same estimation error for the prior (Pr [MM])
is only achieved in 10% of the networks (Figure 7.4(a)). Hence, the percentage of
methylation regions that are highly at risk is multiplied by six when considering the
observed evidence in this case. This demonstrates the severe privacy risk when combining
multiple pieces of evidence across biological layers. Moreover, we notice that observing
relatives’ data is more helpful when inferring the genome than when inferring the
methylation data. Finally, we note that children and mother inference results are very
similar.
Analogously to the previous figure for the estimation error, Figure 7.5 shows the
entropy for the different inference tasks. Here, the advantage of leveraging the Bayesian
network with observed variables over the simple baseline prior becomes more apparent.
First, observing any other variable as evidence always makes the inference outperform
the baseline regarding the entropy. For example, when inferring GM given GC and
MM, almost 90% of the variables provide a prediction entropy of less than 0.4, while
only 7% of the variables result in a similar entropy when using the prior probability for
prediction.
By further analyzing the inference results, some more interesting observations
can be made. For instance, to infer a child’s methylation, the best predictor uses
the child’s genome as observed evidence. Interestingly, although one may naively
believe that observing more variables should improve the result of the inference, this
does not necessarily hold true. For instance, the estimation error for the prediction
tasks Pr [MC | GC ,MM] and Pr [MC | GM, GC ,MM] are equal due to the d-separation
properties. This makes sense as the child’s methylation is not influenced by the mother’s
genome directly, and all related variables are known.
Moreover, the estimation error of these prediction tasks is very similar to the
estimation error of the prediction task Pr [MC | GC ], an observation which does not hold
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Figure 7.5: Entropy when inferring the methylation of (a) mother and (b) child; the
genome of (c) mother and (d) child.
true for the entropy. In the same example as above, the entropies H(MC | GC ,MM)
and H(MC | GM, GC ,MM) are smaller than H(MC | GC).
Similarly, – when inferring the methylation of a mother – we observe that there is no
difference in the estimation error and entropy of inferring MM given GM,MC and the
case where GC is additionally given. In fact, the plotted lines of the first case are hidden
beneath the lines of the latter. From this, we conclude that giving the genome of the
child as additional knowledge when the methylation of the child and the genome of the
mother are already known, does not significantly improve the estimation error or the
entropy. This behaviour is again due to the structure of our Bayesian networks and its
properties. In this case, the additional observation can only affect our inference through
the edge between mother’s and child’s methylation nodes, because GM is observed.
However, as there are less than 6% of such edges in all pairs, it almost has no impact
on the inference performance.
Some SNPs are associated with certain diseases, which makes them more privacy-
sensitive than others. As an example, we further investigate our inference attack
performance at SNP rs17221417 which is known to be linked with Crohn’s disease. By
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Figure 7.6: (a) Estimation error and (b) entropy when inferring the methylation at Mt1 ;
(c) comparison of estimation error between inferring Mt1 and Mt4 .
applying our framework for inferring Pr [GM |MM], we obtain an estimation error of
0.025 at this SNP, while the estimation error of the prior Pr [GM] is of 0.679. Note also
that the average error over all the 32,000 SNPs is 0.215. These results demonstrate that
our framework can be particularly effective on inferring the disease-related information
from observed epigenomic data only.
Concerning the privacy implications, we observe that interdependencies between
genomic and epigenomic data, and also between family members have to be taken very
seriously, since they may pose a considerable privacy threat when multiple pieces of
evidence are collected and combined by an adversary.
Temporal Inference. When considering the temporal inference of DNA methylation,
we first concentrate on predicting the methylation one year after the first sample was
taken.
Figure 7.6(a) shows that the target’s genome is the best predictor on his future
methylation: for 90% of the SNP-methylation pairs, the resulting estimation error is
less than 0.2, compared to only 40% when considering the prior probability. A similar
observation applies to the entropy metric (Figure 7.6(b)).
However, the genome is not the only strong evidence for the methylation. The
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Figure 7.7: Additional graphs for estimation error when inferring the methylation of
(a) mother and (b) child; the genome of (c) mother and (d) child.
target’s methylation in the past can also serve as a strong indicator for the future DNA
methylation profile, exhibiting an estimation error of less than 0.2 for approximately
82% of the SNP-methylation pairs. From a privacy point of view, this again clearly
demonstrates the strong interdependencies of biomedical data, not only across different
layers of the biological stack but also along the temporal dimension.
In order to examine whether the time span between the sample we want to predict
and the sample we observe affects the prediction, we also construct Bayesian networks
using each individual’s methylation at time point 0 to predict her methylation at time
point 4 (four years after the first sample was taken). Figure 7.6(c) shows the estimation
error of both predicting the DNA methylation at t1 and at t4. The result strongly
suggests that the prediction remains stable, even for longer time spans.
Considering all of the results in this section, we have clearly demonstrated severe
privacy risks inherent to epigenetic and genetic data. Especially when observing multiple
pieces of evidence, it becomes clear that an adversary – exploiting the interdependencies
of these types of data – will successfully breach the privacy of many individuals.
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Figure 7.8: Additional graphs for entropy when inferring the methylation of (a) mother
and (b) child; the genome of (c) mother and (d) child.
7.7 Case Study: Mother-Child Linking
So far, we have demonstrated that our Bayesian framework is capable of inferring the
methylation and the genome of an individual, given some evidence. The role of the
Bayesian network, however, is not limited to inference attacks only. The Bayesian
network can also serve as a building block for more complex attacks. In order to
demonstrate one possible application, we study the possibility of linking methylation
profiles of a mother or a child to the methylation profiles of the corresponding child or
mother, respectively. This application is especially sensitive as it can reveal paternity
information (maternity in our data case) between two samples using only methylation
profiles. However, we stress that this is only one possible application and that other use
cases can be built upon our framework as well, which we leave for future work.
We assume that the adversary observes a single DNA methylation profile of his (ob-
served) victim vo and a database D of other methylation profiles. Then, the adversary’s
goal is to identify the observed victim’s mother or child, denoted as the targeted victim
vt, among the other methylation profiles. By leveraging our Bayesian network, we can
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use the learned dependencies between genome and methylation to perform this linking,
even though no genomic data is observed.
For the sake of simplicity, let us first describe the attack when the adversary aims
at finding the child of vo. As we have demonstrated in Section 7.6.3, the adversary
is already able to predict the methylation profile of the observed victim’s child with
a small error. Conversely, for most SNP-methylation pairs (·, r) ∈ Q, the real child’s
methylation value mvt should ideally fall into the bin providing the largest probability
among all methylation bins, i.e., Pr
[
M rC = mrvt |M rM = mrvo
]
is maximal. This, however,
does not have to be true for all pairs, and it might be beneficial for an adversary to
only use a subset Q′ ⊆ Q of all available pairs.
For each a ∈ D and each methylation region r, we estimate the probability of the
child having the methylation value mra as wr,a = Pr
[
M rC = mra |M rM = mrvo
]
. Given a
specific a, this still leaves the adversary with a set of probabilities over all considered
pairs (·, r) in Q′. Since the adversary is interested in finding a choice a that maximizes
wr,a for most regions r, we consider the average or equivalently the sum over all these
probability scores instead:
vˆt = arg max
a∈D
∑
(·,r)∈Q′
wr,a (7.8)
= arg max
a∈D
∑
(·,r)∈Q′
Pr
[
M rC = mra |M rM = mrvo
]
(7.9)
The case of finding the mother of a child works analogously.
As already stated before, the choice of Q′ may have a significant impact on the
performance of the adversary in this kind of attack. Therefore, we will also evaluate
a heuristic to choose a subset of these pairs Q′ from our original set Q. We aim at
choosing those pairs that maximize the adversary’s success.
To this end, our heuristic should choose the pairs that provide the highest correlation
among the methylation of mothers and their children. Since the analysis in Section 7.6.1
showed that a direct link between the methylation profiles of a mother and her child
is rare, we instead focus on the information flowing through the Bayesian network
via the genome-methylation link. Hence, we rely on the Spearman’s rank correlation
coefficient between G and M and only choose the top K SNP-methylation pairs with
regard to their correlation coefficient, where K is subject to our analysis. We compare
this heuristic with an approach that randomly chooses a subset of size K from Q.
Interestingly, this application also has parallels to the previous chapter. It can be
seen as a generalized version of a matching attack, as it is based on a generic model. In
contrast to our previous work, however, we do not take into account the possibility that
the corresponding mother or child is not present.
Experimental Setup. To evaluate this linking attack on our dataset, we split the
mother-child pairs into a training set (70%) and a testing set (30%). After learning
the parameters of the Bayesian network on the training data, we pick a mother vo (or
child) and choose D to contain all remaining samples from the test set, plus all samples
from time point 0 that do not have the corresponding child (or mother) available. This
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Figure 7.9: Success rate for discovering mother/child of each observed victim.
results in a database of |D| = 40 samples, which further complicates the linking task.
We perform the attack for all 21 mothers (and children) in our dataset.
We compute the success rate over all observed victims for the evaluation. The
success rate is computed as the number of correct matches between mother and child,
divided by 21 (the total number of observed victims). We emphasize that the metric we
use is very strict compared to those used in other domains, such as recommendation
systems since the metrics used there usually allow the correct individual to be present
within the top k matches.
Experimental Results. Figure 7.9 shows our experimental results for varying numbers
K of SNP-methylation pairs we consider, ranging from 100 up to 31,586.
Generally, we are able to achieve an excellent prediction: At the best K, we
successfully match 20 out of 21 samples to the corresponding mother/child, given a
database of 40 different choices. This makes a best success rate of 95.23%. When
comparing the randomly chosen subsets from Q with our advanced heuristic, it becomes
apparent that the randomly chosen subsets are significantly outperformed by our
heuristic. Using the top 500 SNP-methylation pairs with the highest correlations enables
us to reach the maximum success rate, while the success rate for a randomly chosen
subset of size 500 is merely around 50%.
Another interesting observation is that using the whole set of pairs Q′ = Q may
result in a worse performance, compared to the best possible subset. This at least is
the case when identifying the child, given the mother’s methylation.
Given these results, we have demonstrated the usefulness of both our Bayesian
network and our heuristic for this kind of application. Indeed, the Bayesian network can
serve as a fundamental building block to cope with more complex application scenarios.
Moreover, this again demonstrates the severe privacy threat stemming from epigenetic
data such as DNA methylation profiles.
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7.8 Proof of Correctness
In this section, we prove the correctness of Algorithm 7.1. We begin recalling the defini-
tion of a Markov blanket in a Bayesian network, as stated by Koller and Friedman [74].
Proposition 1 (Markov Blanket). Given a node X in a Bayesian network G, by
MBG(X) we denote the smallest set of nodes U that are needed to render X independent
of all other nodes in the network. MBG(X) consists of X’s parents, X’s descendants,
and other parents of X’s descendants.
Removing of Edges. Using this definition, we provide and prove the following useful
proposition. It can also be leveraged to improve the algorithm performance as discussed
in Section 7.4.3. The proposition states that removing an edge from a graph only
introduces new independencies.
Proposition 2. Given G = (V,E), removing any edge e ∈ E from G – yielding
G′ = (V,E \ {e}) – implies that I(G) ( I(G′).
Proof of Proposition 2. Without loss of generality, let e = X → Y . First, removing an
edge can only destroy trails in the graph and not introduce new trails. Thus, it also does
not introduce new active trails, and we can conclude that I(G) ⊆ I(G′). In the rest of
the proof, we thus focus on I(G) 6= I(G′), and distinguish two cases: (1) X → Y is the
only active trail between X and Y given ∅, and (2) there exist active trails between X
and Y given ∅ other than X → Y .
In the first case, the active trail X → Y shows us that (X ⊥ Y ) /∈ I(G) by the
definition of d-separation. Removing this edge from G, however, will cause (X ⊥ Y ) ∈
I(G′) to become true because the only active trail between X and Y has been removed
by removing e. Hence, I(G) 6= I(G′).
In the second case, we need to find a Z, such that X → Y is the only active trail given
Z in G. Then, we could deduce that (X ⊥ Y | Z) ∈ I(G′), but (X ⊥ Y | Z) /∈ I(G),
which again proves our claim.
If Y is not the parent of a child of X, the Markov Blanket MBG′(X) satisfies
our constraint, since it implies (X ⊥ Y | MBG′(X)) ∈ I(G′), and Y /∈ MBG′(X) by
definition of the Markov Blanket. Thus, this independency holds in G′, but not in G
where there exists a direct edge between X and Y .
If X and Y , however, have common descendants, this yields v-structures of the form
X → X ′ ← Y . Fortunately, there cannot be any active trail between X and Y passing
through X ′ given any set of nodes other than X ′ or its descendants, as this would result
in a cycle in the graph contradicting the DAG properties. Hence, it is safe to remove
Y and the descendants X and Y have in common from MBG′(X). Consequently, for
Z = MBG′(X) \ ({Y } ∪ CommonDescendantsG′(X,Y )), it holds that (X ⊥ Y | Z) is in
I(G′), but not in I(G).
This concludes both cases and proves the original statement.
Main Proof. Leveraging the proposition from above, we are now able to prove the
correctness of our structure learning algorithm as depicted in Algorithm 7.1.
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Proof of Theorem 7. We prove this theorem in three steps. First, we prove that the
algorithm only returns None if there is no I-map for I over V given κ. Second, we prove
that if the algorithm returns a DAG G∗, I(G∗) ⊆ I and G  κ. Then, we prove that
the removal of any edge would result in either not fulfilling the external knowledge κ or
rendering the graph not an I-map, i.e., for any e ∈ E either G′ = (V,E \ {e}) 6 κ or it
holds that I(G′) 6⊆ I.
Let us assume that the algorithm returns None, although there is an I-map for I
given κ. That is, there is a G, such that G  κ and I(G) ⊆ I. However, if there is such
a G, then G ∈ G, and hence we will execute the loop in line 3 also with this G. Clearly,
G passes the condition in line 5 and – since we assume the algorithm to return None –
would also pass the condition in line 6. As this would set G∗ = G in line 7, and there is
no chance to set G∗ back to None, this clearly contradicts our assumption of returning
None. Thus, our assumption must have been wrong, and the original claim is proven by
contradiction.
Next, we assume that the algorithm does return a DAG G∗ and prove that G∗ is a
valid I-map consistent with κ. Line 1 of the algorithm ensures the consistency: Every
graph considered by the algorithm must be consistent with the external knowledge.
Line 5 of the algorithm ensures that only such graphs are further considered, for which
I(G∗) ⊆ I. Thus, G∗ is an I-map for I, which is consistent with κ.
In the final step, we have to prove that the removal of any edge from G∗ = (V,E)
either results in not being consistent with the external knowledge κ or rendering G not
an I-map for I. We prove this by contradiction and assume that there is an edge e ∈ E
for which none of the two cases above holds true.
Since we assume G′ = (V,E \ {e})  κ, we know that G′ ∈ G in line 1. By
Proposition 2, we know that for G′, it holds that |I(G′)| > |I(G∗)|. Moreover, we know
by assumption that I(G′) ⊆ I, because G′ is an I-map for I. But then, G′ would be
considered in the loop in line 3, pass the condition in line 5 and also the condition in
line 6. This would mean that G∗ is set to G′ at some point and there is no way for the
original G∗ to pass the test in line 6 anymore. Since this makes it impossible to return
the original G∗, it contradicts our assumption and proves the actual claim.
Combining these three proof steps proves the correctness of the algorithm and thus
Theorem 7.
7.9 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have proposed a generic framework for quantifying privacy risks
of any interdependent biomedical data. This model aims to help better assess and
anticipate privacy risks arising from the sharing of an ever-increasing variety and amount
of biomedical data. Our framework relies on a Bayesian network that allows us to
capture and quantify privacy implications, due to correlations between different types
of biomedical data, along the temporal dimension, and between related individuals. We
propose a general algorithm to learn the structure of the underlying Bayesian networks
by combining data with external knowledge. Then, based on our Bayesian networks,
we run an extensive set of experiments, considering the familial relationships and the
temporal dimension separately. In both scenarios, we demonstrate that our Bayesian
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network model is able to achieve a strong prediction performance.
For instance, predicting the DNA methylation of a mother given her genome results
in an estimation error less than 0.1 for 60% of the methylation regions. For the prior
probabilities, this estimation error or smaller is only achieved for 10% of the methylation
regions, demonstrating that the percentage of methylation regions that are highly at risk
is multiplied by 6 when observing the genome. Moreover, when predicting the genome
given the methylation profiles of the mother and the child, we achieve an estimation
error of less than 0.4 for around 80% of the genomic positions, compared to smaller than
10% of the genomic positions when using the prior probabilities only. Lastly, analyzing
the temporal interdependencies, we found that the prediction of methylation based on a
past methylation profile is as successful with a one-year shift as with a four-year shift.
Besides predicting hidden parts of various biomedical profiles, our Bayesian network
model can also serve as a fundamental building block for other attacks. To this end,
we are the first to propose an attack matching DNA methylation profiles across family
members. Building upon our Bayesian network’s posterior probabilities, and proposing
a heuristic that limits the number of DNA methylation positions to consider, our linking
attack is able to achieve a 95% success rate. This further shows the generality and
effectiveness of our framework.
In total, our evaluation strikingly proves all three kinds of interdependencies – cross-
layer, familial, and temporal – to have a severe impact on the privacy of individuals.
An adversary combining information about his victims is able not only to breach the
privacy of the victims but also significantly increases his certainty about the outcome.
Therefore, we suggest that careful considerations have to be made when releasing any
biomedical data and that we are in a strong need for privacy-preserving technologies for
securing biomedical data.
We leave it to future research to extend our framework to incorporate more layers,
i.e., other data types, and interdependencies between layers. Another complementary
extension of our framework is the analysis and handling of intra-genome, and intra-
methylation dependencies.
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In this dissertation, we presented a line of work aiming at quantifying and protecting
the privacy of individuals’ biomedical data. We specifically focused on epigenetic data,
a widely used type of biomedical data. Although our epigenome is closely linked with
our health status, its privacy implications have received little to no attention so far, and
epigenetic data have often been released (without identifiers) on open online platforms
with nonrestricted access.
In this thesis, we thoroughly studied the privacy of individuals in the presence of
multiple realistic attack scenarios, in which an adversary obtains parts of the individuals’
biomedical data. Namely, we consider (1) temporal linkability, an attack scenario in
which the adversary wishes to link epigenetic profiles of the same type of biomedical data
taken at different points in time, (2) linkability between different types of biomedical
data, (3) membership privacy, an attack scenario in which the adversary wishes to learn
whether an individual participated in a study, and (4) inference, an attack scenario
in which the adversary wishes to infer previously unknown data about an individual,
given some observations. Besides quantifying privacy in the presence of such adversaries,
we also presented and evaluated solutions to preserve the privacy of individuals. Our
mitigation techniques stretch from the differentially private release of epigenetic data –
and the quantification of utility in such cases – up to cryptographic constructions to
securely and privately evaluate a random forest on a patient’s data. We instantiated our
use cases with two of the most important types of epigenetic data: miRNA expression
profiles, and DNA methylation in combination with genomic data.
The content of this dissertation stretches across multiple peer-reviewed publica-
tions [P1, P2, P3, P4], covering both, privacy quantifications and mitigation techniques.
Our study on temporal linkability of miRNA expression profiles (Chapter 4) strikingly
demonstrated that personal miRNA expression profiles can be successfully linked over
time. We also proposed and evaluated two defense mechanisms when releasing datasets
of epigenetic data: hiding a subset of the expression data, and adding noise to the
released expression profiles in a fully distributed manner. We observed that, in most
cases, the noise mechanism provides a better privacy-utility trade-off than the hiding
method.
In our work on membership privacy of miRNA-expression-based studies (Chapter 5),
we showed that it is possible for an adversary to detect membership in a miRNA-based
study by relying on only the published mean statistics and the victim’s profile. Moreover,
we further studied two defense mechanisms for releasing the mean statistics of a dataset,
following the example of our previous work: hiding a subset of the expression data, and
adding noise to the released mean values in a differentially private manner. We observed
that the noising mechanism is able to protect the privacy. However, the amount of noise
might render the released statistics useless, in particular for small datasets. Hence, we
recommend having a large number of participants, at least a few hundreds.
We then examined how correlations between the genome and DNA methylation
can be exploited in order to infer an individual’s genotype (Chapter 6). Achieving an
accuracy of more than 97.5% with only a few hundred methylation regions and genotype
positions, we demonstrated the disastrous impact of such an attack on privacy. We
also presented a statistical test upon our matching outcome that is able to identify
and reject the very few wrongly matched pairs and thus further degrades privacy. In
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contrast to our first work, this constitutes a linkability attack between different types
of biomedical data and shows the crucial effect of correlations between such types of
data. On the mitigation side, we proposed a novel cryptographic scheme for privately
classifying tumors based on methylation data. The protocol relies on random forests and
homomorphic encryption, and it is proven secure in the honest-but-curious adversarial
model.
Finally, leveraging the knowledge from our previous studies, we proposed a generic
framework for quantifying privacy risks (Chapter 7), capturing and generalizing most
of the attack scenarios previously presented. Our framework relies on a Bayesian
network that allows us to quantify privacy implications due to various correlations
between different types of biomedical data, along the temporal dimension, and between
related individuals. We also proposed a general algorithm to learn the structure of
the underlying Bayesian networks by combining data with external knowledge. Our
extensive set of experiments demonstrated that our Bayesian network model is able to
achieve a strong prediction performance. The results reinforce that the privacy risks
inherent to interdependent biomedical data – and epigenetic data specifically – have to
be taken seriously.
Future Research Directions. As this thesis shows, it is essential to provide the means
for a quantitative assessment of the privacy risks induced by sharing or leaking medical
data. Potential privacy risks include linkage, identification and inference attacks against
the patients’ data, carried out by a multitude of possible adversaries. Furthermore, after
identifying and quantifying these risks, mitigation measures have to be designed. On the
one hand, it is crucial to adjust those measures with the close collaboration of biomedical
experts to fit their application scenarios and needs. On the other hand, the mitigation
measures have to provide a sufficient amount of privacy, giving the patient herself the
control over her data. Hence, a major challenge while designing those measures is to
strike a balance between privacy risks, the utility of the resulting data, and ease of use.
Not respecting any combination of these will result in the mitigation measure not being
adopted for real use, or in the worst case even causing harm to a patient by providing
inaccurate statements in return for a higher privacy.
The author of this dissertation envisions to come up with solutions to quantify and
mitigate the privacy risks for various kinds of patients’ data, encompassing the whole
pipeline from measuring data and storing data, up to analyzing data and providing a
diagnosis. To achieve this goal, a first step is to find solutions to concrete application
scenarios, raise the awareness for health privacy, and then to generalize the specific
solutions where appropriate to build up a generic framework for securing the privacy of
biomedical data. In the same vein as this thesis, progress has to be made in four areas,
three of which we explored in our work: (1) assessing the privacy risks for biomedical
data, (2) providing mitigation measures by perturbing the data, (3) providing mitigation
measures by relying on cryptographic constructions, and (4) leveraging secure hardware
for trusted computing. While the second research direction is more relevant for the
release of public medical datasets and statistics, the third research direction allows for
the secure storage of medical data and the further analysis thereof without losing utility.
When it comes to assessing the privacy risks, more potential sources of data have
136
to be considered and also previously disregarded dimensions have to be incorporated.
Building on our generic framework from Chapter 7, we could include various other types
of biomarkers and characteristics. Moreover, other potential background knowledge
should be an integral component of new models as well.
Mitigations of privacy risks involving perturbing the biomedical data have to be
adapted to specific scenarios. This might include considering a more realistic adversary
and weakening assumptions in exchange for achieving a sufficient level of privacy and
still a high utility for the original purpose of the data. Side knowledge like the sex
and parts of the genome need to be considered as well. Overall, these adaptations or
relaxations require close collaboration with biomedical researchers and have to be tuned
to fit the scenario at hand.
The third direction aims at securing biomedical data by cryptographic means. This
first requires a deeper understanding of how the data is processed and what the data is
used for, an understanding that has to be acquired in close collaboration with biomedical
experts for a particular application. Then, concepts like homomorphic encryption or
multiparty computation have to be adapted and combined into cryptographic protocols
fulfilling the requirements. Due to the long-lasting impact (also on relatives) of certain
medical data, a particular emphasis has to be put on the resistance of the underlying
cryptographic building blocks against future attackers. Moreover, potential adaptations
of cryptographic mechanisms have to be made to allow for efficient processing of the
data.
Finally, as a fourth, newly emerging field, the application of secure hardware for
trusted computing on biomedical data is also a promising research direction that will
become more important in the future.
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Datasets
Chapter Type Origin Healthy Diseased Time
points
Pub. GEO
accession
number
4 miRNA
expression
blood &
plasma
29 0 2 [57] -
4 miRNA
expression
plasma 0 26 (lung
cancer)
8 [78] GSE68951
4 & 5 miRNA
expression
blood 94 955
(various)
1 [73] GSE61741
6 DNA
methylation
brain
tissue
0 472 (brain
tumor)
1 [1] GSE50022,
GSE55712,
GSE36278,
GSE52556,
GSE54880,
GSE45353,
GSE44684
6 & 7 DNA
methylation
& genome
blood 75 (including 21
mother/child pairs)
9 - -
Overview over all datasets used in this thesis.
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